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Force EF -lllA Raven highlights the implications of mission competition and 
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analysis in the areas oflogistics, funding and readiness. This study begins with 
a review of interservice rivalry, jointness and mission consolidation providing 
both historical and current examples. The case study of the Joint-Service 
Expeditionary Squadrons covers initial planning and organization through 
recent developments and progress toward Navy assumption of the electronic 
warfare mission for the Department of Defense. Finally, an analysis of 
logistics, funding and readiness based on the case study is presented. The 
thesis concludes with a summary of findings, proposed areas for continued 
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During the 1990s, increased international commitments, primarily for 
United Nations and other peacekeeping operations, decreased budgetary 
authority, and greater congressional oversight to encourage jointness of U.S. 
military operations has forced the Department of Defense to consider mission 
consolidation and increased joint-service operations. Budget austerity and 
defense drawdowns have occurred numerous times during the 20th century, 
and each has increased interservice rivalry and mission competition. This is 
particularly true for the post-Cold War defense establishment. 
In a landmark Senate floor speech, Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) called for 
the end to alleged unnecessary and wasteful duplication within the Department 
of Defense. Senator Nunn suggested that missions performed by two or more 
services be consolidated into single missions. In May, 1995 the Commission on 
Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces delivered findings that also suggested 
consolidation of several missions under a single platform or service. The 
Secretary of Defense concurred with many of these recommendations and a 
new era of mission consolidation within the DOD began. 
One such consolidation has occurred in area of airborne electronic 
warfare. The Air Force has begun phasing out the fleet of EF-111A Raven 
jammer aircraft, while the Navy has begun "standing up" five new squadrons 
of EA-6B Prowler electronic attack aircraft to assume the Air Force 
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Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) mission. The new Joint-Service 
Expeditionary Squadrons will be manned by both Navy and Air Force aircrew, 
but will fall under the command authority of the Navy. When deployed in 
support of land-based operations, the joint squadrons will be under the 
operational control of the regional Commander in Chief (CINC), but will be 
administratively controlled by the Navy. 
The trend towards joint-service operations and mission consolidation has 
raised questions regarding budgeting, logistics, and most importantly readiness 
within the Department of Defense and military departments and services. An 
analysis of the mission conversion dynamics for the new joint-service 
squadrons will provide insight into some of the effects of mission consolidation. 
B. OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE 
This thesis is divided into three parts. First, an overview and history of 
interservice rivalry and the roles and missions debate will be provided to 
identifY historical trends. Additionally, a general analysis ofjointness and the 
move toward combined military operations and mission consolidation will be 
discussed to provide background on post-Cold War trends. Second, a case study 
of the new EA-6B Joint-Service Expeditionary Squadrons will provide a more 
specific assessment of lessons learned and future expectations for mission 
consolidation within the Department of Defense. Finally, an analysis of the 
effects of mission consolidation on logistics considerations, funding and military 
readiness will be presented. 
2 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The following research questions are addressed in this thesis: 
Primazy: What impact does interservice rivalry and the trend 
toward jointness and mission consolidation have on 
logistics, budgets, and readiness? 
Secondary: What effects have the Key West Agreement (1948), 
Defense Reorganization Acts of 1953 and 1958, the 
Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, 
and the Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of 
the Armed Forces (1995) had on logistics, budgets,and 
readiness? 
What are the advantages and disadvantages of Navy joint-
service EA-6B squadrons supporting Air Force operations 
from land-based installations? 
What are the possible long-term implications with respect 
to mission consolidation of increased levels of mission 
competition and decreased budgetary authority available 
for defense operations? 
Is mission consolidation beneficial or detrimental to defense 
readiness? Is a case by case analysis required for each 
situation to properly answer this question? 
D. METHODOLOGY 
The data and information used in this thesis were obtained from a 
variety of sources. Historical and background information was found through 
extensive use of the Naval Postgraduate School Dudley Knox Library holdings 
and electronic resources department. Data necessary for the case study were 
obtained through coordination with and site visits to the Joint Operations Staff 
at Commander, Electronic Combat Wing Pacific Fleet (COMVAQWINGPAC) 
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headquarters, Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, Washington and the 
Comptroller and EA-6B Readiness Staffs at Commander, Naval Air Forces 
U.S. Pacific Fleet (COMNAVAIRPAC) headquarters, Naval Air Station North 
Island, California. Personal interviews were also conducted at both locations to 
supplement and understand data and information collected at these sites. 
E. ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter I provides introductory 
information and the purpose for this study. In addition, the chapter provides 
the research questions, objectives and scope of the study and the methodology 
employed in performing the research for the thesis. 
Chapter II provides an in-depth analysis and history of interservice 
rivalry and the current roles and missions debate. Key statutory elements and 
Defense Department policies and reports familiarize the reader with the 
factors creating the current ')ointness" and mission consolidation environment 
in the Department of Defense. 
Chapter III is an extensive assessment of jointness and combined 
military operations prior to enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense 
Reorganization Act of 1986. Secondly, the current trend towards mission 
consolidation as a means of alleviating the pressures of budget austerity is 
examined. 
Chapter IV presents the case study for the thesis. An analysis of the 
processes, plans and options for establishment of the EA-6B Joint-Service 
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Expeditionary Squadrons is provided. The timeframe for the case study is early 
fiscal year 1995 to the present. 
Chapter V addresses issues oflogistics, funding and readiness and how 
they have been affected by consolidation of the airborne tactical electronic 
warfare mission. Site survey data, budget reports and government 
publications provide the background for the analysis. 
Chapter VI presents summary remarks and conclusions that address 
the research questions. Each chapter also ends with summary and concluding 
remarks. Additionally, a listing of areas for further research is provided. 
5 
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II. INTERSERVICE RIVALRY AND THE ROLES & MISSIONS DEBATE 
So that in the nature of man, we find three principal causes of 
quarrel. First, competition; second, diffidence; thirdly, glory. 
-Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan, 1651) 
Tension within an organization is good-as long as its emotional 
content is low. When you are in an organization without tension, it 
is like watching a drunk-the muscles are flaccid, the coordination 
poor, and the "bundle of relations" is in danger of falling on its face. 
- Harlan Cleveland 
The recent serious debate within the Department of Defense and 
Congress over the roles and missions of the various armed services in the post-
Cold War era can be traced back to the beginnings of the Cold War in the late 
1940s. Not surprisingly, the issues and disagreements closely mirror the 
disputes of nearly fifty years ago, and akin to the unprecedented negotiations 
over assignment of military roles in the 1960s for the new arena of warfare 
created by the development of the atomic bomb. The United States armed 
forces are experiencing the largest draw down since the end of World War II. 
Budget cuts facing the services are on a scale similar to those experienced in 
the late 1940s and early 1950s. Today's military is faced with new and 
dramatically evolving warfare environments such as electronic warfare, space, 
cyberspace-information warfare, and peacekeeping operations/enforcement.l 
Even the debate over how to redefine current roles and missions is the same as 
1 Kuehl, Daniel T. and Miller, Charles E., "Roles, Missions, and Functions; 
Terms of Debate," Joint Force Quarterly, No.5, Summer, 1994, p. 105. 
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half a centucy ago, focusing on eliminating redundancy and duplication between 
services in terms of missions, equipment and infrastructure. In his now famous 
address to the Senate in July 1992, Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA), then 
Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, called for a reevaluation 
of service roles and missions to eliminate redundancy and duplication among 
the armed forces.2 This is precisely what the National Security Act (1947) and 
Key West Agreement (1948) intended to do. 
This chapter will focus on the debate over roles and missions and the 
interservice rivalries associated with this debate. The chapter is divided into 
five sections, beginning with a history of the interservice disputes over roles 
and missions from the 1920s to the 1980s. Section B addresses the 1986 
Goldwater-Nichols Act and its tremendous influence on the armed forces of the 
1990s. Section C covers the first two roles and missions studies performed by 
Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr. and 
General Colin L. Powell. Section D examines the report of the congressionally 
mandated Commission on Roles and Missions issued in May, 1995. The final 
section will present summary and concluding remarks. 
A BACKGROUND AND HISTORY 
Interservice rivalry is as old as the nation itself. However, prior to the 
introduction of aircraft as warfighting assets, disputes between the services 
2 Nunn, Sam, "The Defense Department Must Thoroughly Overhaul the 
Services' Roles and Missions," Congressional Record, 138:S9559-S9565, July 2, 1992, 
p. S9560. 
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were relatively minor and usually occurred and were resolved in the field.3 The 
reason for the comparatively superficial impact of these disputes rests in the 
two-dimensional nature of warfare at the time. The Army was responsible for 
conducting operations on land, while the Navy and Marine Corps were 
responsible for the sea and amphibious operations. With the introduction of the 
airplane into military operations, the lines dividing roles and missions became 
increasingly blurred. Disagreements over the use of aircraft between the Navy 
and Army became so heated that several agreements were drafted between 
the War and Navy departments that allowed both services to develop aviation 
assets to meet their respective warfighting needs. 4 The last of these 
agreements, the Joint Action of the Army and Navy (JAAN), lasted through the 
end ofWorld War II, but several significant events including the establishment 
of the Army Air Forces in 1942, the introduction of atomic warfare, the new 
world order known as the Cold War, and the enormous defense drawdown after 
the war, called for major changes to the organization of the U.S. military. 
1. National Security Act (1947) 
The National Security Act of 194 7 was a partial solution to the problem. 
The 1945 bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the Army Air Force ended 
World War II as well as established credibility to the concept of strategic 
3 Winnacker, R. A., "The Historical Framework," in Report to the President and 
the Secretary of Defense by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, Appendix A: Mechanisms for 
Change-Organizational History, July, 1970, p. 4. 
4 Rearden, Steven L., The Formative Years 1947-1950, History of the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense (Vol. I), Washington D.C., Historical Office, Office ofthe 
Secretary of Defense, 1984, p.386-387. 
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bombing and for the Army Air Force argument that they should be a separate 
service. The global nature of the war had also convinced many of the civilian 
leaders of the military and members of Congress that America's armed forces 
should be unified under one department. The Army favored the idea, suggesting 
a "general staff' to coordinate the services. This is a reflection of the Army's 
historical dependence on the other services for transportation and air support. 
The Navy opposed the concept and favored decentralization much like the 
status quo. The Army Air Force loosely supported its parent service in return 
for support of its independence as a separate force.5 During unification 
hearings after World War II, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, then Army Chief 
of Staff, argued that the war had identified the " ... crucial importance of unified 
commands and unified theater actions, the mutual dependence of the services. 
The idea of separate ground, sea, and air operations ... ~as gone forever."'6 
The signing of the National Security Act on September 18, 1947 was a 
compromise of the highest order. The Act officially separated the Air Force 
from the Army and established it as the third department of a new centralized 
Department of Defense. The department was organized under a civilian 
secretary supported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff who were finally given legal 
status by the Act. Congress was careful not to give too much power to the 
Executive by combining the services into a single department, resulting in the 
5 McNaugher, Thomas L. and Sperry, Roger L., Improving Military 
Coordination: The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization of the Department of Defense, 
Washington D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1994, p.220-221. 
6 Wolk, HermanS., "Revolt of the Admirals," Air Force Magazine, 71:5, May, 
1988, p. 63. 
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"weak confederation of military units" that constituted the Department of 
Defense.7 Navy Secretary James Forrestal was named the first Secretary of 
Defense. In conjunction with the signing of the National Security Act, 
President Truman also issued Executive Order 9877 that outlined service roles 
and missions for budgetary and administrative purposes.s The two documents 
were at times at odds with each other causing confusion and disagreement over 
who had responsibility for what with respect to mission and, as importantly, 
budget authority. For example, a major rift between the Air Force and Navy 
occurred over the Navy's supercarrier concept. Coupled with statements by 
retiring Chief of Naval Operations, Fleet Admiral Nimitz, referring to the 
Navy's carrier air force as the primary bombing service, and cuts to the Air 
Force budget by the Bureau of the Budget to meet shipbuilding requirements, 
the Air Force began to suspect that the Navy was attempting to build a 
competing strategic air force in direct violation of Executive Order 9877.9 
Initially, Secretary Forrestal tried to allow the individual services work out 
their disagreements on their own, but when it became clear that the lines of 
contention were too much for the service chiefs to overcome, he summoned 
them to a conference at Naval Air Station Key West to iron out the roles and 
missions debate. 
7 Hobkirk, Michael D., The Politics of Defence Budgeting, Washington D.C., 
National Defense University Press, 1983, p. 26. 
s Rearden, p. 392. 
9 Ibid., p. 393. 
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2. Key West Agreement (1948) 
From March 11-14, 1948, the military heads of each of the services, 
along with Secretary Forrestal, hammered out an agreement that attempted 
to address the continued problems surrounding the roles, missions and 
functions of each branch.10 The document, entitled Functions of the Armed 
Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, proved to be another compromise between 
the various services: 
The Navy gained many of its goals: retention of the Navy-based 
Marine Corps; the authority to provide close air support for 
Marine land operations; and the authority to carry out those air 
operations, including ground-launched missions, which are 
required for sea battles ... And the Army and Air Force agreed to 
cooperate with each other as a team on joint missions ... the Air 
Force pledged to provide the Army with airlift and close air 
support.n 
Many feel that the real issue of contention between the Air Force and the 
Navy during this period was completely centered on responsibility for the 
strategic atomic mission which was the key to budget dollars in the early days 
of the Cold War.l2 
One of the more significant outcomes of the Key West Agreement was 
the definition of secondary or "collateral" roles and missions that required each 
10 For purposes of consistency, the following generally accepted definitions are 
provided: Roles are broad, enduring purposes specified by Congress in law for the 
Services and selected DoD components, Missions are the tasks assigned by the 
President or Secretary of Defense to the combatant commanders, and Functions are 
specific responsibilities assigned by the President and Secretary of Defense to enable 
the Services to fulfill their legally established roles. 
n Halperin, Mortin H. and Halperin, David, 'The Key West Key," Foreign 
Policy, No.53, Winter, 1983-84, p. 117. 
12 Wolk, p. 64. 
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service to assist other services in the accomplishment of their primary 
missions. Unfortunately, this actually caused an increase in interservice 
disputes. Halperin and Halperin (1983) point out that even though the 
agreement outlined the basic structure of roles and missions, each service 
fiercely protected their primary duties to the detriment of the secondary duties 
that required the use of budget dollars to support a rival service. Specifically, 
the Air Force neglected close air support while the Navy slighted sea lift in 
order to concentrate on sea control and nuclear warfare.13 Regardless of its 
shortcomings, Forrestal presented the Key West Agreement to President 
Truman on April 27, 1948. The President consequently canceled Executive 
Order 9877 in favor of the accord. In doing so, Key West set the stage for 
continued interservice rivalry for decades to come. 
3. The Revolt of the Admirals (1949) 
One of the most famous interservice disputes occurred the following 
year during the so-called "Revolt of the Admirals," when newly appointed 
Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson canceled the Navy's planned flush-deck 
supercarrier, the USS UNITED STATES, believing that naval airpower was a 
collateral role and that the funds would be better utilized on building up the Air 
Force's strategic bomber inventory; specifically, the B-36. This move resulted 
in the immediate resignation of Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan and the 
beginning of a bitter battle between the top officers of both the Air Force and 
Navy. Captain Arleigh Burke, head of the Navy's Op-23 a research and policy 
unit, spearheaded a public campaign to press for the reinstatement of the 
13 Ibid., p. 117-118. 
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supercarrier program while simultaneously gathering information critical of 
the B-36 program. This information raised questions not only about the 
technical aspects of the bomber, but about alleged occurrences of contract 
fraud and conflict of interests.14 After an "anonymous document" circulated 
charging Defense Secretary Johnson among others of fraudulent activity in 
connection with the B-36, Congressional hearings were held to investigate. 
What began as an attempt by the Navy to protect naval air and glean a 
portion of the strategic weapons budget quickly became a bitter clash between 
the Navy and her sister services. Secretary of the Air Force W. Stuart 
Symington and Air Force Chief of Staff General Hoyt Vandenburg testified 
that "The B-36 intercontinental bomber ... was under attack by naval officials 
because it was seen as a threat to the Navy. These attacks had always 
increased when the military budget was under consideration."I5 Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs General Omar Bradley dealt a crushing blow to the Navy's 
case by characterizing the manner in which the Navy hierarchy had 
approached the loss of the supercarrier and other budgetary cuts as "open 
rebellion against civilian control." He further descried the Navy as "'fancy dans' 
who won't hit the line with all they have on every play, unless they can call the 
signals."I6 After hearing this and related testimony, Chairman of the House 
Armed Services Committee, Carl Vinson, stated that there was " ... not one iota, 
14 Rearden, p. 412-413. 
15 Wolk, p.67. 
16 Rearden, p. 419. 
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not one scintilla of evidence that would support charges that collusion, fraud, 
corruption, influence, or favoritism played any part whatsoever in the 
procurement of the B-36 bomber."17 He further congratulated Secretary 
Johnson saying, ''You did the right thing in canceling the carrier and if I had 
occupied that position, I would have done the same thing."18 After all the 
smoke had cleared, Johnson forbade the services from reprisals against any 
officer who had testified. However, this restriction did not apply to Chief of 
Naval Operations, Admiral Louis E. Denfeld, whom Johnson relieved based on 
Denfeld's testimony which left questions to his loyalty and respect for civilian 
authority.19 
Wolk (1988) states, "Overtly, the 1949 'rebellion' pitted the flush-deck 
supercarrier against the B-36 bomber, but the real struggle was about roles 
and missions." Why was this controversy so pivotal to the roles and missions 
debate? Rearden (1984) points out: 
Apart from laying to rest accusations of corruption in B-36 
procurement, the most valuable contribution of the hearing may 
well have been in providing an outlet for pent-up frustrations 
which, without some means of release, might have led to even 
more serious problems.20 
Even though the controversy and subsequent hearings failed to give the Navy 
significant control over the strategic mission, it did give the Navy some nuclear 
17 Wolk, p. 66. 
18 Rearden, p. 420. 
2o Ibid., p. 422. 
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capability thus preventing a monopoly for the Air Force. The Air Force was 
subsequently forced to improve its strategic bomber capability in penetrating 
Soviet airspace and survivability.2I 
4. Defense Reorganization Acts (1953 & 1958) 
Defense reorganization in 1953 gave increased powers to the Secretary 
of Defense and the Joint Chiefs. However, increasing interservice bickering 
over the development and control of strategic arms prompted Congress to 
implement further changes within the Department of Defense.22 The 1958 
Defense Reorganization Act designated the commanders of the unified and 
specified commands as "Combatant Commanders" or Commanders in Chief 
(CINCs) of their respective areas of responsibility (AOR). The law also placed 
the CINCs in direct chain of command of the President, Secretary of Defense, 
and the Joint Chiefs. This effectively placed control over the broad missions in 
the hands of the CINCs and redefined the services as force providers for the 
individual joint commanders. 23 One final, but extremely important, aspect of 
the 1958 Reorganization Act gave the Secretary of Defense the legal authority 
to exert centralized control over the individual services via the budgetary 
processes. Specifically, the Act gave the Secretary the power to effect " ... the 
21 Thompson, Fred and Jones L.R., Reinventing the Pentagon, San Francisco, 
J ossey-Bass Publishers, 1994, p. 30. 
22 Hobkirk, p. 29. 
23 Kuehl, p. 103. 
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transfer, reassignment, abolition, and consolidation of functions" of the armed 
forces to advance economic and efficient operations within the Department of 
Defense.24 
B. THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS DEFENSE REORGANIZATION 
ACT (1986) 
The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 was the last major reform of 
the Department of Defense for 27 years.25 The 1961-67 tenure of Defense 
Secretary Robert MeN amara was characterized by his employment of civilian 
staff instead of the Joint Chiefs to control and subdue the interservice rivalries 
rampant in weapons acquisition. This power was granted him by the 1958 Act. 
Military department and service resistance to McNamara and his systems 
analysis "whiz kids" led later administrations to tend to leave significant 
management discretion to the service secretaries and chiefs. The result was 
that when President Ronald Reagan took office in 1981, he was faced with 
nearly twenty years of festering service rivalries.26 
By 1986, a litany of U.S. military failures including operations in 
Vietnam, the failed hostage rescue attempt in Iran, sea-based MX missile 
systems, the bombing of Marine barracks in Lebanon, and service 
incompatibilities during the 1983 invasion of Grenada, led Congress to once 
24 Hall, Michael A., Defense Policymaking: the Post-Cold War Roles and 
Missions Debate, Monterey, CA, Naval Postgraduate School, 1993, p. 19. 
25 McNaugher, p. 224. 
261bid. 
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again consider reorganizing the Department of Defense.27 In 1986, Senator 
Barry Goldwater (R-AZ) and Congressman William Nichols (D-AL) sponsored a 
reorganization bill that passed both the House and Senate by overwhelming 
majorities. President Reagan signed the bill into law on October 1, 1986. "By 
passing into law some of the proposals that had initially been put forth under 
the Eisenhower administration, the Goldwater-Nichols Act corrected some of 
the more pathological administrative shortcomings of the defense 
department."28 The bill provided for a considerable increase in the power of the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by making him the principal military 
advisor to the President (subject to the prerogatives of the Secretary of 
Defense) and primary spokesman for the combatant commands within the 
Defense Department. However, the bill did require that the Chairman submit 
any dissenting comments from the service secretaries and chiefs along with his 
own. Additionally, the bill provided for the creation of a Vice-Chairman second 
(instead of sixth) in rank behind the Chairman. The CINCs were also given 
expanded and better defined powers over their subordinate commands in all 
areas of military operations, training and logistics.29 The Goldwater-Nichols 
Act reemphasized the need for unity of combat command. The successes of 
military operations since 1986 including Operations El Dorado Canyon (Libya, 
1986), Just Cause (Panama, 1989), Sharp Edge (Liberia, 1990) and of course, 
27 Halperin, p.114-115 and McNaugher, p. 226-229. 
28 Thompson and Jones, p. 78. 
29 McNaugher, p. 245. 
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Desert Shield and Desert Storm (Iraq, 1990-91) provide some positive evidence 
to support the effectiveness of the Act. 
What the Goldwater-Nichols Act did not specifically address (as is the 
case with every reorganization act since 194 7) was the roles and missions of 
the services. The Act did require the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to provide a 
triennial report to " ... recommend such changes in the assignment of functions 
(or roles and missions) as the Chairman considers necessary to achieve 
maximum effectiveness of the Armed Forces."ao The rest of this chapter is 
dedicated to the three major reports on the roles and missions of the armed 
forces issued since enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. 
C. CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF REPORTS ON 
THE ROLES AND MISSIONS OF THE ARMED FORCES 
As mentioned, one provision of the Goldwater-Nichols Act was to require 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to report at least once every three 
years on recommendations for modifying the roles and missions of the Armed 
Forces to improve efficiency and economy in operations. There have been two 
such reports. The first was made by Admiral William Crowe in September, 
1989 and the second was made by General Colin Powell in February, 1993. 
This section will provide brief overviews of the recommendations of each report 
and responses to them. 
30 Powell, Colin 1., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Report on the Roles. 
Missions. and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States, Washington D.C., 
Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 10, 1993, p. v. 
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1. Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr. - "Roles and Functions of the 
Armed Forces" 
Admiral Crowe was the first to submit the required report to Congress 
on September 28, 1989, only two days before his retirement. The report 
presented only two major findings: (a) "The 'roles' of the Armed Forces as 
crafted in law are fundamentally sound." and (b) "The 'functions' of the Armed 
Forces as written in DODD 5100.1 31 are also basically sound, but need to be 
revised and updated to more clearly reflect current national military strategy, 
our efforts to harness technology, and our responses to evolving threats to the 
national security."32 Of the four recommended changes to DODD 5100.1, only 
two were considered substantive: (1) assignment of close air support as a 
function of all the services, and (2) assignment of primary responsibility for 
space functions to the Air Force. 33 Defense Secretary Dick Cheney never 
publicly criticized the report, but neither did he implement any of the 
recommendations. 
Response to the report was tepid. No major overhaul in roles and 
missions was recommended. However, in September 1989, the Cold War still 
dominated defense planning. The way in which the Defense Department 
delineated roles, missions and functions in 1948 still applied to the present 
31 DODD 5100.1 is the document that promulgates the responsibilities and 
functions of the Defense Department. 
32 Crowe, William J, Jr., Roles and Functions of the Armed Forces: A Report to 
the Secretary of Defense, Washington D.C., Office of the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, September 28, 1989, p. 28. 
33 Collins, John M., Military Roles and Missions: A Framework for Review, 
Washington D.C., Congressional Research Service, May 1, 1995, p. 15. 
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situation. The events that took place in the ensuing two and a half years would 
attempt to change that mentality. 
2. General Colin L. Powell - "Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the 
Armed Forces of the United States" 
By July, 1992, significant changes in the world order prompted Senator 
Sam Nunn's landmark speech "The Defense Department Must Thoroughly 
Overhaul the Services' Roles and Missions." He lauded the Goldwater-Nichols 
Act as " ... the most far-reaching step yet taken to create a coherent, efficient, 
and effective Defense Establishment," and contended that the law was one of 
the keystones for the overwhelming success of Operation Desert Storm.34 
Senator Nunn was quick to point out, however, that the Act had only 
addressed roles and missions in a superficial manner, namely the requirement 
of review of the functions of the military by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. He also argued that the Key West Agreement of 1948 had fatal flaws. 
Although the agreement addressed the roles and missions of each service, it 
also allowed for the " ... tremendous redundancy and duplication among the 
military services."35 He highlighted ten broad areas of"substantial duplication 
and potential opportunity for streamlining'' and challenged Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Powell, " ... to conduct a no-holds-barred, 
everything-on-the-table review of the current assignments of roles and 
34 Nunn, p. S9559. 
35 Ibid., p. S9560. 
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missions among the military services."36 Senator Nunn's statements and 
recommendations left little doubt in anyone's mind of what he and his Senate 
Armed Services Committee expected to see in General Powell's report: 
significant recommendations for change and elimination of what appeared to 
be overlapping and duplicative programs and systems. 
General Powell presented his report to Secretary of Defense Les Aspin 
and Congress on February 10, 1993. The report was not what Senator Nunn 
and others in Congress had expected. Instead of recommending sweeping 
changes to the alleged redundancy and overlapping capabilities of the Armed 
Forces, General Powell addressed 29 separate issues with his 
recommendations for their futures. Of key importance was General Powell's 
defense of necessary "redundancies" within the services and staunch support 
for the redundancies created by the Key West Agreement: 
Some argue that the Key West Agreement is flawed, that it failed 
to resolve redundancy and duplication. In fact, what the Chiefs 
recognized in 194 7, and Congress has supported ever since, is 
that there are a number of advantages in having similar, 
complementary capabilities among the Services. the availability 
of similar but specialized capabilities allows the combatant 
commander to tailor a military response to any contingency, 
regardless of geographic location.37 
Recommendations in support of redundancy numbered eleven while only three 
supported streamlining. General Powell recommended consolidation of basic 
fixed-wing flight training and combining the strategic command and control air 
forces under the newer Navy E-6A. He also recommended reduction of Air 
36 Ibid., p. S9561. 
37 Powell, p. I -6. 
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National Guard wings for U.S. air defense. Among those areas identified by 
Senator Nunn as redundant and duplicative, General Powell supported overlap 
as necessary for effective accomplishment of missions. Key to his 
recommendations was his rebuttal of Senator Nunn's assertion that America 
effectively maintained four air forces. General Powell stated that the United 
States Air Force is America's only air force and that the other services air 
warfare components were "essential to their warfighting roles."38 Under the 
umbrella of that ideology, General Powell made several controversial 
recommendations regarding air assets: (1) zero reductions to Marine Corps 
tactical air wings, (2) retention of attack helicopters in both the Army and 
Marine Corps, (3) retention of C-130 assets in each service, (4) retention of 
both the Navy's EP-3 and Air Force's RC-135 electronic surveillance aircraft, 
and (5) continued support and funding for both the Air Force EF-111 and Navy 
EA-6B electroiric attack aircraft. 
Criticism of General Powell's report came quickly and directly. Most 
notably, then Chairman of House Armed Services Committee, Ronald V. 
Dellums (D-CA) remarked during hearings on the report: 
I will be candid in saying that I had hoped that this report would 
represent a more in-depth review and would recommend more 
substantial changes than it indeed does ... Our budget decisions will 
be harder this year, in the chair's opinion, because of this 
inefficiency. 39 
38 Ibid., p. xxiii. 
39 U.S. Congress, House, Roles, Missions and Functions of the Armed Forces of 
the United States, Hearing Before the Committee on Armed Services, (HASC No. 
103-17), 103d Congress, 1st Session, Washington D.C., U.S. GPO, February 24, 
1993, p. 4. 
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The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) commented that the Powell report 
exceeded the Crowe report in substance, but that it failed to address several 
key areas outlined in a report to Senator John W. Warner (R-Va) released in 
July 1993.40 Many others communicated similar disappointment over the 
report.41 With heavy criticism of the results and recommendations of General 
Powell's report, Congress made good on Senator Nunn's "promise" that if the 
military couldn't reform itself, then Congress would assist them. 
D. THE COMMISSION ON ROLES AND MISSIONS OF THE 
ARMED FORCES 
Although possessed of some autonomy, the JCS still represents a 
structure for achieving consensus among the services rather 
than dynamic leadership. It thus surprised few people that the 
periodic roles and missions reviews were largely content to tinker 
around the margins of the subject.42 
The above statement supports the decision by the House and Senate 
Armed Services Committees, to take matters into their own hands. A 
conference report accompanying the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
40 U.S. General Accounting Office, Roles and Functions: Assessment of the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Report, GAO/NSIAD-93-200, Washington D.C., 
July, 1993, pp. 2-6. 
41 Collins, p. 17. 
42 "JCS Champions Status Quo," International Defense Review, May 1, 1995, p. 
34. 
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1994, established an independent Commission on Roles and Missions of the 
Armed Forces. 43 As part of their findings, the conferees concluded: 
The existing process of a triennial review of roles and missions by 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff pursuant to provisions 
of law enacted by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense 
Reorganization Act of 1986 has not produced the comprehensive 
review envisioned by Congress .. .It is difficult for any organization, 
and may be particularly difficult for the Department of Defense, 
to reform itself without the benefit and authority provided by 
external perspectives and analysis. 44 
Dr. John P. White, director of Harvard University's Center for Business 
and Government, was appointed as Chairman of the eleven member panel. 
Panel members were selected from the private sector and included several 
retired flag and general officers. The mandate of the commission was to: 
• Review the appropriateness of existing service role, mission and 
function allocations in light of the post-Cold War era environment; 
• Evaluate and report on alternative distribution of those allocations; 
and 
• Recommend changes to the existing definitions and allocations of 
those roles, missions, and functions. 45 
The over arching goal of the Commission on Roles and Missions was to pursue 
Senator Nunn's theory that unnecessary redundancy and duplication was 
rampant among the services, and to recommend solutions for eliminating 
overlap to streamline and improve the efficiency of the U.S. military. 
43 U.S. Congress, House, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
1994, Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 2401 (Report 103-357), 103d Congress, 
1st Session, Washington D.C., U.S. GPO, November 10, 1993, p. 197-202. 
45 Ibid. 
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With a full year and virtually carte blanche to investigate roles and 
missions, expectations were high as the Commission met for the first time in 
May, 1994. Early on, Chairman White indicated that, "the biggest challenge 
[for the commission] is to find out what we are going to emphasize and not 
emphasize as we go forward."46 By October, 1994, the Commission had 
identified 25 specific topics to be addressed under three broad categories: Joint 
Warfighting/N ew Missions, Major Contingencies, and Central 
Support/Infrastructure. 4 7 
Each service was invited to submit recommendations and comments on 
the most immediate issues pertaining to roles and missions. This sparked a 
round of interservice disputes comparable to those of the post-World War II 
era. Perceiving the Commission as a threat to individual service programs, 
each service established a Pentagon office headed by a flag officer to address 
component roles and missions. The lines of battle were drawn quickly. General 
Merrill A. McPeak, the controversial Air Force Chief of Staff, fired the first 
shot. 
46 Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces Holds Initial Meeting, 
CORM release, June 2, 1994, p. 1. 
47 Collins, p. 23. 
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While the other services concentrated on justifying to the 
commission what they do, the Air Force made what some are 
calling a naked grab to take duties from other branches. The Air 
Force also offered to give up at least one mission it has performed 
since its creation, something none of the other services has been 
willing to do. 48 
Among the Air Force recommendations were USAF control of all space 
operations, theater missile defense and deep strike capabilities, partitioning of 
the battlefield, elimination of Marine Corps fixed-wing aircraft, major 
reductions to tactical air assets of all other services, and the transfer of 
responsibility for close air support to the Army. General McPeak attempted to 
brief his reasoning behind these recommendations, but was "cut short" by 
emotionally charged accusations by other service chiefs. 49 Navy and Army 
recommendations approached the matter with less aggression. The 
Navy/Marine Corps report discussed traditional roles and missions and 
recommended nine issues for consideration including primary use of Naval and 
Marine assets for forward presence, executive authority over theater missile 
defense and strategic sealift, and retention of space and information systems 
in the joint arena. The Army stressed six issues: strategic mobility, 
maintenance of a strong overseas presence, primary control of theater air 
defense, non-partitioning of the battlefield, and joint operations in space. 50 
48 Kreisher, Otto, "Interservice Rivalry Takes a Nasty Turn: Debate on 
Branches' New Roles Heating Up," San Diego Union-Tribune, February 11, 1995. p. 
A-21 
49 Glashow, Jason and Holzer, Robert, "USAF Aggressively Grms for Roles," 
Defense News, 9:36, September 12-18, 1994, p. 1. 
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Collins (1995) observed, "All generally agreed that some adjustments seemed 
advisable, but each predictably emphasized solutions that would improve its 
position, resources, and capabilities. Reluctance to compromise was evident."51 
Even though Chairman White assured the services that the basic structure 
and existence of the services would not be threatened, uneasiness and 
interservice bickering continued in the months leading up to the presentation of 
the Commission findings. Ness (1995) observed, "Because the commission 
presumably has the ear of Congress, the services scrambled to make their 
best case."52 
When the Commission on Roles and Missions finally submitted its 
report "Directions for Defense: Report of the Commission on Roles and 
Missions of the Armed Forces" to the Secretary of Defense and Congress on 
May 25, 1995, it was met with mixed reactions. The Report did not take the 
form expected by most. In fact, it differed entirely from original expectations, 
and some argued it differed from its statutory mandate. 53 
Senator Nunn had expressed hopes the previous year that the 
Commission would excel where the previous roles and missions reviews by 
Admiral Crowe and General Powell had fallen short. His visions were not 
realized as one of the primary findings of the Commission stated: 
51 Collins, p. 5. 
52 Ness, Leland, "TurfWarfare Scrutinized," International Defense Review, 
28:5, May 1, 1995, p. 32. 
53 "Think Tank Blasts CORM Report," Armed Forces Newswire Service, 
September 12, 1995. 
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A conventional criticism of the Services-unrestrained 
parochialism and duplication of programs-is overstated .. .In each 
case, our analysis of core competencies, assignment of functions, 
and the needs of the unified CINCs found that popular 
perceptions of large-scale duplication among the services are 
wrong.54 
What the Commission did find in their 124 page report was that the real 
question was how well the services were combining their efforts to support the 
CINCs to ensure the success of joint operations. 55 The Commission's 
recommendations were classified under three broad areas: Effective Unified 
Military Operations, Efficient and Responsive Support, and Improved 
Management and Direction. The commission identified six attributes of a 
successful Defense Department for the future: 
• Responsiveness to rapidly changing global requirements; 
• Reliability in delivery of predictable, consistent performance; 
• Cooperation and Trust necessary for successful unified operations; 
• Innovation in new weapons, organization, and strategy; 
• Competition in constructive solutions to the complex problems of the 
future; and 
• Efficiency in the use and allocation of resources. 
Recommendations on how the future force could accomplish the goals were 
numerous. Of note were recommendations on providing a joint vision for the 
54 U.S. Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, Directions for 
Defense: Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, John 
P. White, Chairman, Arlington, VA, May 25, 1995, p. 1-4. 
55 Pine, Art, "Panel Urges U.S. Armed Forces Teamwork," Los Angeles Times, 
May 25, 1995, p. 22. 
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department as a whole, integrating the service doctrines of "Global Reach, 
Global Power'' for the Air Force, "Force XXI" for the Army and "Forward ... From 
the Sea" for the Navy; further empowerment of the Joint Chiefs and the 
CINCs in determining force and procurement requirements; improvement of 
joint training; defining service 'core competencies'; outsourcing of depot 
maintenance, education and training; consolidation of service staffs; and 
reengineering of the planning, programming and budgeting system. 
Both praise and criticism of the Commission report came quickly. Many 
viewed that the report did right by going beyond the debate over allocation of 
roles and missions to the various services and looking at the problems that 
plagued the defense systems as a whole. 56 Defense Acquisition Executive Paul 
Kaminski praised the Commission's call to maximize privatization and 
collocation of aviation program management offices.57 Others praised the 
Commission's willingness to go against the congressional tide, for example, the 
Commission's recommendation to upgrade the Navy and Marine Corps' EA-
6B Prowler to meet the electronic attack needs of the DoD while retiring the 
Air Force's equivalent, the EF-111 Raven. 58 
Criticism of the report was trenchant and widespread. Many accused 
the Commission of skirting the issue of interservice rivalry that had created a 
56 Shanahan, David, "Roles Report Finds Its Mark: Commission Focuses on 
Broad Process Issues," Defense News, 10:32, June 19-25, 1995. 
57 Marrocco, John D., "Merging Aviation Support Piques Pentagon Interest," 
Aviation Week & Space Technology, 142:23, June 5, 1995, p. 43. 
58 "Roles and Missions Gives EA-6B Nod for Airborne Electronic Warfare," 
Defense Daily, 187:40, May 26, 1995, p. 295. 
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state of "gridlock" at the Pentagon. 59 Robert W. Gaskin, a former Pentagon 
planner, observed, "The sad result is that the commission was simply unable 
to transcend interservice rivalries ... Fundamental reforms have been 
camouflaged by a fine mist of proposals that fail to address the structural 
imbalances plaguing the American military."60 An independent think tank, The 
Defense Budget Project, characterized the report as a "disappointment," citing 
glaring failures to conform to its charter and contradictory statements about 
the deep strike mission. 61 
Further controversy came when Defense Secretary William J. Perry 
presented his response to the Commission's recommendations. Dr. White, now 
Deputy Secretary of Defense (he was confirmed by Congress only two weeks 
after release of the report), reported in a lengthy press conference that 
Secretary Perry had accepted approximately two-thirds of the Commission's 
100 plus recommendations. "Acceptance," however, fell into two categories; 
first, that the recommendation had been or was in the process of being 
implemented and second, that the recommendation warranted further study. 
Only a relatively few number of eight to ten recommendations were flatly 
rejected.62 Most notable of the recommendations cited for immediate 
59 Pexton, Patrick, "The Conclusion: Not Much to Fix," Air Force Times, 55:4, 
June 5, 1995, p. 8. 
60 Pine. 
61 Armed Forces Newswire Service. 
62 White, John P., ''DoD Responds to Roles and Mission Commission Report 
Findings," Defense Issues, 10:82, August 25, 1995, p. 1. 
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implementation was the assignment of the Air Force as executive agent for 
space operations. However, the Secretary of Defense deferred making a 
definitive response on the more controversial areas of deep strike 
responsibilities and co-location of Navy and Air Force aviation support 
facilities. The Secretary rejected Commission proposals such the training of 
constabulary forces and placing the Vice-President in charge of counter-
proliferation operations.63 Many supporters of the report praised the 
Pentagon's implementation of the bulk of the recommendations, but others 
accused Secretary Perry of avoiding the tough choices. Others pointed out that 
many of the recommendations accepted by the Defense Department were 
simply reinforcements of ongoing reforms and projects. One commentator 
stated, "Mr. Perry's decision to conduct what will amount to mini-roles reviews 
is disappointing at a time when decisive leadership is needed."64 
E. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter provided background on the issue of interservice rivalry 
and the roles and missions debate from the post-World War II era of unification 
and the onset of the Cold War to the present. The National Security Act of 
194 7 unified the services under the Department of Defense, established 
statutory authority for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and created the United States 
63 Robinson, John, "Pentagon to Carry Out Most of Commission's Proposals," 
Defense Daily, 188:39, August 28, 1995, p. 288. 
64 "End the Roles Debate," Defense News, 10:35, September 4-10, 1995, p. 22. 
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Air Force as a separate service. However, the Unification Act was unclear on 
the assignment of roles and missions to each of the services. The Key West 
Agreement of 1948 delineated the roles and missions for each of the services 
and has proven to be the primary source of interservice role and mission 
definition and rivalry that exists today. One of the most legendary instances of 
these oftentimes acrimonious disputes between the services was the so-called 
"Revolt of the Admirals" which grew from service competition over the budget-
rich strategic bombing mission. In essence, the revolt aired the growing 
antagonism between the services over roles and missions. Reorganizations of 
the Defense Department in 1953 and more significantly in 1958 provided 
increased power and authority to the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff over resource decision making in an effort to bridge growing rifts 
between the services. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara's extensive use of 
this newly apportioned power during his 1961-1967 tenure contributed to the 
interservice rivalry that characterized the relationship between the Armed 
Forces into the 1980s. 
The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 is viewed as 
a largely successful measure that further strengthened the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, while 
pushing for increased interservice cooperation. As with reorganization efforts 
in the past, the Goldwater-Nichols act largely avoided specifically defining roles 
and missions for the services. The act did, however, require triennial review and 
recommendation by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs on improvements to and 
modifications of the roles and missions assigned to the various services. Only 
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two reports were submitted to the Secretary of Defense and both were treated 
by Congress as inadequate. Many lawmakers on Capitol Hill, especially 
Senator Sam Nunn, felt that elimination of excessive redundancy and 
duplication within the services held the key to vast cost savings. An 
independent Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces was 
mandated in the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 in response to 
the two "ineffective" documents produced by the Joint Chiefs. The Commission 
was given a year and free rein to analyze the current allocation of roles and 
missions and provide recommendations on how to streamline the services and 
eliminate duplication and inefficiencies. The final report of the Commission, 
however, dismissed these concerns as "non-issues" and recommended 
improved joint operability, privatization and reengineering of support systems, 
and improved management of the budget process and civilian personnel. 
Today's Armed Forces are facing situations that closely mirror those 
faced 50 years ago. The world order, once rocked by the onset of the Cold War 
is now facing the dynamic changes associated with its demise. The Defense 
Department is experiencing budget cuts on a scale comparable with cuts made 
following World War II. As in 1947 with the National Security Act, the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act and has affected the roots of the defense infrastructure. 
Additionally, in the late 1940s the military was confronted with unfamiliar 
warfighting arenas such as nuclear warfare and conflict polarized between the 
superpowers. Today, the arena the military has trained for fifty years to fight 
also has changed. Realms that future warfare will inhabit include space, 
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electronic warfare, cyberspace and operations other than war. Interservice 
rivalry today, just like half a century ago, centers on budgetary issues: 
History reveals a tendency for the services to diverge rather than 
coalesce during periods of relative fiscal austerity. That is, each 
service tends to put planning priority on assuring and protecting 
core competencies at the expense of those capabilities that 
support and facilitate operations of the other services . 
... parochialism is stronger when budgets draw down.65 
It may be time for another Key West. Many of the recommendations of 
the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces appear to be 
sound, but interservice rivalry remains a serious issue. Bitter disputes of the 
type that characterized the "Revolt of the Admirals" nearly fifty years ago and 
the more recent clashes over deep strike, space and tactical air forces of the 
last few years are counter-productive. This is not to say that competition is 
unfavorable. As Arthur Hugh Clough states in The Latest Decalogue, "Thou 
shalt not covet; but tradition approves all forms of competition." The 
Commission on Roles and Missions also supported constructive competition 
between the services, stressing that: 
.. .it is necessary to place a high value on broad Service 
competition. To some this is a counter-intuitive finding. But 
competition among the Services produces innovation in weapon 
systems, forces, doctrine and concepts of operations that yield 
the dramatically superior military capabilities we need. America 
must not lose that edge.66 
What appears to be needed, is a redefinition of roles and missions that 
addresses how each service can be best utilized to meet the needs of the 
65 Owens, William A., "JROC: Harnessing the Revolution in Military Affairs," 
Joint Force Quarterly, No.5, Summer, 1994, p. 57. 
66 U.S. Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, Preface. 
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CINCs of the unified combatant commands. If overlap of missions occurs or 
redundancy in capabilities are called for, then so be it. Collins (1995) asserts, 
"Overlapping responsibilities ... can sometimes cost-effectively create 
multifaceted capabilities that complicate enemy responses."67 
Many observers, including Senator Nunn, have termed the 1948 Key 
West agreement a failure because it did not address redundancy and 
duplication, and because it simply restated the positions of each service, giving 
them exactly what they wanted. The relatively weak positions of the Secretary 
of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs at the time probably better 
accounts for the perceived failures. With the greatly enhanced authority and 
control given to the Secretary and Chairman, accord and compromise on roles 
and missions between the services can now be achieved, albeit slowly. 
The roles and missions of the post-Cold War military must be defined by 
the senior leadership of the services, the Joint Chiefs, the service secretaries, 
and the Secretary of Defense. It may be argued that, as in 1948, those most 
knowledgeable and sensitive to the functions of the Armed Forces are in the 
leadership of the military, not Congress, especially in light of the fact that 
there are significantly fewer military veterans in Congress today than fifty 
years ago. 
The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 is an 
effective and necessary tool for reform of the Defense Department. As former 
Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney commented: 
67 Collins, p. 28. 
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I am personally persuaded that [Goldwater-Nichols] was the 
most far-reaching piece of legislation affecting the Department 
since the original National Security Act of 1947. Clearly, it made 
a major contribution to our recent military successes. 68 
The Goldwater-Nichols appears to be correct in allowing the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs and Secretary of Defense to determine how roles and missions 
should be defined, modified, and allocated. The post-Cold War military of today 
and that of the Twenty-first century must adapt to a new national security 
environment. Part of this adaption will include redefining the roles, missions, 
and functions of the Armed Forces. As Senator Nunn said in his memorable 
speech: 
We should not go into the future with just a smaller version of our 
cold war force. We must prepare for a future with a fresh look at 
the roles and missions that characterized the past 40 years. We 
must reshape, reconfigure, and modernize our overall forces-not 
just make them smaller. 69 
68 Nunn, p. S9559. 
69 Ibid., p. S9561. 
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III. JOINTNESS AND MISSION CONSOLIDATION 
Separate ground, sea and air warlare is gone forever. If ever again 
we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with 
all services, as one single concentrated effort. 
- President Dwight D. Eisenhower 
(Letter to Congress, 1958) 
J ointness is the term applied to the concept of combined military 
operations and support functions between separate military services. Some 
see jointness as means to eliminate wasteful duplication, while others see it as 
increased effectiveness through teamwork and cooperation. I History is full of 
examples of the triumphs and tribulations of joint warfare. At present, joint 
cooperation among the services is of paramount concern. The Goldwater-
Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 is by far the most powerful force 
behind the push for joint interoperability among the armed forces. Many 
observers see the failure of joint military campaigns such as Vietnam, the ill-
fated hostage rescue attempt in Iran and the disorganized and uncoordinated, 
albeit successful, invasion of Grenada as causes for the Goldwater-Nichols Act 
and its insistence on jointness. The common thread in all of these allegedly 
"failed" operations has been identified by some as interservice rivalry. The 
Goldwater-Nichols Act identified interservice rivalry as an obstacle to 
jointness.2 Overcoming the parochialism inherent in each branch of the armed 
forces is essential to true joint interoperability. 
1 Cropsey, Seth., "The Limits of Jointness, "Joint Forces Quarterly, No. 1, 
Summer, 1993, p. 72. 
2 Ibid., p. 73. 
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The sudden end of the Cold War was not envisioned by lawmakers when 
the 1986 Act was passed. However, as is always the case, the end of a war 
spawns dramatic reductions in defense spending and sparks renewed friction 
between the services. In an effort to ease the impact of fiscal austerity during 
the post-Cold War drawdown while continuing to maintain a strong National 
Defense structure, the Pentagon has begun consolidating missions common to 
two or more services under the control of a single service when feasible and 
hopefully without decreasing overall defense capabilities. These consolidations 
have occurred in almost every aspect of defense from education and training to 
support functions to tactical aircraft. Mission consolidation can also create 
mission competition as each service scrambles to gain "executive agency'' 
control over a program or mission. As can be expected, the ultimate goal of this 
competition is often increased budget authority for the service who "wins." 
This chapter will concentrate on describing jointness and recent efforts 
at mission consolidation and the competition borne of its necessity. The 
chapter is organized into five topical areas. First, an historical account of 
interoperability and joint warfighting's successes and failures leading up to the 
1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act will be presented. Section B will highlight the Act 
itself and its successes and shortcomings, while Section C will discuss the key 
recommendations of the Commission on Roles and Missions of 1995 that 
address various aspects ofjointness that are seen by many as improvements 
on the Defense Reorganization Act. Section D will visit the concepts of mission 
consolidation and the ensuing competition for missions as well as key examples 
of both. The final section will present summary and concluding remarks. 
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A A BRIEF HISTORY OF JOINTNESS AND UNIFIED 
OPERATIONS FROM THE CLASSICAL AGE TO THE 20TH 
CENTURY 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff publication "Joint Warfare of the US Armed 
Forces" (Joint Pub 1), states that the new global environment, the rapid 
evolution of technology, high speed communications which accelerate the pace 
of battle and most importantly people, are the key points of modem warfare.3 
Joint Pub 1 further states that the advent of technology has forced members 
of different services to work together like never before and that " ... there is no 
place for rivalry that seeks to under cut or denigrate fellow members of the 
joint team."4 Instances of successful joint operations during the Civil War's 
Mississippi River Valley campaign, the Solomon Island operations of World 
War II, and General MacArthur's famous assault on Inchon in Korea are used 
to highlight the importance of joint operations in modem warfare. Jointness, 
however, is not a new concept. Instances of unified military operations can be 
found going back to the beginning of written history. 
1. Amphibious Operations and Joint Warfare from Ancient 
Greece through the War of 1812 
The Athenian defeat of the Persians at Salamis (480 B.C.) saw the first 
extensive use of Hoplites-the classical age's version of Marines, while their 
victory over Sparta at Pylos gave rise to extensive use of amphibious warfare 
3 Powell, Colin L. and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed 
Forces, Joint Pub 1, Washington, D.C.,National Defense University Press, 1991, pp. 
2-3. 
4 Ibid., p. 4. 
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and joint land/sea integration. However, not all these jointly fought battles can 
be viewed as successes. The "great victory'' at Pylos planted the seed of utter 
defeat as Athenian commanders attempted a similar amphibious operation at 
Syracuse on the island of Sicily only to lose 50,000 men and 200 
warships-leading to their ultimate defeat at the hands of the Spartans. The 
Peloponnesian War " ... saw the zenith and nadir of Athenian grand plans 
hinging on jointness, as an undertaking that yielded great success led to greater 
failure later."5 In Roman times, Julius Caesar's amphibious landings in Britain 
in 55 B.C. and Emperor Claudius's joint campaign at Kent thirteen years later 
placed the Britons under Roman control for the next 500 years.6 
The greatest and most successful practitioners of joint operations of the 
first millennium A.D. were unarguably the Vikings. Hundreds of years of a 
commitment to joint warfare ultimately led to the establishment of the 
Norman colonies and kingdoms of Europe. 
The Vikings' method of war was the essence of jointness. They 
carried horses in their ships ... and in sea fights, like the Romans, 
they relied on infantry afloat. They eschewed ramming, and 
lashed their ships together, the crews sometimes clambering 
across vast clusters to mass at the points ofheaviest fighting.7 
The introduction of gunpowder and naval gunfire, changed the face of 
joint operations considerably, as navies switched from galleys to large heavily 
armed sailing ships characteristic of the mid to late 1500s. Probably the most 
5 Beaumont, Roger A., Joint Military Operations: A Short History, Westport, 
Connecticut, Greenwood Press, 1993, p. 4. 
6 Ibid., pp. 5-6. 
7 Ibid., p. 7. 
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noteworthy joint operation of that time period was the ill-fated Spanish 
Armada of 1588. The Force was initially composed of 560 ships that would 
carey 35,000 soldiers to England. The disasters that befell them are well known 
if not the specifics. 
The seventeenth century witnessed a great rise of the maritime powers 
of Italy, Portugal, Spain, France and England. Enormous advances in 
technology allowed for the expansion of their spheres of influence to Africa, the 
Americas, and the Far East. With so much at stake, huge battle fleets and 
forces of marines were sent to protect national interests around the globe. 
Numerous joint operations of varying scales took place. These expeditionary 
forces and the conflicts that ensued continued on well into the eighteenth 
century. It is at this point in history that numerous accounts of interservice 
bickering among commanders led to defeat in joint warfare. For example, 
England's failed Cartagena expedition in 1745 as well as the disastrous assault 
against the French stronghold at Rochefort 12 years later were both blamed on 
friction between the army and navy commanders. However, the lessons 
leamed from these failed campaigns were used successfully by Royal Army 
General James Wolfe and Royal Navy Admiral Charles Saunders when they 
directed the series of joint operations that led to France's defeat at Quebec in 
1759. This cooperation between commanders from different services did not 
set a precedent as interservice squabbling continued to plague later British 
joint operations during the American Revolution. 
The first attempt at a major combined naval and ground assault during 
the revolution did not fare well. In 1776, British Lieutenant General Sir Henry 
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Clinton and Admiral Sir Peter Parker set upon Charleston, South Carolina. 
The assault failed miserably due to the failure of the two commanders to agree 
on a plan of battle, coordinate their attacks, and their underestimation of the 
colonist's resolve.s 
However, the British enjoyed other victories due to well planned joint 
operations during the American revolution. In 1778, Colonel Archibald 
Campbell and 3,000 crack troops were escorted up the Savannah River and 
executed a very successful combined assault on the city of Savannah. Four 
years after his embarrassing defeat, General Clinton returned to Charleston 
with Admiral Mariot Arbuthnot and through " ... a superb example of a 
beautifully coordinated eighteenth-century joint operations" defeated and 
occupied the Charleston peninsula.9 
During the War of 1812, the United States suffered heavy naval 
losses in the early years of the war. It appeared that the British would be able 
to strike American ports with impunity as evidenced by the landing of 5,000 
British troops at the Patuxent River and their subsequent occupation of 
Washington D.C. However, shortly after the British departed the Capitol, their 
attempts to take Baltimore and Fort McHenry with combined forces failed 
miserably. The final embarrassment to British joint operations during the war 
came in December, 1815 when Major General Andrew Jackson repelled some 
8 Lumpkin, Henry, From Savannah to Yorktown: the American Revolution in 
the South,Columbia, S.C., University of South Carolina Press, 1981, p. 10-18. 
9 Ibid., p. 41. 
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7,500 veteran British soldiers during an amphibious attack on New Orleans. 
The British lost over one third of their forces and their three senior 
commanders. The Americans suffered seven killed and six wounded. Author 
Wilbur S. Brown ascribes these disasters of joint warfare to " ... the greed of 
some commanders and speculators, major disagreement between Army and 
Navy leaders, and bureaucratic delay on the part of the admiralty."IO 
2. American Joint Operations in the 19th Century 
After solidifying the position of the Navy and Marine Corps during 
actions against the Barbary Pirates and the Navy/Marine assault on Tripoli in 
1804, amphibious and joint warfare became key elements to America's 
wartime strategy. However, large scale joint operations were not seen again 
until the War with Mexico. The famous joint assault on Vera Cruz in 1847, 
although successful, was not the model of interservice cooperation that all 
involved envisioned: 
As preparation [for the assault] began in earnest, lack of 
interservice coordination was reflected in the delay of eight 
warships and in major snarls in the assembling of transport and 
supply vessels in the gulf Bureaucratic confusion, delay, and poor 
rapport were paralleled by intra-service political tensions 
between generals [Winfield] Scott and [Zachary] Taylor.ll 
Even though service cooperation was a major stumbling block, the results of 
the campaign led to the capture of Mexico City, and Vera Cruz became a model 
for joint operations well into the next century. 
IO Beaumont, pp. 16-17. 
11 Ibid., p. 19. 
45 
The numerous joint operations during the Civil War were often marred 
by interservice friction and politics. In fact, Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote that 
the concept ofjointness at the time was: 
... the established rule by which, when military and naval forces 
are acting together, the commander of each branch decides what 
he can or can not do, and is not under the control of the other, 
whatever the relative rank..12 
Despite this unwritten rule, General illysses S. Grant along with Flag Officer 
Andrew Hull Foote and later Rear Admiral David Dixon Porter launched the 
successful riverene campaign against Confederate strongholds in the 
Mississippi River Valley. The common goals of their military strategy and the 
abandonment of interservice rivalry were key aspects of the campaign which 
effectively split the Confederacy in two. However, displays of interservice 
parochialism affected many other joint endeavors during the war. Most notably 
the failure of the strategically critical Red River expedition of 1864. It has been 
asserted that many of the failures of joint operations between the Union Army 
and Navy can be directly connected to the personal hostilities between the 
Secretary of War Edwin Stanton and Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles.13 
After the Civil War ended, joint operations again faded from the forefront 
of military thinking. It wasn't until the onset of the Spanish-American War 
that combined operations became a necessity. Since the Army and Navy had 
12 Mahan, Alfred Thayer, The Gulf and Inland Waters, New York, Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1883, p. 20. (From Joint Pub 1) 
13 Beaumont, p. 26. 
46 
little reason to interact during the relatively quiet years between the wars, 
service parochialism and animosity was excessive at the outbreak of war in 
1898. 
Years of separate missions, geographic dispersion, inaction, and 
competition for scarce resources had produced a keen 
parochialism that became open hostility during operations in 
Cuba and continued into the Philippine Insurrection.14 
The animosity between Major General William Shafter and Admiral William 
Sampson during the siege of Santiago, Cuba was evidence of the problems 
faced by joint operations during the war. As evidenced by Navy/Marine 
accomplishments during the Philippine Insurrection, subsequent joint 
operations and colonial incursions by U.S. armed forces, were left to the 
Department of the Navy. 
3. American Joint Strategy from World War I to Grenada 
Even though American involvement in World War I was short-lived 
compared to the rest of the combatants, two very crucial aspects of American 
joint military strategy were involved. First, the use of the United States 
Marine Corps alongside Army units in extended land campaigns was a major 
shift in military thinking. The Marines were up to the challenge and further 
solidified their position as a formidable fighting force. The introduction of air 
assets was another factor that would change the face ofwarfighting forever. It 
was only at the very end that aircraft were used in direct support of land 
operations, but the tactic known as Close Air Support would become a key 
element of joint operations in subsequent conflicts. 
14 Ibid., p. 32 
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Between the Great War and World War II, joint interoperability was not 
as easily pushed out of the spotlight as it had in earlier periods of peace. The 
National Defense Act of 1920, although flawed and weighted considerably on 
the side of the Army, established a Joint Board which was composed of 
representatives from both the Army War Plans Division and the Navy Chief of 
Naval Operations Staff. The board met often in the twenty years between the 
wars, and discussed strategic issues on a scale heretofore unheard of. Though 
not completely "joint" by modern standards, the seeds for increased 
interservice cooperation during conflict were sown. 15 The increasing use of air 
power for coastal defense and the growing conflicts between the air arms of the 
Army and Navy would set the stage for the bitter and often costly disputes and 
inefficiencies that would hinder joint operations in future conflicts. 
By the time America became involved in World War II, it was clear that 
single-service operations would be the exception rather than the rule. Losses in 
Norway and the successful yet disjointed evacuation of forces at Dunkirk early 
in the war served as painful lessons for the allies that joint operations were the 
key to survival and victory. In Europe, joint allied operations in North Africa, 
Sicily and southern Italy taught valuable lessons to allied commanders: 
Each landing in the sequence sharpened Allied skills in joint 
operations in several dimensions, each teaching a new set of 
bitter lessons, as earlier failures had.16 
15 Ibid., pp. 65-67. 
16 Ibid., p. 90. 
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These lessons, often painful and costly, led to the maturing in 
interservice and allied cooperation highlighted by Operation Overlord, the allied 
invasion of Normandy. The key to success was once again unity of command, 
an abandonment of friction between services and allies, and common purpose 
in the overall objective.17 This cooperation served as the benchmark for other 
combined operations in Europe culminating with the tri-service crossing of the 
Rhine in March 1945. 
The Pacific campaign after Pearl Harbor was defined by joint operations 
from the Solomon Islands to Okinawa. Although not always successful, 
combined warfare was the key to success in the Pacific. The invasion of 
Guadalcanal in August 1942 pitted combined Marine, Army and Navy forces 
against deeply entrenched Japanese defenders and ships. The "Cactus Air 
Force" a unique combination of Army, Navy and Marine aircraft were vital to 
the success of the campaign. As Eric Larrabee commented in Commander in 
Chief: 
No episode in World War II better illustrates than Guadalcanal 
the interdependence of the services that is characteristic of 
'modern war.' Any one of the military arms of land, sea, or sky 
could have thrown away the issue; none alone could gain it.18 
Victory was gained through jointness. Interservice cooperation continued 
during General Douglas MacArthur's "Island Hopping" campaign and " ... was a 
product of MacArthur's close rapport with his air chief, George Kenney, and 
17 Powell, pp. 49-50. 
18 Larrabee, Eric, Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt. His 
Lieutenants. and Their War, New York, Harper & Row, 1987, p. 261. 
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Admiral William 'Bull' Halsey, and their staffs."l9 Culminating in the bloody 
victory at Okinawa in July, 1945, unified operations proved to be the essential 
ingredient in allied strategy in the Pacific. 
When World War II ended, America was faced with a new global 
environment. The introduction of nuclear arms and the dissolution of the 
Russo-American alliance into the Cold War, placed the victorious U.S. armed 
services in unfamiliar position of war during peace. With the battle won, the 
heads of the military and civilian lawmakers turned to an internal battle over 
unification and the status of air forces. In 1947, the National Security Act, 
also known as the "Unification Act" established the Air Force as a separate 
service and made the Joint Chiefs of Staff, unofficially organized in 1942, a 
permanent fixture in the new Department of Defense. Though designed to 
promote jointness, the Act instead ignited the series of unprecedented 
squabbles and outright confrontations between the services described in the 
previous chapter. The battle for control of nuclear munitions and budget dollars 
continued for three years and jointness fell from the services' lists of priorities. 
When the North Koreans crossed the 38th parallel in June, 1950, 
America was ill-prepared for another war and even less so for joint operations. 
The Marine Corps troop strength had been drastically reduced and the Navy's 
World War II peak of 600 amphibious ships had declined to less than 100. 
Regardless of their dwindling numbers the Navy-Marine Corps team were 
called upon by General MacArthur to provide naval and amphibious services 
for his plans to strike the rear of the North Korean Army at Inchon. Ever 
19 Beaumont, p. 101. 
50 
mindful of the recent ''War of the Potomac" between the services after WWII, 
MacArthur found himself, " ... clasping hands over the bloody chasm of 
interservice rivalry that had only just begun to close ... "20 Operation Chromite, 
codeword for the Inchon landing, was an operation reminiscent ofWorld War II. 
Planners and commanders had a goal, made every attempt at overcoming 
friction between the services, and within three months executed the operation 
that turned the tide of the Korean conflict. President Truman's position on 
jointness was evident in his congratulatory message to General MacArthur: 
I am particularly impressed by the splendid cooperation of our Army, 
Navy and Air Force ... the unification of our arms established by you and 
by them has a set a shining example.21 
Although a striking example of joint warfare, the assault at Inchon would prove 
to be the last major amphibious operation against strong resistance in modem 
American military history. 
The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 further attempted at 
promoting jointness between the services, by strengthening the position of the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and establishing the unified and 
specialized commands. Unfortunately, seamless coordination between the 
services seemed out of reach. The ongoing battle between the Army and the 
Air Force over control of close air support assets and the continued friction 
between all the services regarding strategic nuclear weapons hindered progress 
towards jointness. Each service continued to operate independently with 
20 Ibid., p. 139. 
21 Truman, Harry S., Memoirs by Harrv S. Truman <Volume Two): Years of 
Trial and Hope. Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday & Company Inc., 1956, p. 360. 
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respect to support, communications and hardware. Even with the 
strengthening of the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the 1958legislation, the JCS 
continued to perform in a largely advisory capacity that mediated 
compromises between the individual services. "With no direct involvement in 
the budget process, its guidance of defense doctrine and structure was by 
general directive rather than firm control."22 This inability to control military 
doctrine or control over the services' intense parochialism led to the failure of 
jointness in Vietnam. 
The unified command structure in South Vietnam known as the Military 
Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), was not a true unified command 
since it was subordinated to the Navy Commander in Chief Pacific Command 
in Hawaii. Its inability to control joint operations is evidenced by the separate 
air wars waged by the Air Force and Navy. Although joint operations did occur 
during the war at lower operational levels, the overall war was " ... fought with 
far less jointness than World War II or even Korea."23 However, several 
relatively joint concepts such as the dual development and employment of the 
F -4 Phantom fighter by both the Navy and Air Force and the combined 
riverene operations of the Army and Navy did emerge as positive examples 
during Vietnam. The failure ofjointness is only a small fraction of the troubles 
22 Beaumont, p. 147. 
23lbid., pp. 148-150. 
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that caused the debacle of the Vietnam conflict. Political interference from the 
highest levels was also a major contributor that would become predominate in 
the decade between Vietnam and the Invasion of Grenada. 
Failures of joint operations in the 1970s did little to ally the growing fear 
in Congress that the services were unable to operate together. The "Mayaguez 
Incident" of May 1975, although successful in its mission of rescuing 39 
merchant seamen taken hostage by the Khmer Rouge, was an example of the 
difficulties that the services experienced in joint operations. Poor exchange of 
intelligence, confusion between commanders, and unfamiliarity with sister 
service procedures left a body count of 41 Marines and airmen at the end of the 
14 hour battle.24 Fifteen years later in April1980, two helicopters collided and 
crashed in the Iranian desert during Operation Eagle Claw-the attempt to 
rescue the American hostages in Tehran. The failure of the operation, also 
known as Desert One, " ... was caused in part by a jury-rigged rescue 'team' 
unnaturally composed of members from all three services who had not trained 
together ."25 Clearly not the embodiment of true joint interoperability. 
The final U.S. joint operation prior to passage of the Goldwater-Nichols 
Act was the successful, but problem-plagued invasion of the island of Grenada 
in 1983. Originally exhibited as a model of joint warfare, evidence to the 
contrary surfaced in the following months. Examples of failures in joint 
24 "The Mayaguez-What Went Right, Wrong', U.S. News & World Report, 
78:22, June 2, 1975, p.29. 
25 Grossman, Lany, "Beyond Rivalry," Government Executive, 23:6, June, 
1991, p. 11. 
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interoperability abound. When battle damaged Army helicopters landed aboard 
a Navy carrier, an urgent message from the Navy Comptroller's office advised 
the operation's commander, Admiral Wesley McDonald, not to fuel any Army 
helicopters because the Army had failed to sign the paperwork agreeing to 
reimburse the Navy for the fuel! In another case, Army helicopters carrying 
wounded soldiers were denied permission to land aboard ship because they did 
not have the necessary at-sea landing qualifications. Perhaps the most 
publicized and embarrassing occurrence highlighted the lack of integrated 
communications between the services. An army unit pinned down by enemy 
fire was unable to call for close air support because they could not contact Air 
Force assets standing by. "The stranded Army unit received air support only 
after a quick-thinking soldier appealed for help by using his telephone credit 
card to call the Army base at Fort Bragg, N.C., from a local phone."26 By the 
mid-1980s, the lack of joint interoperability between the services was painfully 
apparent. Debates inside Congress and within the Pentagon called for a serious 
and effective reorganization of the Department of Defense. Senator Sam Nunn 
spoke for many in Congress when he said: 
A close look at the Grenada operation can only lead to the 
conclusion that, despite our victory and success, despite the 
performance of individual troops who fought bravely, the U.S. 
armed forces have serious problems conducting joint operations.27 
26 Hadley, Arthur T., "The Split Military Psyche," The New York Times, July 
13, 1986, p. 26-33. 
27 Herres, Robert T., "Making Interoperability & Jointness a Way of Life," 
Defense '88, January/February, 1988, p. 22. 
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B. THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS DEFENSE REORGANIZATION 
ACT'S EMPHASIS ON JOINTNESS 
The 1986 Defense Reorganization Act, commonly known as the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act, ushered in a 'bright new era' of 
interservice cooperation and integration that culminated in the 
unparalleled successes of Operation Desert Storm in 1991.28 
The Goldwater-Nichols Act significantly enhanced the position of the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, increased the powers of the 
Commanders in Chief of the Unified Commands, streamlined command 
relationships and established powerful requirements for joint duty officers, 
removing the stigma of joint staff duty. Interestingly, the Act went against 
Congress' traditional aversion toward consolidating power within an executive 
branch agency. Normally Congress tried to create divisions within such 
agencies allowing lawmakers to maintain substantial legislative control, 
especially when it came to the Department of Defense.29 Not as unusual 
though was the opposition of Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger and other 
senior service leaders. "Because the reorganization act upset longstanding 
relationships and changed the balance of power at high levels of the military, 
many in the Pentagon resisted it."30 
28 Quigley, John M., "Creating Joint Warfighters," U.S. Naval Institute 
Proceedings, 121:9, September, 1995, p. 62. 
29 McNaugher, p. 219-220. 
so Grossman, p. 10. 
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1. Major Provisions of Goldwater-Nichols 
The most significant change to the existing defense structure was the 
enhanced powers and autonomy given to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. 
Prior to enactment of the Act, the Chairman was limited in his powers over the 
Joint Chiefs. If the Chairman was unable to extract a unanimous decision from 
the service chiefs on a particular issue, the issue was likely postponed without 
resolution.31 However, Goldwater-Nichols subordinated the Joint Chiefs to the 
Chairman who became the principal military advisor to the President, the 
National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. 32 Congress' intent 
was to ensure that teamwork and jointness within the Pentagon overruled the 
designs of the parochial service chiefs: 
The fundamental purpose of this bill is to refine the role of the 
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The bill would enable the 
chairman ... to transcend the service-orientation of the respective 
service chiefs to provide clear-cut, objective military advice to the 
national conim.and authorities.33 
Additionally, the Chairman's powers were expanded in areas of strategic 
direction and planning as well as advising on requirements, programs and 
budget matters for the Commanders in Chief of the Unified Command. 
31 Smith, Perry M., Assignment Pentagon: the Insider's Guide to the Potomac 
Puzzle Palace, Washington D.C., Pergamon-Brassey, 1989, p. 125. 
32 U.S. Congress, The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization 
Act of 1986, Public Law 99-433 (100 Stat. 992-1075a), 99th Congress: §151b. 
33 U.S. Congress, House, Joint Chiefs of Staff Reorganization Act of 1985~ 
Report from the House Committee on Armed Services to Accompany H.R. 3622, 
Report 99-375, 99th Congress: §2. 
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Opposition to the idea of a powerful Chairman was considerable. Many 
argued that a strong central military structure appeared as a move towards 
militarism.34 Also, as the primary military advisor, the National Command 
Authority would be deprived of alternative courses of action. Others, including 
former Chairman Air Force General David C. Jones, felt that a stronger 
Chairman was the key to avoiding the interservice power plays that resulted in 
the Desert One debacle and confusion in Grenada. 35 
In addition to expanded roles for the Chairman, the office of the Vice 
Chairman was created, as the second ranking officer in the military, the Vice 
Chairman spoke for the Chairman in his absence. The Chairman and the Vice-
Chairman may not be from the same service a design to prevent parochialism 
at that level. Though not specifically set forth in the legislation, the position of 
Vice Chairman as the presiding member of the Joint Requirements Oversight 
Council (JROC) was instrumental in the elimination of wasteful duplication 
and fraud that characterized the defense procurement system in the 1980s. 
Another significant provision of Goldwater-Nichols is the streamlining of 
the chain of command within the Department of Defense. The individual 
service chiefs were removed from the operational chain of command in relation 
to the Commanders in Chief. The new chain of command now runs from the 
President to the Secretary of Defense to the CINCs. This provision gives the 
CINCs considerably greater latitude in how to manage the forces under 
34 McNaugher, p. 237-238. 
35 Grossman, Larry, "A Joint Venture?," Government Executive, 23:7, July, 
1991, p. 14. 
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them-a direct improvement in joint operability. This streamlining and more 
joint approach to the chain of command may have considerable effects on the 
budgetary system as well. Section 166 of the Act directs the Secretary of 
Defense to submit separate budget proposals for each of the unified 
commands. "With the CINCs now more firmly in command and the chairman 
of the JCS and the joint staff expanding their purview, the budget process too 
seems to be shifting slightly away from the services and service secretaries 
and toward the unified and specified commands."36 
The last major stipulation of the legislation is Title IV, "Joint Officer 
Personnel Policy." This section directs that "[a]n officer may not be selected for 
promotion to the grade of brigadier general or rear admiral Gower half) unless 
the officer has served in a joint duty assignment."37 This is a direct effort to 
promote joint cooperation in the highest ranks of the military, where failures in 
joint operations historically are found. In the past, services were inclined to 
send less qualified or career-minded officers to joint staff billets, opting to keep 
their most skilled and promotable officers close to the fold. The problem with 
this practice was that officers became so ingrained with the views and 
parochial interests of their parent service, they became the source of the 
interservice rivalry that crippled past joint operations. The framer's intentions 
36 McNaugher, p. 245. 
37 Goldwater-Nichols Act, Sec. 404, 100 STAT 1032. 
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seem to have been met. The Goldwater-Nichols Acts attempts at promoting 
joint cooperation within the Department of Defense can be reflected in the 
successes of military operations in the decade since its enactment. 
2. Joint Operations Since 1986 - The Success of Goldwater-
Nichols 
The U.S. armed forces have been involved in more that half a dozen joint 
military operations from Operation Just Cause in Panama to Operation Joint 
Endeavor in the Balkans since Goldwater-Nichols was signed into law. 
Compared to the failures of joint operations prior to Goldwater-Nichols, these 
operations have been extremely successful. Most significantly the liberation of 
Kuwait in Operation Desert Storm. Many observers both inside and outside the 
Department of Defense attribute the effectiveness of these operations and the 
improved service attitude toward jointness directly to Goldwater-Nichols. 
Senator Sam Nunn in his July 1992 floor speech to the Senate stated: 
The Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986 was the most far-reaching 
step yet taken to create a coherent, efficient, and effective 
Defense Establishment ... We saw the first tangible fruits of that 
act in operation Just Cause in Panama and Operation Desert 
Shield/Desert Storm in Southwest Asia. For the first time, the 
services were integrated in a way that combined the unique 
strengths of the individual services.38 
Both General Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander in Chief of Central 
Command and Coalition Force Commander during Desert Storm and 
Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney echoed Senator Nunn's sentiments. With 
the more powerful role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the streamlined 
38 Nunn, p. S9559. 
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chain of command from the President to the Combatant Commanders, there is 
little wonder that the services have finally fallen in line with the concept of 
jointness. 
Other observers caution that the successes of American joint 
operations of the past decade are not as clear cut as Senator Nunn believes 
citing major shortfalls in airlift and sealift support and reports that nearly 25 
percent of American casualties during Operation Desert Storm were the result 
of friendly fire incidents.39 Command and control communications and doctrinal 
deficiencies are cited by others. Nevertheless, "[w]hen comparing the 
performance of the U.S. forces in Operations Just Cause, Desert Storm, and 
Provide Comfort with Vietnam, Desert I, and Grenada, it is hard to argue that 
change was not for the better."40 
3. Shortcomings of the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 
Shortly after the end of hostilities in the Gulf War, several witnesses 
testified before the House Armed Services Committee including former 
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff General David C. Jones, and former CINC of the Atlantic Command 
Admiral Harry Train. All of them generally agreed that major improvements in 
America's defense organization and ability to operate jointly could be credited 
to Goldwater-Nichols.41 The celebrated mastermind behind the logistical 
39 Beaumont, p. 173-174. 
40 Chiarelli, Peter W., "Beyond Goldwater-Nichols," Joint Force Quarterly, No. 
2, Autumn, 1993, p. 7 4. 
41 McNaugher, p. 245. 
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success of Desert Storm, Lieutenant General William "Gus" Pagonis testified 
" ... that he could not have done his job-moving a city the size of Charleston, 
S.C., halfway around the globe in five months-before Goldwater-Nichols."42 
Even the most casual observer of military operations since 1986 must admit 
that there has been significant improvements in the way the armed forces 
have performed. 
Goldwater-Nichols can certainly be given credit for a significant share of 
that success. However, as the United States has become more involved in 
peacekeeping operations and other joint activities, shortfalls in the decade old 
legislation have come to the forefront. This is not to criticize the landmark 
legislation, only to indicate that more can be done to improve joint 
interoperability among the services. Of key concern to many in the Defense 
Department are the requirements for joint staff education and experience. 
Also, personal experience in Operation Southern Watch, the no-fly zone in 
southem Iraq, highlighted continued difficulties with interservice operations, 
tactics and communications at the tactical level between the services that still 
exist. 
The 1986 Reorganization Act imposed rigorous standards on the 
promotability of military officers to flag or general grade, requiring that all 
officers to carry a "joint specialty'' in addition to their military occupational 
specialty. In order to eam the joint specialty designation, an officer must: "(A) 
successfully complete an appropriate program at a joint professional military 
education school; and (B) after completing such program of education, 
42 Grossman, "Beyond Rivalry," p. 11. 
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successfully complete a full tour of duty in a joint duty assignment."43 
Depending on the type of education and the length of the joint duty tour, an 
officer can spend between three and six years earning the necessary 
qualifications for promotion to the 0-7 level. This is a considerable amount of 
time spent away from the duties for which the officer is primarily trained. 
Many critics agree that while being educated in multi-service matters and 
serving on a joint staff lends toward improved jointness among the armed 
services, but this training is largely strategic and organizational in nature with 
" .. .little focus or emphasis placed on actual operations and tactics."44 Other 
critics go further stating that training literally thousands of officers to ensure 
promotability to a rank that less than 1 percent will attain not only stretches 
the resources of personnel commands, but " .. .is likely to generate a crowd of 
dilettantes instead of a corps of skilled o:fficers."45 Proposed corrections to this 
deficiency is the addition of tactical joint and exchange billets to the Joint 
Specialty Assignment List or the creation of a "mini-joint subspecialty" for 
critically needed operational specialists and warfighters from communities 
that require a high level ofinterservice operability such as tactical aviation.46 
43 Goldwater-Nichols Act,§ 661, 100 STAT 1026. 
44 Quigley, p. 62. 
45 Holland, W. J. jr., "Jointness Has Its Limits," U.S. Naval Institute 
Proceedings, 119:5, May, 1993, p. 39. 
46 See: Palzkill, Dennis, "Making Interoperability Work," U.S. Naval Institute 
Proceedings, 117:9, September, 1991, and John M. Quigley, "Creating Joint 
W arfighters." 
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The problems with the joint education and subspecialty requirements 
lead to further deficiencies at the operational level. From personal experience 
during Operation Southern Watch, jointness is a necessity borne of both fiscal 
and strategic requirements, but at the operational level, service specific 
tactics, doctrine and procedures hinder the interoperability so necessary for 
success in both peace and war. During Desert Storm, the daily Air Tasking 
Order (ATO) that designated targets and strike package specifics had to be 
flown from headquarters in Saudi Arabia to aircraft carriers in the Arabian 
Gulf because of a lack of a secure means of communications between the ships 
and land. Additionally, planners in Riyadh failed to take into consideration 
armament restrictions unique to carrier operations. During "STRIKE-EX '94," 
a semi-annual multi-service, multi-national joint air operation in the skies of 
Southern Iraq, the ''box" as it is called by those that enforce the no-fly zone had 
to be divided into three separate areas. One for British and French coalition 
aircraft, one for the Air Force and one for the Navy due to differences in 
tactics, doctrine and airborne refueling configurations. 
Although touted as a major joint exercise, in reality the evolution was 
three separate events conducted at the same time in close proximity. Though 
communications between the carriers at sea and Air Force assets in Dhahran, 
Saudi Arabia have been vastly improved, other aspects of the ATO still plague 
joint interoperability. During combined U.S.-NATO air strikes in Bosnia during 
1995, conflicts ranging from tactics to weaponeering to simple flight line 
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procedures caused constemation and confusion at Aviano Airbase in Italy.47 
Although these stumbling blocks will not derail the ongoing trend towards 
jointness, they do highlight shortcomings in the Goldwater-Nichols Defense 
Reorganization Act. The 1995 Commission on Roles and Missions has made 
attempts at identifying courses of action that hope to rectify these and other 
imperfections in the legislation. 
C. THE COMMISSION ON ROLES AND MISSIONS: STEPS 
TOWARD JOINTNESS 
As described in the previous chapter, the May 1995 Report of the 
Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces was not a guide for 
redefining or reallocating the roles and missions of the U.S. military. Instead, it 
provided a series of broad recommendations to enhance joint interoperability 
between the services through increased support of the CINCs: 
The central message for DOD form the Commission on Roles and 
Missions of the Armed Forces is in the 21st century, every DOD 
element must focus on supporting the operations of the Unified 
Commanders In Chief (CINCs). Everything else DOD 
does ... should support that effort. 48 
The Commission recommendations for improved overall joint operational 
effectiveness was grouped into twelve main categories. The categories that 
directly addressed the perceived shortcomings in Goldwater-Nichols were: (1) 
creation of a unified vision for joint operations, (2) strengthening of joint 
47 Anderson, Jon R., ''Rivalries on U.S. Side Emerged in Air strikes," Air Force 
Times, 56:10, October 9, 1995, p. 6. 
48 U.S. Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, p. ES-1. 
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doctrine, (3) increased support for the CINCs, and (4) improved joint training. 
Additionally, the Commission recommended consolidation or reorganization of 
missions and responsibilities in several areas of the Defense Department.49 
1 . A Unified Vision for Joint Operations 
The Commission lauded the individual services for the development of 
their unique capabilities and their performance during the Gulf War, but 
pointed out that they still do not work well together. The Commission 
submitted that this was a direct result of the lack of a unifying vision for 
development of individual service doctrine. "Not surprisingly, the Services' 
ideas about how to integrate all forces reflect their own perspectives, typically 
giving the other Services a role supporting the 'main effort'."50 The Commission 
acknowledged that the various service doctrines of "Forward ... From the Sea," 
"Force XXI" and "Global Reach, Global Power" were integral to the services 
ability to train and develop, but that these documents lacked unifying guidance 
that would allow the separate services to act as one during war. 
Therefore, the Commission recommended that the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff develop a joint warfighting vision that would harmonize 
the doctrines of the individual services. They proposed that the document 
should give direct guidance to each service on what capabilities the services 
must provide to unified military operations while indirectly encouraging the 
49 Ibid., p. 2-1, 2-21. 
50 Ibid., p. 2-2. 
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"maturation" of their separate doctrines through development of concepts for 
how· the service can best contribute to overall DOD capabilities. 51 
Secretary of Defense Perry enthusiastically agreed with the 
recommendation and tasked Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General John 
Shalikashvili to develop a joint vision for the Department. In July 1996, the 
Joint Chiefs issued "Joint Vision 2010." Citing long range precision capabilities, 
enhanced information warfare and stealth technology as keys to military 
successes in the future, the document avoids addressing specific programs 
concentrating on overall defense strategy. Vice Chairman General Joseph 
Ralston, USAF, stated "This is the yardstick by which service programs will be 
measured."52 The 38 page document will be expanded into a "Joint Future 
Operations Document" that is currently being developed by the Joint 
W arfighting Center at Fort Monroe, Virginia. The 10 volume set is scheduled 
for released in early September, 1996. 
2. Strengthened Joint Doctrine 
The Goldwater-Nichols Act directed that part of the expanded 
responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was the development of joint 
doctrine for the U.S. armed forces. Over a period of six years, the Joint Staff 
directed each service to develop joint doctrine in each service's area of 
expertise. The Commission cited this plan as a reason for the, " ... compendium 
of competing and sometimes incompatible concepts ... " that characterized the 
51 Ibid., p. 2-3. 
52 Holzer, Robert, "JCS Forms Strategy for Future Warfare," Defense News, 
11:29, July 22-28, 1996, p. 4. 
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first generation of joint doctrine publications.53 The members of the 
Commission felt that the next generation of joint doctrine should be written 
with a focus on the joint vision statement as proposed in the previous section. 
Their recommendation, revision of current joint doctrine development 
process with a single joint agency as the executive, will begin with the 
previously discussed "Joint Future Operations Document" being developed at 
the Joint Warfighting Center. Additionally, the Commission urged the 
Secretary of Defense to increase the manning and funding for the Joint 
Warfighting Center which they considered a cornerstone to the department's 
joint initiatives. In his 1996 "Annual Report to the President and Congress," 
Secretary Perry indicated that funding for not only the Joint Warfighting 
Center had been increased in fiscal years 1995 and 1996, but that the Joint 
Training, Analysis, and Simulation Center had also received a funding boost. 
Additionally, funding was programmed for the establishment of the Joint 
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, 
and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) Battle Center. 54 
3. Increased Support for the Commanders in Chief 
The Commission also recommended increased support for the CINCs as 
a tool for increased jointness within the Department of Defense. They felt that 
the CINCs needed greater influence over the processes used to acquire the 
53 U.S. Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, p. 2-3. 
54 Perry, William J., "Annual Report to the President and Congress," 
Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, March, 1996, p.47. 
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weapons, equipment and forces required to fulfill their missions, but at the 
same time should not be burdened with responsibilities that may divert their 
efforts away from successful execution of these missions. The Commission 
cited several areas that could be centralized to assist the CINCs in improved 
integration of individual service capabilities. These areas covered the spectrum 
of doctrine and joint concepts in the areas of theater air missile defense to joint 
logistic capabilities. The Commission also recommended the reorganization of 
several CINCs Areas of Responsibilities (A0Rs).55 
Secretary Perry again agreed with the CORMs recommendations and in 
response designated the Air Force as executive agent for theater air defense 
battle management and C4I and joint theater air and missile defense doctrine 
development.56 Additionally, the aforementioned Joint Vision 2010 and its 
supporting doctrines and the recently C4IST Battle Center were tasked to 
assist the CINCs in any manner required. On December 28, 1995, President 
Clinton approved the requested changes to the Unified Command Plan, 
reassigning geographic areas such as large portions of the Arabian Sea and 
Indian Ocean to different CINCs. In this case from U.S. Pacific Command to 
U.S. Central Command.57 
55 U.S. Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, p. 2-5,2-12. 
56 Perry, William J., "Letter to the Honorable Strom Thurmond, Chairman, 
Senate Committee on Armed Services," August 24, 1995, p. A-1. 
57 Perry, "Annual Report to the President and Congress," p. 49. 
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4. Improved Joint Training for the Department of Defense 
Noting that training is the key to service maintenance of core 
competencies, the CORM expanded that concept to include joint training as 
fundamental to successful unified military operations. They asserted that in 
the course of their examinations, joint training was not being performed as 
effectively as service training. This was not a new or surprising concept for the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs who had commented 9 months earlier: " ... When 
you look at joint training .. .it's an embarrassment to me. I have gone to more 
joint exercises and walked away from them more embarrassed than anything 
else."58 To rectify this shortcoming, the Commission recommended that joint 
training receive increased funding, that the CINCs be given greater control 
over joint portions of each service's training budget and the creation of a 
functional unified command responsible for joint training and integration of 
CONUS based forces. 
Both the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense agreed that joint 
training had to be improved and initiated several studies to investigate the 
most efficient way of doing so. These studies resulted in increased funding for 
joint training and the reorganization of U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM) to 
58 General John M. Shalikashvili during a speech to the Association of the 
United States Land Warfare Forum, 1 September 1994. As quoted in the CORM 
report. 
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include oversight of joint training of U.S. forces. However, the Chairman 
recommended to the Dr. Perry, that the assignment of all U.S. based forces to 
USACOM be deferred until it had effectively assimilated its new roles. 59 
5. Consolidation of Missions and Responsibilities Within the 
Department of Defense 
In addition to the previously mentioned reorganization of the Areas of 
Responsibilities for several of the unified commands and the expansion of 
USACO M, the Commission recommended " ... reemphasizing traditional Service 
functions, sharpening the boundaries in some areas where unneeded overlap 
occurs, and relieving them of responsibilities that detract from their core 
competencies."GO The Commission recognized the importance of each service's 
core competencies as necessary to enhanced joint effectiveness, but also felt 
that many of these core competencies had to be integrated across traditional 
service boundaries. The CORM asserted that this concept held true especially 
when a service's capabilities had to be interoperable with all the other services 
capabilities. Since future interoperability issues are the purview of the Joint 
Requirements Oversight Council, the Commission recommended that three 
near term interoperability issues should be addressed. Specifically, the 
Commission recommended that Air Force KC-135 aerial refueling aircraft be 
equipped with multi-point capacities in order to refuel not only Air Force but 
Navy, Marine Corps and coalition aircraft as well. The Commission also 
asserted that all munitions, especially precision weapons, should be useable by 
59 Perry, "Annual Report to the President and Congress," p. 49. 
Go U.S. Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, p. 2-20. 
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tactical aircraft of all services. Finally and most relevant to this study, the 
Commission recommended the expansion and upgrade of the Navy/Marine 
Corps EA-6B Prowler electronic combat aircraft to meet all Department of 
Defense airborne electronic stand off jamming needs. 61 This recommendation 
was in direct opposition to the General Colin Powell Roles and Missions Report 
of 1993 that opposed the idea of consolidating the tactical airborne electronic 
combat mission under a single service and airframe, citing degraded readiness 
and capabilities as effects of doing so. 
Defense Secretary Perry agreed with these recommendations, directing 
the Air Force to continue with current plans to equip all KC-10 and KC-135 
aerial refueling support aircraft with multi-point capabilities. He also directed 
the department to investigate the possibility of making all munitions multi-
service capable as part of its Military Department Recapitalization plans. The 
recommendation of establishing the EA-6B as the DODs sole radar jamming 
aircraft was not a new idea, and a decision to increase funding had already been 
made.62 
Consolidation was not a new concept in May 1995. Earlier studies 
including General Powell's Roles and Missions study had identified consolidation 
as a means for cost savings in the face of a rapidly declining post-Cold War 
defense budget and as a way to enhance the capabilities of the department as 
61 U.S. Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, p. 2-21. 
62 Perry, "Annual Report," p. 48 and Perry, Letter to Senator Thurmond. 
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a whole. The following section highlights key areas that have been consolidated 
or may be in the future. It will also identify key areas that have become areas 
of extreme mission competition. 
D. MISSION CONSOLIDATION AND COMPETITION AMONG THE 
SERVICES 
Faced with a increasingly smaller share of the federal budget, the 
Defense Department has turned to consolidation as a means to cut costs while 
minimizing negative effects on overall Defense Establishment capabilities. 
This mission consolidation covers the entire spectrum of defense activities 
from education and training to support functions to warfighting. With the 
continuing race by the services to establish their roles and missions, 
competition for control of these consolidated functions as well as emerging 
missions is keen. Some proponents of jointness see this consolidation as 
beneficial to interoperability and unified operations. Others are concerned that 
too much consolidation will irreversibly damage the core competencies that the 
Commission on Roles and Missions identified as so vital to improved joint 
military effectiveness. 63 
1. Mission Consolidation 
Consolidation can be done in a variety of ways: under a single service, 
through the designation of a service as "executive agent" for a mission or 
function, through privatization or by assigning the area to a joint command or 
63 See: Bowes, W. C., "Consolidate, Cut Costs, ... But Be Smart," U.S. Naval 
Institute Proceedings, 120:9, September, 1994, pp. 40-42. 
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oversight committee. Since the end of the Cold War and the ensuing defense 
draw down, many areas of the Defense Establishment have been considered for 
consolidation. General Colin Powell's "Report on the Roles, Missions, and 
Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States" suggested several areas 
for consolidation including the Space and Strategic Commands, CONUS based 
forces under a unified command, depot level maintenance, common aircraft 
such as the Air Force EC-135 and Navy E-6A, initial fixed-wing flight training, 
and helicopter maintenance and simulation training. Two years later, the 
Commission on Roles and Missions suggested even further consolidation in 
many areas. The Commission recommended centralized intelligence support, 
establishment of the Air Force as executive agent for space and combat 
search and rescue, management of all operational support airlift aircraft 
(excluding Navy Reserve C-9s) under Air Force, consolidation of the Defence 
Contract Audit Agency and the Defense Contract Management Command 
under the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, and the 
combination of each service's secretariat and service staffs into a single staff. 
The CORM also recommended the consolidation of medium-altitude air defense 
and expeditionary engineering responsibilities under the Army, eliminating 
those missions in the Marine Corps. The Commission went beyond the Powell 
report recommending the outsourcing of all current support-type activities, all 
new and emerging support requirements and movement toward a depot 
maintenance system relying heavily on the private sector. Additionally, the 
focus of this study, the consolidation of the tactical airborne electronic combat 
mission under the Navy was also recommended. 
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Not all of these consolidations have been implemented, but some have 
with varying levels of success. Institutional and statutory roadblocks have 
hindered some of these recommendations including the removal of the so-called 
60/40 rule of Title 10 of the U.S. Code which prohibits privatization of more 
than 40 percent of depot level maintenance. Other attempts have been 
blocked by Congressional action that often reflects lawmakers' constituency 
concerns. Others, such as the elimination of the EC-135 and expanded use and 
support of the Navy E-6A TACAMO aircraft and the consolidation of basic \ 
flight training have produced excellent results. 64 
The push for consolidation is not over yet, the Defense Department is 
considering combining all rotary wing infrastructure. The plan includes 
consolidation of all DOD helicopter research and development, test and 
evaluation, acquisition and training under the Army. Proponents contend that 
significant cost savings in areas such as logistics and personnel will be realized. 
The proposal also recommends decreasing the number of different helicopter 
types from 16 to only four. The proposal also asserts that combining pilot 
training at Forts Eustis and Rucker would not only decrease the cost of 
training but standardize operations across the entire DOD while promoting 
jointness. The plan even suggests consolidating all DOD air traffic control 
training at Fort Rucker. 65 There are even calls for the Defense Department to 
64 See: Viccellio, Henry, jr., ''The Challenge to Interservice Training," Joint 
Force Quarterly, No.7, Spring, 1995, pp. 43-47. 
65 "Army Formally Proposes Consolidating Helicopter Infrastructure," 
Aerospace Daily, 173:21, February 1, 1995. 
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consolidate the service academies into a single "U.S. Defense Academy ," 
saving over $265 million annually while promoting jointness at the earliest 
point in young officers' careers. 66 
2. Competition Borne of Mission Consolidation and Emerging 
Mission Areas 
The services have almost always opposed consolidation if it means their 
service will be losing the mission or control over a certain function. On the 
other hand, if a particular service is in a position to gain from consolidation 
they are more than willing to take on the added responsibility since more 
responsibility over a particular area means more budget dollars with which to 
exercise that authority. Competition for missions today is as keen as it was 
following World War II. The previously discussed "Revolt of the Admirals" over 
the competition for the strategic bombing mission is by far the most famous 
battle over missions. Other historical examples such as airborne coastal 
defense between the Army Air Corps and the Navy and the air defense missile 
battle between the Air Force and Army illustrate the motivations behind 
mission competition. 
Today, the same mission competition is apparent in the maneuvering 
for control of the Deep Strike Mission, Close Air Support, Theater Missile 
Defense and Space. Each of these missions would provide the service with 
control increased budgetary authority, acquisition power and influence within 
the Pentagon. 
66 Haraden, Timothy J., "Joint from Day One," U.S. Naval Institute 
Proceedings, 121:7, July, 1995, pp. 37-39. 
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E. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter has highlighted the history of jointness and its significance 
in today's military. Historical insights into the success and failures of joint 
operations identified interservice rivalry and competition for a "piece of the 
action" as frequent causes for failure and defeat. The introduction of airpower 
further blurred the lines between services and increased the need for unity 
between the services during war. During World War II combined operations in 
Europe matured into the enormous success of Operation Overlord, the allied 
invasion of Normandy. Jointness is credited as the key to success in the Pacific 
beginning with the Solomon Islands in 1942 and culminating with the hard-won 
victory in Okinawa. The commitment to jointness by commanders in the 
Pacific can be seen in the following statement made by Admiral William F. 
"Bull" Halsey in 1942 
Gentlemen, we are the South Pacific Fighting Force. I don't want 
anybody even to be thinking in terms of Army, Navy, or Marines. 
Every man must understand this, and every man will understand 
it, if I have to take offhis uniform and issue coveralls with 'South 
Pacific Fighting Force' printed on the seat of his pants. 67 
As with periods of peace before, attitudes toward jointness succumbed to 
interservice bickering and animosity between World War II and Korea. 
However, even with interservice gaps still wide, General Douglas MacArthur 
successfully engineered the last major amphibious joint assault in modern 
American history at Inchon. The complete breakdown in joint interoperability 
67 Potter, Elmer Belmont, Bull Halsey, Annapolis, Md., Naval Institute Press, 
1985, p. 186. 
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in Vietnam and Grenada as well as the failed and fatal hostage rescue attempt 
of Desert One, was the proverbial "straw that broke the camel's back." 
In 1986, landmark legislation known as the Goldwater-Nichols Defense 
Reorganization Act was the first successful attempt at promoting jointness 
during peacetime. The Act enhanced the powers the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff elevating him from a position of "first among equals," created 
the position of the Vice Chairman as the number two ranking officer in the 
U.S. military, further empowered the Commanders in Chief of the Unified 
Commands while streamlining the chain of command between the CINCs and 
the National Command Authority, and established procedures that ensured 
each service would dedicate its ''best and brightest" to joint duty by making the 
joint specialty designation a prerequisite for promotion to general or flag rank. 
The influence of the Goldwater-Nichols Act can be seen in successes of joint 
military operations such as Just Cause in Panama, Restore Democracy in 
Haiti, and today in Joint Endeavor in the Balkans. Of course, the most 
prominent achievement in combined warfare and jointness was Operation 
Desert Storm in 1991. Although many see Desert Storm as a flawless example 
of the joint interoperability of the American armed forces, many problems were 
identified-especially in the interoperability of the different services. Other 
observers feel that Goldwater-Nichols limits the ability of the services to 
maintain their own individual and diverse identities as well as core 
competencies in their officer corps. 
The Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces made key 
recommendations that would enhance the spirit of jointness fostered by 
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Goldwater-Nichols and the GulfWar. The Commission saw enhanced and total 
support for the CINCs as the key to improved and effective joint 
interoperability. The CORM recommended a unified vision for the Department 
of Defense, a stronger join doctrine and vastly improved joint training as 
essential elements to this support. The Commission also recommended the 
continued consolidation of capabilities within the defense establishment begun 
by earlier studies including Colin Powell's maligned roles and missions report of 
1993. 
Consolidation as a means for cost savings and streamlined joint 
capabilities has been ongoing since the very beginning of the post-Cold War 
defense drawdown. Consolidation efforts have affected every facet of the 
defense infrastructure from flight training to staff and support functions to 
common aviation assets. The subject of this study is an example of the latter. 
However, with mission consolidation comes mission competition as each 
service seeks control of existing and emerging missions for fiscal as well as 
political reasons. Even as the Defense Department continues down the road to 
jointness, interservice friction remains. 
In today's military characterized by reduced budget authority and 
increasing world-wide commitments, jointness is required. The individual 
services can no longer maintain their insular and parochial attitudes and "go it 
alone." Interservice rivalries that characterized the Vietnam War and the lack 
of interoperability that led to the disaster of Desert One and confusion in 
Grenada have been diminished, but not eliminated, by the Goldwater-Nichols 
Act. The Act, viewed by many as the solution to the many roadblocks to 
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jointness is merely the beginning of the process. As the Report of the 
Commission on Roles and Missions points out: 
The Department has strengthened its capabilities for unified operations 
considerably since passage of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense 
Reorganization Act. But, that job is not yet done; further efforts to 
ensure the effectiveness of joint operations are essential to a successful 
and secure future. 68 
However, it should be noted that the Goldwater-Nichols Act is the first 
successful implementation of the concept of jointness during peacetime in 
modern American military history. Concerns about the effects of extended 
separation of officers from their parent services to earn joint subspecialty 
designation must also be considered. 
The CORM report is right in its assertion that further enhancements to 
effective joint military operations will come through expanded support of the 
CINCs. Greater control of the budgetary aspects of the unified combatant 
commands must be placed in their hands. The Commission recommendations 
have been largely implemented, but care must be taken to ensure the 
individual service identities and core competencies are not lost in a headlong 
rush towards jointness. 
Mission consolidation will continue due to constrained budget resources. 
With it comes the competition for control of those missions. The acrimony of 
this competition may also detract from the goal of seamless interoperability 
and cooperation between the services. As described in the historical accounts 
ofjointness, failures in combined operations occurred when interservice friction 
surfaced between military leadership, not at the operational level. What is 
68 U.S. Commission on the Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, p. ES-1. 
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necessary is a top-down commitment within each service and the Defense 
Department as a whole to serve the needs of the nation as well as the needs of 
each service. 
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W. CASE STUDY: U.S. NAVY EA-6B "JOINT-SERVICE 
EXPEDITIONARY SQUADRONS" AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF 
THE TACTICAL AIRBORNE ELECTRONIC WARFARE MISSION 
One of the most significant mission consolidation decisions made in the 
post-Cold War Department of Defense was to merge tactical airborne 
electronic warfare under the Navy using the EA-6B Prowler electronic attack 
aircraft. This was unique in that previous consolidations had involved mainly 
training and support functions. For the first time in modern military history, a 
tactical mission is to be manned and fought by members of two separate 
services in the same unit-a textbook case ofjointness. With budget dollars 
dwindling, in the areas of modernization and procurement, the Department of 
Defense was faced with finding ways to cut expenses without severely 
degrading readiness and core capabilities. The result was the decision to retire 
two aircraft from the Air Force inventory, the EF-111 Raven and the F-4G 
Wild Weasel, to transfer their mission to the Navy, and to concentrate future 
spending and program enhancements on a single aircraft, the EA-6B Prowler. 
This decision has produced both praise and criticism. Those in favor see this 
change as a herald for joint operations of the future and as a positive means of 
funding the electronic combat mission at reduced cost without a significant 
reduction in America's warfighting capacity. Critics predict readiness shortfalls 
and cite ulterior motivation to eliminate older "sunset" equipment and missions 
in favor of budget rich "sunrise" systems rather than joint interoperability as 
the rationale for reducing the Air Force role in electronic warfare. 
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This case study will cover the consolidation process in detail, divided into 
five areas. First, a brief history and background of the electronic combat 
mission of the Prowler and Raven aircraft, the decision to consolidate the 
mission under one service/platform, and the arguments for using the EA-6B 
instead of the EF-111 as the sole mission provider will be presented. Section B 
will cover the consolidation process from consideration of the earliest options to 
the present plan of action and accompanying milestones. Section C will 
address the final Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the services and 
the Joint Staff and how it addresses joint issues, while (D), the following 
section, assesses developments in the consolidation since the MOA was 
promulgated. Section E will summarize the case study and offer concluding 
remarks. 
A HISTORY AND BACKGROUND 
Although electronic warfare has been part of military aviation since the 
waning days of World War II, funding and resources directed towards filling this 
need were at first relatively small. The lack of funding inevitably impacted the 
mission of airborne electronic warfare in both qualitative and quantitative 
terms. Through the 1950s and early 1960s, the number and capabilities of 
aircraft dedicated to combat in the rapidly expanding radar environment were 
minimal. For a considerable period of time, modern equipment was scarce, 
funding was difficult to secure and, as a consequence, the few electronic 
combat units that did exist had to struggle with aircraft and hardware that 
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was old and near-obsolescence. This lack of equipment and expertise was 
unfortunate during peacetime; however during war, it became fatal. With U.S. 
aircraft and air crew suffering heavy losses in Vietnam to surface-to-air 
missiles and radar guided anti-aircraft artillery, the need to develop aircraft, 
weapons and tactics to defeat these weapons became of paramount 
importance. Unfortunately, with the ever-increasing capabilities of radar 
systems, it took a considerable amount of time to develop and field electronic 
warfare systems that could adequately handle the threat. Rapidly 
implemented modification programs did, however, result in some improvement. 
Navy vintage Douglas EA-1F Skyraiders were replaced by the Douglas EKA-
3B Skywarrior while the Air Force modified a similar variant, the B-66 
Destroyer, into the EB-66 with fairly positive results. Thus, with the dedication 
of tactical aircraft to warfare in the electromagnetic realm, the mission of 
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) was bom.l 
It was the Navy which first upgraded its electronic warfare capability, 
deploying the first models of the Grumman EA-6B Prowler in the summer of 
1972, shortly before the end of the Vietnam War. The Air Force was forced to 
wait for almost another decade before it began to take delivery of a long-
overdue EB-66 replacement. Therefore, a gap of several years between the 
retirement of the aging EB-66 and the induction of the General 
Dynamics/Grumman EF-111A Raven severely limited Air Force warfighting 
capabilities on the "electronic battlefield." Both the EA-6B and EF-111 have 
1 Streetly, Martin, Airborne Electronic Warfare: Historv. Techniques and 
Tactics, London, Janes Publishing, 1988, pp. 34-65. 
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served with distinction, culminating in their significant contribution to the 
overwhelming success in the air war during Operation Desert Storm. In light of 
their superb performance and role in protecting strike aircraft from airbome as 
well as surface launched threats, rules of engagement in subsequent "No-Fly'' 
zones prohibit aircraft from entering threat environments without an 
electronic combat aircraft escort. Unfortunately, neither EA-6Bs nor EF-111s 
were airborne when Air Force Captain Scott O'Grady's F-16 Falcon was shot 
down in Bosnia.2 
1. The Grumman EA-6B Prowler 
The roots of the Prowler can be traced back to the A-6 Intruder, a two-
seat all weather attack aircraft that entered service in the early 1960s and is 
just now being phased out of the Navy inventory. However, except for the very 
earliest versions of the aircraft, the Prowler was built from the "ground up" as 
an electronic attack aircraft. The first EA-6Bs entered the fleet in 1971 with 
the establishment ofVAQ-129 and VAQ-132.3 The former designated as the 
Fleet Replacement Squadron (FRS) for training new aircrew and the latter as 
the first operational squadron which eventually saw combat in the waning 
days of Vietnam. By 1990, there were 14 carrier-based and two reserve Navy 
Prowler squadrons, while the Marine Corps operated one reserve and one large 
active squadron. Each fleet squadron was composed of 4 to 5 aircraft 
2 "GAO, DOD at Odds Over Support for SEAD Mission," Aerospace Daily, 
178:10, April 12, 1996, p. 73. 
3 '~ AQ" is the unit type identifier for a Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron. 
The 'V stands for aviation, "A:' for attack and the "Q" for electronic. 
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depending on the needs of the air wing and its operational demands. All of the 
Navy squadrons, except one forward deployed to Japan, are now located at 
Naval Air Station Whidbey Island. The Marines deployed detachments out of 
their large squadron, VMAQ-2, from Cherry Point Marine Corps Air Station 
until 1993, when the reserve squadron was activated and VMAQ-2 was divided 
into three separate squadrons. 
The EA-6B is a twin engine, four seat, all-weather electronic attack jet 
that is manned by a pilot and three Electronic Countermeasures Officers 
(ECMOs). The heart of the Prowler mission system is the ALQ-99F Tactical 
Jamming System which allows ECMOs to analyze, record, target and jam 
enemy ground and airborne radars through ram-air turbine powered jammer 
pods carried on four wing stations and one fuselage centerline station. Each pod 
carries two jamming transmitters, each of which is dedicated to a certain radio 
frequency bandwidth. Transmitters can be removed and replaced within the 
pods, enabling the Prowler to carry up to ten transmitters with various 
jamming capabilities which allows the aircraft to be tailored to meet the 
electromagnetic environment. Additionally, the Prowler has been upgraded to 
carry the AGM-88 High Speed Anti-radiation Missile (HARM). With the 
retirement of the F-4G Wild Weasel, the Prowler has become the premiere 
platform for employment of the unique, radar-seeking HARM. The Prowler is a 
sub-sonic, non-after-burning jet aircraft with top speeds of approximately 565 
knots and cruising speeds of 420 knots. The service ceiling is 38,000 feet, 
though it is normally operated at flight levels between 25,000 and 30,000 feet. 
The last major system upgrade was the Improved Capability II (ICAP II) in 
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the mid-1980s with occasional software upgrades since. Currently, the fleet is 
receiving safety of flight and navigational system upgrades dubbed Block 89A. 
In light of the mission consolidation, a major mission system upgrade, ICAP 
III, has received preliminary funding from Congress in the fiscal year 1997 
Defense Authorization. The Prowler is also being upgraded to carry a tactical 
communications jammer, the USQ-113, to further enhance its effectiveness.4 
2. The General Dynamics/Grumman EF -lllA Raven 
Unlike the Prowler, all EF-111s are modified F-111 Aardvark, 
supersonic bombers upgraded by Grumman Aerospace to employ the ALQ-
99E Tactical Jamming System. The Air Force Raven began service in late 
1981 resulting in a total inventory of 42 aircraft. Two squadrons of EF-111s 
were established. The first and largest squadron, the 390th Electronic Combat 
Squadron (ECS), was based at Mountain Home Air Force Base in Idaho, and 
the second squadron, the 42nd ECS based at Royal Air Force Base Upper 
Heyford, England. Mter Desert Storm, the squadrons were consolidated into 
the 429th Electronic Combat Squadron and based at Canon Air Force Base, 
New Mexico with the remaining F-111s. There are currently 12 Ravens in the 
inventory,scheduled for retirement in fiscal year 1998. The Air Force 
maintains rotating detachments of EF-111s at bases in Incirlik, Turkey and 
Dhahran, Saudi Arabia to support ongoing operations in no-fly zones in 
4 Guns ton, Bill, An illustrated Guide to Spy Planes and Electronic Warfare 
Aircraft, New York, Prentice Hall, 1988, pp. 80-89. 
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northern and southern Iraq. Ravens are also in service in Operation Joint 
Endeavor in the Balkans. 5 
The EF-111 is similar to the Prowler in that it uses the ALQ-99 Tactical 
Jamming System. Like the Prowler, its sensors are located in the 
characteristic tail pod known as the "football." The Raven differs from the 
Prowler in that it carries all ten of its jamming transmitters internally in a 16 
foot long canoe-shaped ventral fairing. Additionally, the Raven is a two-seat 
aircraft manned by a pilot and Electronic Warfare Officer (EWO) seated to his 
right. The system relies on a higher scale of automation via its AYK-14 tactical 
computer to decrease the substantial workload involved in electronic 
surveillance and countermeasures. Also, the Raven is not capable of employing 
the HARM missile unlike its Navy counterpart. The EF-111 is a super-sonic 
aircraft with top speeds in excess of 1200 knots and a cruising speed of 430 
knots. The service ceiling is 45,000 feet, though like the Prowler, it tends to 
operate at lower altitudes. 6 The Raven mission system has received four block 
upgrades since its inception. A scheduled System Improvement Program (SIP) 
first funded and subsequently cut in 1988 was canceled again in 1995 when the 
decision to retire the platform in favor of the EA-6B was made. 7 
5 Interview with Ronald Rivard, Lt Col, USAF, Joint Operations Staff, 
COMVAQWINGPAC, NAS Whidbey Island, WA, 26 March 1996. 
6 Gunston. 
7 Knowles, John and Zachary Lum, "Into the Readiness Gap," Journal of 
Electronic Defense, 19:3, March, 1996, pp. 46-51. 
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3. The Decision to Consolidate the Electronic Warfare Mission 
Consolidation of the Tactical Airbome Electronic Warfare Mission is not 
a new concept. Proponents of using the EA-6B as the Defense Department's 
primary electronic combat aircraft can be found as early as 1982 when the 
Raven was just entering service. 8 These voices were quieted with the enormous 
defense build-up by the Reagan administration. There simply weren't enough of 
either aircraft to meet deployment commitments and adequate funding was 
available to maintain both platforms and their infrastructure. However, the 
collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the end of the Cold War led to enormous 
cutbacks in defense spending as lawmakers sought the fruits of the so-called 
"Peace Dividend." With funding becoming increasingly scarce and the costs of 
upgrading both fleets measured in the billions of dollars, the decision to find cost 
savings in consolidation found renewed support. In his famous July, 1992 
Senate floor speech, Senator Sam Nunn called for the elimination of 
unnecessary duplication of capabilities and a move towards joint 
interoperability. He specifically cited alleged redundancies in electronic combat 
aircraft and charged Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell to find 
and eliminate these redundancies during his review of the roles and missions of 
the armed forces. 9 Interestingly, the Senate failed in attempting to begin the 
consolidation process prior to receiving General Powell's report by, 
" ... eliminating further EF-111 upgrades and concentrating all funds in the EA-
8 Miller, Gerald E., "The Promises and Pitfalls of USAF-Navy Cooperation," Air 
Force Magazine, 65:11, November, 1982, p. 73. 
9 Nunn, p. S9562. 
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6B [program]" when formulating the fiscal year 1993 Defense Authorization.10 
When the Chairman delivered his findings in February, 1993, he specifically 
recommended retaining both aircraft, citing complementary not duplicative 
capabilities that significantly benefit the Defense Department.n 
When the congressionally-mandated Commission on Roles and Missions 
of the Armed Forces delivered their recommendations over two years later, the 
alleged redundancy in tactical electronic warfare was re-analyzed. This time, 
the recommendation was for increasing funding for the Prowler and retirement 
of the EF-111. This time, Pentagon and service officials had preemptively 
decided on a course of action months before the CORM submitted its findings. 
As early as November, 1994 indications that the EF-111 was headed for the 
"chopping block" led to Program Budget Decisions (PBD) 752 and 753 in 
December 1994. PBD 752 increased funding and manning appropriations for 
the Prowler beginning in fiscal year 1996 by $656 million while PBD 753 cut 
funding for the Raven by $1.482 billion through the end of fiscal year 1997, 
respectively.12 Though no official direction was provided until September, 1995, 
the shifting of funds combined with the decision by top Air Force officials to 
retire the EF-111left little doubt that the Prowler was intended to be the sole 
10 Boatman, John, ''Tougher Line on Joint Projects," Janes Defence Weekly, 
18:16, October 17, 1992, p. 7. 
11 Powell, Report on the Roles. Missions. and Functions of the Armed Forces of 
the United States. 
12 See: Program Budget Decisions 752 and 753. Additionally, a November 1994 
report from the Operations Staff to the Commander, Electronic Combat Wing Pacific 
outlined concerns that required consideration if the EA-6B community was destined 
to assume the electronic combat mission for the Air Force. 
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source of Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (JSEAD) support into the 
21st century.13 
4. Choosing the EA-6B over the EF-lllA 
The decision to retire the Raven in favor of the Prowler was made 
according to many variables including fiscal considerations, operational 
capabilities, availability and survivability. The EA-6B was the best platform in 
nearly every area. Several capabilities and advantages were traded-off in the 
selection of the Prowler. Of primary concern was that the platform be equally 
suited for both land-based and carrier-based operations. This meant that the 
Prowler would be the aircraft of choice since the Raven is not carrier capable 
(ironically, the F-111 was originally intended for shipboard use, but was too 
large to operate in the carrier environment). However, other attributes of the 
Prowler were also key in the decision to retire the EF-111. 
With the F-4G Wild Weasel also slated for deactivation, the Air Force 
was forced to rush into integrating the HARM Targeting System (HTS) on the 
F-16 as a replacement. Unfortunately, the HTS-equipped Falcon is not an 
equal substitution for the SEAD capabilities lost in retiring the Wild Weasel.14 
The superior HARM employment capability is a much closer replacement. 
Also, the Prowler is capable of communications jamming, which the Raven is 
not configured to perform. For survivability considerations, the Raven carries 
only two aircrew while the Prowler carries four. This leads to greatly enhanced 
13 Interview with Kenneth Scruggs, LCDR, USN, Joint Operations Manning 
Requirements, COMVAQWINGPAC, NAS Whidbey Island, WA, 12 August 1996. 
14 Knowles and Lum, p. 50. 
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situational awareness, division oflabor and response time for the EA-6B.15 All 
of these are critical in the dynamic realm of electronic combat. 
With a rapidly expanding surface-to-air threat environment and the 
proliferation of third and fourth generation anti-aircraft missile systems, both 
the Raven and Prowler were in dire need of extensive system upgrades, the 
costs of which for both were well over $1 billion. The upgrades proposed for the 
Prowler were actually more extensive. However, these upgrades would be 
considerably more effective in bringing the EA-6B to the level required to meet 
emerging threats. Additionally, there were 127 EA-6B aircraft in the inventory 
as opposed to a total of 40 Ravens in the Air Force inventory.16 Training 
considerations showed that while the Raven pilots were trained at the F-111 
training squadron, training for EWOs in the art of employing the Raven system 
was done by the operational squadrons. Conversely, the Prowler community 
had VAQ-129, the designated Fleet Replacement Squadron with more than 15 
dedicated aircraft for the express purpose of training pilots and ECMOs for the 
fleet. Fiscally, the Prowler is a cheaper aircraft to operate. The Flight Hour 
Program cost for the Prowler in 1996 is approximately $3,255 per flight hour 
while the cost per flight hour for the Raven is approximately $5,500.17 
15 Electronic Warfare Associates, "Joint Prowler Program," Draft Brief dated 
March 6, 1995. 
17 Force Comptroller, COMNAVAIRPAC, "Official Flying Hour Cost Report: 
June 1996," August 9, 1996, Activity Group 1A, TACAIRIEA-6B. and Electronic 
Warfare Associates, Draft Brief. 
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Arguments that questioned Prowler ability to fill the gap that would be 
created by Raven retirement centered around performance differences between 
the two aircraft and tactical considerations in the different ways the services 
employed their airborne jamming assets. The Prowler, as previously 
mentioned, is not capable of super-sonic flight, and many tacticians worried 
that the concept of "fast strike" would be jeopardized. Some Air Force plans 
and tactics require super-sonic runs deep into the battle arena followed by 
super-sonic exits from the threat environment. The differences in service 
ceilings, range and endurance were also questioned as the Raven has slightly 
greater capacity in each of these areas. Finally, Air Force tactics are different 
than Navy SEAD tactics, with different profiles flown by the two jammers. 
This was more of a parochial concern as training to new tactics was never 
considered to be a "show stopper." Nevertheless, each of these areas was 
scrutinized and evaluated before the decision to retire the EF-111 was made. 
B. THE PROCESS OF CONSOLIDATION 
The decision to consolidate the electronic warfare mission officially 
began in late 1994 with the issuance of Program Budget Decisions 752 and 753 
by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Since then, two Joint-Service 
Expeditionary Squadrons have been established and the first of these 
squadrons, the V AQ-134 "Garrudas," has been deployed to Marine Corps Air 
Station (MCAS) Iwakuni in southern Honshu, Japan. This milestone occurred 
well ahead of the timeline originally developed. However, the process of 
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consolidation was not simple. Several Concept of Operations (CONOPS) 
meetings were held and many options were considered before the final 
Memorandum of Agreement was distributed in March 1996. The plan is still in 
flux, with concems about adequate funding, deployment schedules and the 
ability of the Navy to provide the support required by the Air Force still under 
debate. 
1. Initial Planning, Options and Concerns 
In January 1995, a Concept of Operations meeting was arranged by the 
Current Operations Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Operations Directorate 
(J33). This meeting was held on January 25 and 26, 1995 at Naval Air Station 
Whidbey Island and included representatives from each CINC staff, the Joint 
Command and Control Warfare Center (JC2WC), the Navy, Air Force, Marine 
Corps and various representatives from the Navy and Air Force electronic 
attack community. The purpose of the meeting was to provide an orientation 
on the EA-6B, joint CONOPS development, and to receive input from each 
CINC regarding electronic warfare requirements in both peacetime and war. IS 
The main objective of this initial meeting was to identify CINC and Joint Staff 
requirements. This would allow the Navy and Air Force to begin planning for 
the final configurations of the joint squadrons and the multitude of transition 
requirements as the EF-111 retired and the EA-6B operational inventory was 
18 Message from Joint Staff dated January 14, 1995. 
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increased.19 The meeting was viewed as successful with everyone involved 
from the Joint Staff to the CINCs and individual services agreeing on, " ... a 
baseline understanding of capability differences and, in some cases, a reluctant 
realization that we will have to make this program work and work efficiently 
with 16 operational EA-6B's (plus 4 more for [FRS] training)."20 Immediate 
recommendations were to increase the Navy Primary Aircraft Inventory (P AI) 
of EA-6Bs by 20 aircraft and halt the decommissioning of V AQ-134 as part of 
the drawdown for its rebirth as the first joint-service squadron. Initial plans 
were to have the Garrudas in deployable status by mid-1996 to cover the EF-
111 force reduction, and ready the squadron for deployment in fiscal year 
1997.21 The increase in the EA-6B P AI allowed for 16 aircraft for use by four 
joint squadrons and 4 additional aircraft to support the increased training 
requirements at VAQ-129. 
Early in February 1995, using the budget authority shifts approved by 
PBD 752 (no official direction had been received), the Chief of Naval 
Operations' Aviation Manpower and Training Branch (N889) reestablished the 
manning requirements for VAQ-134 and prepared to recommission the V AQ-
133 ''Wizards" during fiscal year 1996. The ''Wizards" were one of the first EA-
6B squadrons decommissioned as part of the defense drawdown in 1991. 
19 Memo from Kenneth Kretch, CDR, USN, COMVAQWINGPAC Staff to AI 
Miller, CDR, USN, N880C3 (EA-6B Requirements Officer, Office of the Chief of 
Naval Operations), dated January 18, 1995. 
2o Message from Roger A. Pierce, CAPT, USN, COMV AQWINGPAC, to 
RobertJ. Spane, VADM, USN, COMNAVAIRPAC, dated January 27, 1995. 
211bid. 
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Additionally, plans were made to "stand up" the final two joint squadrons, the 
VAQ-137 "Rooks" and the VAQ-142 "Grim Watchdogs," in fiscal year 1997. 
With the increase in operational squadrons and the joint nature of the new 
squadrons, manning at training facilities and maintenance activities at NAS 
Whidbey Island were also programmed for expansion. Additionally, an Air 
Force liaison was requested from USAF to assist in the smooth transition to 
"Purple Prowlers."22. 
On February 28, 1995, a meeting was held at the headquarters of the 
Commander, Naval Air Forces Pacific Fleet (COMNAVAIRPAC), " ... to 
establish a baseline for efforts required to identify supportability issues ... "23 
The minutes of this meeting highlighted two options for joint squadron 
composition. The overall plan was to establish four joint-service Prowler 
squadrons that would be deployed to air bases in Incirlik, Turkey and Dhahran, 
Saudi Arabia and other sites as requested by regional CINCs. The first option 
was for six aircraft per squadron that could be split into two detachments for 
dual site manning, and the second option was for four aircraft per squadron 
with a two aircraft "plus up" for deployments that would still meet the two 
detachment plan of option one. 24 Major concems addressed at this meeting 
included readiness, flight hour funding, and shore basing requirements. 
22 Memo from R. Buncher to COMNAVAIRPAC EA-6B Requirements Office 
dated February 3, 1995. 
23 Memo from Butler Smythe, LCDR, USN, COMNAVAIRPAC Staff to 
COMV AQWINGPAC Readiness Office, dated March 2, 1995. 
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Maintenance issues revolved around funding for Standard Depot Level 
Maintenance (SDLM) of aircraft and Intermediate level Maintenance Activity 
"vans" since the Air Force had recently transitioned to only two levels of 
maintenance (operational and depot levels). Additionally, supply and logistics 
concerns such as support equipment, Aviation Consolidated Allowance List 
(A VCAL) spares, and Individual Material Readiness List (IMRL) tools were 
also identified. 
From March 27 through 29, 1996, another joint CONOPS meeting was 
held by J33 at the Naval Doctrine Command and U.S. Atlantic Command to 
address these issues. Joint Staff goals also included production of a timetable 
and concept of operations for the completion of transition of all JSEAD 
responsibility to the Navy and the publication of a draft Memorandum of 
Agreement between the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps to support the 
plan.25 The briefings began with an overview of the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense vision for the future of electronic warfare by the Joint Staff, noting 
that no official direction on how the consolidation of the JSEAD mission was to 
be accomplished.26 The CINC representatives highlighted their concerns for 
providing the required electronic attack support to units in the areas of 
responsibility while the Marine Corps briefed specific concems of the Army and 
Marines regarding electronic attack support on the "digitized battlefield." The 
25 Message from Joint Staff dated March 13, 1995. 
26 Secretary of Defense William Percy's "Annual Report to the President and 
Congress," dated February 1995, did point out that the Navy EA-6B would assume 
the Air Force EF-111 mission, p. 208. 
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Air Combat Command voiced concerns that the consolidation would limit their 
ability to provide electronic warfare support to their forces and suggested to 
options to lessen the impact. The first option was to "nationalize" the EA-6B 
and the second was to transfer a number of Prowlers to the Air Force instead of 
establishing joint squadrons managed by the Navy. After these briefings, 
attendees were divided into four working groups that discussed: (1) CINC 
requirements (peacetime/major regional conflict or MRC/contingency 
operations), (2) logistics and training issues, (3) EA-6B warfighting upgrades 
and (4) EA-6B/USAF mission integration and planning systems.27 Each of 
these working groups identified possible solutions and alternatives to the 
problems discussed. The Logistics and Training working group's findings 
indicated that the most cost effective and timely results could be found through 
the continuation of the joint-service plan.28 
By the end of the conference, a draft Memorandum of Agreement 
between the Air Force and Navy laid down the ground work for the 
establishment of, "[f]our land-based carrier-capable EA-6B squadrons of at 
least six aircraft each, fully trained and continuously available for tasking ... "29 
The squadrons were to be located at NAS Whidbey Island to make efficient use 
of the existing support and training infrastructure, and the squadrons would be 
manned by a combination of Air Force and Navy air crew but, would be 
27 "Hot Wash Up: Joint EA-6B CONOPS Meeting," dated March 27-28, 1995. 
28 Ibid. 
29 ''USN/USAF Memorandum of Agreement on Consolidation of Airborne 
Electronic Attack Mission," Draft, dated March 30, 1995. 
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maintained by Navy personnel. Training for all personnel would remain under 
the purview of the Navy. The agreement required that the squadrons would be 
land-based and supported as such. The MOA also left planning, programming 
and budgeting for the squadrons and necessary upgrades to the discretion of 
the Navy.3o The agreement also outlined areas of agreement and points of 
disagreement that were still left to be answered. Both services agreed that the 
ability to prosecute two nearly simultaneous MRCs would be questionable, but 
the goal was to meet the CINC requirements. Funding levels in areas such as 
IMA "vans", AVCAUspares, training and mission planning systems were also 
agreed upon. The major points of disagreement centered around whether the 
Prowler should be "nationalized," if the squadrons should be carrier-qualified 
and short and long term "mission area" funding issues.31 Because of 
considerable dissension over the language and scope of the MOA, it was not 
adopted. The Air Force followed through with plans to determine the feasibility 
of organically operating and maintaining a force of EA-6Bs and which base 
(NAS Whidbey Island, MCAS Cherry Point, or Cannon AFB) should serve as 
their home.32 
2. Squadron Composition, "Ownership" and Basing Issues 
A feasibility study and site survey conducted by the Air Force in June 
1995, reported, " ... that while it would be possible for the Air Force to own and 
30 Ibid. 
32 Headquarters, U.S. Air Force message 211959ZAPR95, Subject: EA-6B 
Feasibility Assessment and Site Visits, April21, 1995. 
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operate the EA-6B, the absence of compelling warfighting advantages and the 
presence of significant ops and logistics complications make integration of this 
weapon system into the USAF undesirable."33 The report also recommended 
that NAS Whidbey Island serve as the home base for the joint squadrons. 
In recommending against USAF ownership of EA-6Bs, the survey team 
cited Navy corporate knowledge as advantageous to re-configuring 
"mothballed" Prowlers to meet the expanded PAl as well as significant 
maintenance and technical data resource differences between the two services 
as potential stumbling blocks. Overcoming these issues, " ... would involve a 
significant amount of retraining ... and an extensive level of time and effort."34 
The report cited past difficulties in this area when the Air Force acquired HH-
60 Blackhawk helicopters from the Army. Additionally, the Tactical EA-6B 
Mission Planning System (TEAMS) that provides complete mission and 
aircraft planning data for the ALQ-99 system is not compatible with the Air 
Force Mission Support System (AFMSS) or Combat Intelligence System (CIS) 
and a minimum investment of $10 million and two years would be required to 
assimilate. Finally, supply support for the aircraft would have to be conducted 
manually between the Air Force and Navy since the supply systems of each 
service are different. After careful consideration of these and other manpower 
and personnel training issues, the survey team concluded: 
33 Message from John W. Gillis, Lt Col, USAF, Air Combat Command CINC 
and Congressional Support Staff to Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, dated June 7, 
1995, p. 2. 
34 Ibid., p. 4. 
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USAF ownership would allow more direct control of 
training/integration and maintain USAF expertise in the support 
jamming role. However, these objectives can also be achieved 
through a robust joint training program and an increased USAF 
aircrew presence in the Navy EA-6B program. Given the cost and 
complexity associated with setting up this unique unit, as well as 
the absence of net value added, [we] believe the best course of 
action is to allow the Department of the Navy, well experienced in 
operating the EA-6B, to continue to do so.35 
The decision to maintain the squadrons at NAS Whidbey Island was 
equally well-though-out. Six areas of concern were analyzed and given the 
following priority: (1) Operations, (2) Housing, (3) Mission Facilities, (4) 
Manpower and Organization, (5) Supply, and (6) Intermediate Level Support. 
There were four main issues addressed in evaluating each site for operations. 
Single-engine performance was an issue at Cannon AFB since its elevation of 
4,295 feet above sea level combined with temperatures greater than 90 
degrees fahrenheit exceeded conditions for safe single-engine rates of climb if an 
engine were to fail on takeoff. Neither Whidbey Island nor Cherry Point 
exceeded these safety of flight issues. The next factors considered under 
operations was the availability of electronic warfare, ground controlled 
intercept and acquisition radar training and flight simulator facilities. Whidbey 
Island has the 15E34 "Dolly'' electronic combat simulation system specifically 
designed for airborne electronic warfare training as well as excess capacity in 
both its "front seat" flight simulators and "back seat" system training 
simulator. Cherry Point had available airbome and flight training facilities, 
however there was little excess capacity built into the current contracts. 
Cannon did not have simulators and would require installation of facilities at 
35 Ibid., p. 7. 
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great expense or significant temporary assigned duty (TAD) funding to send 
aircrews to Whidbey Island for requisite training. The final operational factor 
considered was training airspace availability. Whidbey Island aircraft had 
access to four large operating airspaces and the commercial air traffic 
congestion was minimal. Cherry Point was at a disadvantage due mainly to its 
proximity to major commercial air traffic control centers on the eastern 
seaboard. 
The second area of concern was housing. Both Cherry Point and Cannon 
had sufficient military and civilian housing to accommodate the new squadrons 
while Whidbey would require $15 million in additional military construction 
budget authority to construct additional housing. The waiting period for housing 
at Whidbey Island was between four and 14 months. However, locating at 
Whidbey Island would negate the long-term need for TAD billeting during 
training evolutions. 
The third area analyzed was the availability of mission facilities. None of 
the bases had sufficient facilities to support the additional squadrons. 
However, significant cost differences, estimated in fiscal year 1997 dollars, 
existed. New construction and improvements at Cherry Point were estimated 
at $11 million as compared to only $4 million at both Cannon and Whidbey 
Island. Whidbey Island was considered more advantageous in light of the 
already mentioned costs and difficulties in manpower, logistics, and training 
faced with locating at Cannon. 
The next area, Manpower and Organization, was not as favorable at 
Whidbey Island. Cannon was the first choice since it was an Air Force base 
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and already configured, manned and organized for USAF control. Cherry Point, 
although a naval installation, was in the U.S. Atlantic Command's (USACOM) 
AOR as was the Air Combat Command. This would greatly ease coordination 
and communications between the two organizations. Whidbey Island was the 
least favorable option, since it was a Navy installation and fell under the 
responsibility of the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM). 
As previously mentioned, the area of Supply would be easier if the 
squadrons were located at a naval installation. In this area, both Whidbey 
Island and Cherry Point were "tied" since they used the same supply system 
and coordinated through COMVAQWINGPAC for supply support. Cannon 
would have been faced with extended lead and turn around times since all 
supply support would have to be handled manually. 
The final area of concern, Intermediate Level Maintenance support, was 
overwhelmingly in favor ofWhidbey Island. Although Whidbey Island needed 
additional manpower to increase the Aviation Intermediate Maintenance 
Department's (AIMD) capacity, the site was permanent, supplying personnel 
as necessary for SEAOPDET requirements for deployed units. Cherry Point 
also had intermediate level support, but these units deployed with the Marine 
squadrons and a much larger increase in personnel and maintenance "vans" 
would be required. Since the Air Force had transitioned to two levels of 
maintenance and the availability of EA-6B spare parts would not support that 
concept, intermediate level support would have to be supplied from Whidbey 
Island anyway. 
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In summary, the site survey team recommended basing the joint 
squadron aircraft at NAS Whidbey Island, stating that: 
Whidbey Island offers the best facilities and training environment 
to stand up the [joint-service squadrons]. It would also require 
only one move for training and unit assignment. Aircraft expertise 
is readily available and the ... supply pipeline would be as short as 
possible. [We] believe these advantages outweigh the housing 
shortage and USPACOM coordination differences. The single 
engine performance limitations at Cannon would add risk to 
summer operations. Cherry Point has the housing and aircraft 
expertise, but would further congest East coast airspace.36 
3. The General Officer Steering Group (GOSG): Analysis and 
Results 
On June 21, 1995, a General Officer Steering Group headed by Rear 
Admiral Francis W. Lacroix, presented their recommendations from their 
"EA-6B Consolidation Study'' as directed by the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense in February 1995.37 The brief provided background and insights into 
CINC requirements for Operations Other Than War (OOTW). The GOSG main 
question for analysis was how to cover the CINC requirements with adequate 
electronic attack assets with PERSTEMPO being the overriding factor.38 
Based on a 2:1 PERSTEMPO for the existing nine Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 
dedicated Navy squadrons, one Navy reserve EA-6B squadron and 4 Marine 
36 Ibid., p. 11. 
37 Lacroix, Francis W., RADM, USN, and the General Officer Steering Group, 
"EA-6B Consolidation Study," Draft Brief, dated June 21, 1995. 
38 PERSTEMPO is the ratio at which personnel are "at home" vs deployed. For 
example, a PERSTEMPO of 2: 1 implies that for evezy 6 months a unit is deployed, 
they are supposed to remain in port for 12 months. This does not preclude the unit 
from participating in short exercises and detachments away from home base in a 
temporarily assigned duty status. Navy policy strictly enforces the 2: 1 rule for 
extended deployments. 
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Corps Prowler squadrons for deployment to MCAS Iwakuni, three squadrons 
were required to maintain 1 continuously deployed. Using this calculation, the 
GOSG determined that to cover three forward deployed sites (Iwakuni plus two 
USAF support sites) would require 19 squadrons. With only the fourteen 
squadrons in existence, the GOSG determined that an actual requirement for 
five joint-service squadrons would be necessary.39 With four aircraft per CVW 
squadron and five aircraft per Marine squadron, the Primary Aircraft 
Inventory for EA-6Bs stood at 60 Prowlers.40 The addition of five joint-service 
squadrons with 4 aircraft each raised the new PAl to 80 aircraft. Additionally, 
25 percent of PAl determines the number of aircraft required for training 
(V AQ-129), therefore the FRS fleet would be expanded to 20 aircraft. Also, the 
Operational Test and Evaluation Force (OPTEVFOR) squadron, VX-9, 
maintains four aircraft for test purposes. This culminated in a new Prowler 
fleet PAl of 104 EA-6Bs. Estimating 16 percent of the EA-6B inventory as 
undergoing Standard Depot Level Maintenance at a given period equated to a 
SDLM requirement of 17 aircraft. Therefore, the GOSG determined that Total 
Aircraft Inventory for the assumption of the JSEAD mission would be 121 EA-
6Bs. With an Full Aircraft Inventory of 127 EA-6Bs, the Steering Group 
concluded that sufficient aircraft were available to assume the mission and 
accommodate six years of attrition.41 
39 GOSG, p. 13. 
40 Perry, "Annual Report," 1995, p. 208. 
41 GOSG, p. 16. 
104 
The concept of operations outlined by the General Officer Steering 
Group required that the Prowler fleet be: (1) MRC responsive, (2) the entire 
EA-6B fleet would be owned and operated by the Department of the Navy, (3) 
one squadron would be assigned to each deployable air wing, ( 4) MCAS Iwakuni 
would be continuously manned by rotating squadrons of Marine Corps 
Prowlers, (5) the fleet would have the capability to deploy a minimum of2land-
base EA-6B squadrons simultaneously for OOTW, and (6) land-based 
operations would be logistically sustainable with both operational-level and 
intermediate level support available. To ensure that the budget authority 
would be available to support this concept of operations, the GOSG established 
a baseline Program Objective Memorandum (POM) with two other options. The 
baseline POM included the budget "plus-up" provided for in PBD 752 which 
allowed for 15 Block 89A upgrades as well as adequate personnel and Navy 
Operations and Maintenance (O&M/N) funding. What PBD 752 did not provide 
budget authority for was the depot maintenance funding required to activate 
24 "mothballed" EA-6Bs or the funds for purchasing shore support 
requirements. Shore support requirements included deployable intermediate 
level maintenance "vans", spare parts or mission planning equipment. This 
baseline resulted in an "inventory bathtub" (i.e. shortfall) because of a depot 
maintenance funding shortfall in fiscal years 1996 and 1997 of $38 million for 
the 24 inactive Prowlers. 
A second option presented combined the Navy POM (including PBD 752) 
and an Air Force POM for $152 million that provided funding for electronic 
warfare assets in fiscal years 1997, 1998 and 1999. This option would mitigate 
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the afore-mentioned "inventory bathtub" by providing the $152 million in 
funding which would cover the depot maintenance for the 24 EA-6Bs, fund 
intermediate level "vans", and maintain a 12 aircraft EF-111 inventory 
through fiscal year 1999. This option did not provide for depot maintenance and 
"vans" beyond 1999 that was estimated to be $105 million. It also extended 
the EF-111 in the Air Force inventory at least two years beyond its scheduled 
retirement in fiscal year 1997. 
The third option, dubbed the "Accelerated Department of the Navy 
Program Objective Memorandum," included the $656 million provided for in 
PBD 752 plus accelerated funding plan for $105 million in fiscal years 1996 
and 1997. The new total of$761 million reduced the inventory shortfall to four 
aircraft in fiscal year 1997 and provided shore sustainability for fiscal years 
1996 and 1997. Additionally, the accelerated POM option provided for full Joint 
mission capability by January 1998, met the Raven retirement goal of April 
1997, and ensured that the first Joint-Service Expeditionary Squadron, VAQ-
134, would be ready for operations by April 1996.42 
The brief then addressed the three overarching goals required by the Air 
Force participants. The first goals was that the EA-6B would be able to fill all 
Joint requirements. The GOSG asserted that the Accelerated Navy POM 
option would ensure that this goal was met. The next target was that the plan 
would provide for an adequate number of electronic warfare assets through the 
transition period of consolidation. Once again, the GOSG determined that this 
end would be best served by the Accelerated POM option. Finally, the Air Force 
42 Ibid., pp. 22-23. 
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stated that they wanted adequate peace-time access to the EA-6Bs for 
training purposes and exercises. The Steering Group recommended that a 
Memorandum of Understanding between the Air Force, Navy and Marine 
Corps be promulgated to ensure that the Air Force would not be left out when 
assets were required to meet commitments other than contingency operations. 
The next issue addressed by the Steering Group was the requisite 
upgrades to the EA-6B to maintain its value as a force multiplier. Priorities for 
various upgrades were based on four studies in the areas of Prowler specific 
electronic warfare. The funding analysis assumed that all 127 TAl EA-6Bs 
would be upgraded. The four studies were the EA-6B Operational Assessment 
Group (OAG) priority list, which is a compilation of needs identified by the 
members of the EA-6B community, a draft report of the Joint Tactical 
Airborne Electronic Warfare Study (JTAEWS) EA-6B Recommendations, the 
Navy Low Cost Advanced Capabilities (ADVCAP) Alternative Study, and a 
contractor provided EA-6B Alternative Upgrade Study. The GOSG determined 
that five upgrades were required based on comparison of the studies. The 
highest priority upgrade was development of a high frequency jamming 
capability to counter fourth generation or "double digit" Russian-made surface-
to-air missile systems. The funding analysis determined that $105 million in 
Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) budget authority would be required. The 
next required upgrade would center around electronic receiver upgrades to 
complement recently acquired low frequency and proposed high band jamming 
transmitter improvements. Initial FYDP funding would be $154 million with an 
additional $294 million to complete the upgrade. The third priority was a 
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"Connectivity Upgrade" that would provide the Prowler with data-link ability to 
communicate and coordinate with space assets, national airborne electronic 
intelligence assets and other strike aircraft such as the F-16 and F-15. FYDP 
funding for the upgrade was estimated at $124 million. The fourth priority 
upgrade was a structural upgrade to take advantage of two currently unused 
under-wing stores stations. Activating these stations would allow the Prowler 
to carry two extra HARM missiles, approximately 4000 pounds of additional 
fuel or two extra jamming pods for a total of 4 additional jammer transmitters. 
Initial FYDP funding was $140 million with an additional $32 million to 
complete. The final proposed upgrade was for expansion of the EA-6B 
communications jamming capability. Required Future Years Defense Plan 
funding was estimated at $236 million. The grand total for upgrading all 127 
EA-6Bs with the five high-priority upgrades was estimated at nearly $1.1 
billion.43 
Based on their analysis, the General Officer Steering Group 
recommended that the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and the 
OSD Program Review Group endorse the following: (1) implement the 
"Accelerated Department of the Navy Program Objective Memorandum" as it 
provided for an acceptable transition schedule while drastically reducing the 
aircraft inventory shortfall while providing for adequate land-based support, (2) 
direct the Navy to act as "owner/operator" for the joint-service squadrons 
providing that a Memorandum of Understanding between all parties for 
training operations and exercises was established and Air Force personnel were 
43 Ibid., p. 26. 
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integrated into the joint squadrons and COMV AQWINGPAC staff, and (3) that 
the identified warfighting upgrades be implemented as budget resources 
allowed. 
The GSOG briefed the Joint Requirements Oversight Council on June 
26, 1995. The JROC recommended the following directives: 
1) That 5 new joint-service EA-6B squadrons consisting of four aircraft 
each. One Marine Corps Prowler squadron would be included into the 
rotation for a total of six squadrons in the JSEAD mission area. This 
would allow the squadrons to cover two simultaneous land-based 
deployments using a 2:1 PERSTEMPO. 
2) The EF-111 would be retired in fiscal year 1997, and would not be 
extended as earlier proposed by the Air Force. 
3) Support shortfalls would be experienced in the area of intermediate 
level capability and mission planning systems during the first year, 
but would be funded for in following years. 
4) Funding for 24 SDLMs would be provided in fiscal year 1997. 
However, 12 SDLMs would be performed in fiscal year 1996 with 12 
more in fiscal year 1997.44 
On July 18, 1995, the Joint Staff Force Structure, Resources and 
Assessment Directorate (J8) staff briefed the Defense Resources Board (DRB) 
accepted the JROC recommendations and GSOG Accelerated Navy POM 
option and forwarded this recommendation to the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense. Vice Admiral William Owens, Vice Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
and Chairman of the JROC, instructed his staff to perform a electronic 
44 Boe, J. R., LCDR, USN, COMNAVAIRPAC EA-6B Requirements Officer, 
"Point Paper on the EA-6B/EF-111A Mission Transition Issue," July 18, 1995 and 
Message from Roger A. Pierce, CAPT, USN, COMVAQWINGPAC to Robert J. 
Spane, VADM, USN, COMNAVAIRPAC, dated July 17, 1995. 
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warfare mission assessment to examine the funding requirements for the 
warfighting upgrades recommended by the GOSG. 45 
By mid-July 1995, the process and plan for consolidation of the JSEAD 
mission had finally solidified and plans for funding and logistics were well 
underway. Interestingly, official direction from the Chief of Naval Operations 
had still not been issued. This was now more than a simple administrative 
inconvenience as other defense agencies were becoming involved in areas of 
programming, budgeting, logistics and personnel, but could not obligate 
requisite budget authority to provide for the mission consolidation. 46 Finally, on 
September 3, 1995, nearly one year after the initial planning for the Navy 
assumption of the Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses for the 
Department of Defense, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jeremy Boorda, 
issued direction to COMNAVAIRPAC and COMVAQWINGPAC to establish 
five Joint-Service Expeditionary Squadrons.47 
45 Message from AI Miller, CDR, USN, Chief of Naval Operations Staff, EA-6B 
Requirements Officer (N880C3), to Brent M. Bennitt, V ADM, USN, Director 
Aviation Warfare Division, Chief of Naval Operations, July 18, 1995. 
46 Message from Roger A. Pierce, CAPT, USN, COMVAQWINGPAC to Robert 
J. Spane, VADM, USN, COMNAVAIRPAC, dated July 17,1995. 
47 Interview with LCDR Ken Scruggs, USN, Joint Operations Staff, 
COMV AQWINGPAC, August 12, 1996. 
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C. FINAL MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT: ADDRESSING 
JOINT ISSUES 
On March 25, 1996, the final Memorandum of Agreement between the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Air Force was 
issued. The MOA satisfied direction in Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) 
I, dated August 18, 1995. The purpose of the Agreement was to provide for, 
" ... mutually agreed procedures concerning operational and training scheduling, 
inter-Service aircrew augmentation, and employment of tactical jamming 
aircraft."48 The MOA was to become effective upon the approval of all services 
involved and was subject to triennial review, modification or termination. The 
Agreement placed Cognizant Agent responsibility on the Joint Staff Director 
for Operations and Operational Deputies of each service. Three main areas of 
concern are addressed by the MOA: (1) Operational and Training Scheduling, 
(2) Inter-Service Aircrew Augmentation, and (3) Employment of Tactical 
Jamming Aircraft. 49 
1. Operational and Training Scheduling 
For purposes of scheduling the joint-service squadrons, a semi-annual 
long-range planning conference was to determine planned deployments, 
training, test and evaluation, and various exercises based on USCINCACOM 
and USCINCPAC requirements. COMVAQWINGPAC was identified as the 
48 "Memorandum of Agreement Between the United States Navy, United 
States Marine Corps, United States Air Force, and the Joint Staff on EA-6B 
Support," Version 6.0, March 25, 1996, p. 1. 
49 Ibid. 
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responsible agency for training and test support. Additionally, Headquarters 
Marine Corps (HQMC) was to maintain final approval and coordination 
authority for the scheduling of Marine Prowlers. The Air Force also agreed to 
provide EF-111 assets to the maximum extent possible to cover other test, 
training and operations until the Raven is retired in mid-1997. 
2. Inter-Service Aircrew Augmentation 
In the area of inter-service aircrew integration, seven issues regarding 
training, manning and funding were addressed. First, the Air Force intends to 
maintain 24 EA-6B aircrew (6 pilots and 18 ECMOs) in the Prowler program 
at all times. This number equates to one USAF crew consisting of a pilot and 3 
ECMOs in each of the joint-service squadrons and one crew in training at VAQ-
129. The Agreement does not intend to "cap" the number of aircrew in the joint 
program but, simply identifies a minimum. The MOA also limits the number of 
field grade (0-4) officers to one in three. The second area addressed training 
issues. All Air Force crews that report to VAQ-129 are to have completed joint 
undergraduate pilot or navigator training and all ECMOs will have attended 
either USAF Electronic Warfare Officer School or Joint/Navy EWO/ECMO 
training at Naval Technical Training Center Corry Station in Pensacola, 
Florida. Pilots are required to attend joint undergraduate training including 
initial carrier qualification. The next issue reemphasized that Air Force crews 
must be qualified in the complete range of EA-6B training to include carrier 
qualification in the Prowler. The fourth item concemed coordination between 
the Navy and the Air Force liaison officer assigned to the Joint Operations 
Staff at the Wing. The liaison officer, currently a Lieutenant Colonel, is 
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responsible for coordinating an even flow of Air Force aircrew into the 
community. The Liaison Officer's responsibilities range from planning for 
inbound permanent change of station (PCS) personnel to their final 
assignment to one of the Joint-Service Expeditionary Squadrons. The fifth area 
directed the Navy as responsible for funding all training and associated costs 
for USAF aircrew and assimilation into the fleet. This responsibility also 
includes funding for all costs associated with deploying Air Force personnel as 
part of Navy operations. The Air Force is to be responsible for all costs 
incurred in service PCS moves and USAF specific professional development 
training. 
The next item concerned leadership opportunities within the squadrons 
and the Wing itself. The Navy is responsible for ensuring that all field grade 
officers are given equal consideration for commanding officer, executive officer 
and department head billets. The cognizant authority for this decision will 
remain with the Navy boards and personnel that have traditionally determined 
these positions. The same direction applies to USAF officers assigned to 
COMVAQWINGPAC. The final item maintained the authority to remove Air 
Force students from the training syllabus who fail to meet requisite standards 
with the Commanding Officer of the Fleet Replacement Squadron, VAQ-129. 
The MOA required that the USAF liaison officer be consulted prior to student 
removal from the training pipeline. 50 
50 Ibid., pp. 3-4. 
113 
3. Employment of Tactical Jamming Aircraft 
To ensure that the EA-6B is optimally employed in the support of 
training and operational evolutions specific to JSEAD, the Memorandum of 
Agreement detailed specific responsibilities and relationships between the 
services and cognizant agencies within each service in the areas of doctrine, 
tactics, training, infrastructure, maintenance support, budgeting and aircraft 
inventory management. The first area of concern was doctrine. With the 
renewed battle over roles and missions and the increased emphasis on 
jointness, doctrine has fallen under intense scrutiny. Even Navy traditional 
opposition toward doctrine has faded with the issuance of"Forward ... from the 
Sea." The MOA requires that the Department of the Navy issue EA-6B tactics 
for the support of joint operations to the CINCs as quickly as possible. To aid 
the Navy in accomplishing this task, the Agreement directed the Air, Land, 
Sea Application (ALSA) Center to develop a joint-service tactics, techniques 
and procedures (TTP) manual. This document, entitled "J-Prowler," will be 
distributed this year. Once the services approve and adopt the publication, the 
EA-6B Tactics Manual (TACMAN) is to be updated to reflect the Prowlers new 
role in the joint arena. 
On the issue of tactics, the MOA directed the ACC to assist the Navy 
Electronic Combat Weapons School (ECWS), the Naval Strike Warfare 
Center (NSWC), and the Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron 
ONE (MA WTS-1) in integrating USAF electronic combat tactics and training 
into their various academic and flight training syllabi. Additionally, the Navy 
and Marine Corps were tasked with assisting the various Air Force 
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Operational Commands (i.e. ACC and Pacific Air Forces) and the USAF 
Fighter Weapons School (USAFWS) in incorporating EA-6B specific 
capabilities and employment considerations into their operational planning and 
training processes. Also, the MOA instructs ECWS and USAFWS to develop a 
mutual relationship in developing joint training events to enhance Prowler 
interoperability with other forces. 
The Air Force and Navy were instructed to integrate the EA-6B into the 
Air Force Force Generation Plans (FGP) 100 and 200 by the end of the fiscal 
year. Force Generation Plans 100 and 200 delineate timelines for rapid 
deployment of forces. They provide a single source plan that units can train to, 
and generally represent worst case scenarios. The Air Force Inspector General 
also uses the FGPs to evaluate the ability of assigned units to meet these rapid 
deployment schedules. The amended FGPs are intended to ensure that the joint 
squadrons can deploy along the same timelines as other Air Force units. 51 
To determine that the joint squadrons will be assimilated seamlessly 
into Air Force composite wings during land-based deployment, the MOA tasked 
Commander, Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIRSYSCOM), HQMC 
Aviation Logistics Support (ASL), Chief of Naval Operations Staff, and 
Headquarters ACC Logistics, to develop a joint Aviation Logistics MOA that 
will identify the minimum support required ofland-based sites. 
Maintenance support issues are addressed by requiring the Marine 
Corps to maintain its 60-day maintenance support packages, and the Navy to 
51 Interview with Ronald Rivard, Lt Col, USAF, Joint Operations Staff, 
COMVAQWINGPAC, NAS Whidbey Island, August 8, 1996. 
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provide a minimum of two Peculiar Contingency Support Packages (PCSP) 
containing support equipment, A VCAL, IMRL, and intermediate level "vans" 
and all personnel necessary to provide such support. The PCSPs were part of 
the POM submission forwarded by the JROC to the OSD for programming and 
budgeting. 52 The first of these packages will be available by the first quarter of 
fiscal year 1997 and the second will be operational by the third quarter of fiscal 
year 1998.53 
Planning, programming and budgeting for the EA-6B will continue to be 
managed by the Department of the Navy. A minimum of one USAF liaison 
officer will be assigned to ensure Air Force requirements are considered in all 
funding evolutions. Additionally, the MOA requires the Navy to take all 
necessary steps to ensure that increase to the agreed upon Primary Aircraft 
Inventory of 104 EA-6Bs will be completed by October 1, 1997. The MOA 
further directs the Navy to provide a detailed plan of action and milestones for 
the accomplishment of this goal within 45 days of approval of the MOA. 
Additionally, the Navy is required to advise all parties of any delays or changes 
in budgeting or the overall consolidation process that will affect increase to the 
104 Prowler PAl. 
The final direction contained in the Agreement requires the Joint Staff 
Deputy Director for Current Readiness and Capabilities (J38) to provide 
52 See: GOSG, p. 23 and Miller, message dated July 18, 1995. 
53 Memorandum of Agreement, March 1996, p. 5. 
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periodic updates on consolidation progress to each of the services on November 
1, 1996, March 1, 1997, September 1, 1997 and by specific request thereafter. 
D. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CONSOLIDATION PROCESS FROM 
APRIL TO AUGUST 1996 
Even though advancement towards complete consolidation of the 
electronic warfare mission has progressed steadily since the promulgation of 
the final version of the Memorandum of Agreement, the Agreement itself has 
not been approved. Apparently the MOA is being "staffed" for continued 
analysis within the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. 54 The primary 
reason for the delay is the recent clash between the Navy and the Air Force 
over Navy admission that it may not reach the 104 EA-6B Primary Aircraft 
Inventory by the October 1, 1997 deadline as required in the Memorandum of 
Agreement. 55 However, other aspects of the consolidation have progressed 
steadily, while others have actually advanced well beyond the established 
timeline. This section will discuss developments from April 1996 to date to 
provide the status of the consolidation up to the completion of this thesis. 
54 Interview with Lt Colonel Ronald Rivard, USAF, August 8, 1996. 
55 Holzer, Robert, ''U.S. Air Force Slams Navy EW Progress; Claims Inaction 
Could Waste $133 Million," Defense News, 11:26, July 1-7, 1996, p. 1. 
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1. Joint-Service Expeditionary Squadron Establishment 
Timeline and Progress 
The original timeline for establishment or "standing-up" of the joint 
squadrons was identified in July 1995. The timetable was as follows:56 
Squadron 
V AQ-134 "Garrudas" 
V AQ-133 ''Wizards" 
V AQ-137 "Rooks" 
VAQ-142 "Grim Watchdogs" 







This schedule experienced many revisions agreed upon by the Air Force 
which pushed forward establishment of each squadron considerably. However, 
the Navy returned to the original schedule and V AQ-134 was re-established as 
the first Joint-Service Expeditionary Squadron in October of 1995. VAQ-133 
was commissioned in March, 1996 prior to the distribution of the Memorandum 
of Agreement and one month ahead of schedule. Plans are presently underway 
for VAQ-137 to activate in October 1996. In a change from the original plan of 
action, the "Rooks" will replace the Marine Corps EA-6B squadron currently 
attached to the USS GEORGE WASHINGTON Carrier Air Wing as a fleet 
squadron. The Marine Squadron will consequently be made available for 
deployment in support of USAF contingency operations. 57 
V AQ-134 has recently deployed to MCAS Iwakuni, Japan for a six 
month tour. The Marine Corps has subsequently provided their EA-6Bs for 
56 COMVAQWINGPAC message to COMNAVAIRPAC, dated July 17, 1995. 
57 Interview with Lt Col Rivard, August 8, 1996. 
118 
operations in support of Operation Joint Endeavor at Aviano Air Base, Italy. 
The V AQ-134 deployment is significant since the squadron was not originally 
intended for operational deployment until late June 1997. VAQ-133 is slated to 
relieve the "Garrudas" at MCAS Iwakuni, in late November 1996--nearly two 
years ahead of schedule. According to Lieutenant Colonel Ronald Rivard, the 
current USAF liaison officer at COMVAQWINGPAC, the remaining two joint 
squadrons, VAQ-142 and VAQ-128, are still expected to stand-up on time. 
2. USAF Aircrew Integration and Deployment 
The training of Air Force pilots and Electronic Countermeasures 
Officers has been touted by some as an enormous success. 58 The first crew of 
Air Force officers graduated from the training program at V AQ-129 on June 6, 
1996. These officers have been assigned to VAQ-133 and will deploy with the 
squadron in late 1996. One of the officers, an Air Force Major, is currently 
filling the position of Assistant Operations Officer for the "Wizards" and is 
expected to assume the duties of Operations Officer-a department head 
billet-in the near future. The other officers, Captains, have been assigned to 
various 0-3 level billets within the squadron including the Electronic Warfare 
department. 59 The next graduating class of USAF aircrew will be assigned to 
VAQ-134. Current plans are for the next field grade officer to be assigned as a 
"plank owner," an original member of the squadron, with VAQ-142. This officer 
will be instrumental in the pre-commissioning aspects of establishing a new 
58 "Combined USN/USAF EA-6B Training Program Successful," Air Force 
News Service, May 29, 1996. 
59 Interview with Lt Col Rivard, August 8, 1996. 
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unit. As per the Memorandum of Agreement, all USAF officers assigned to the 
joint squadrons will be given equal opportunities to hold any billet within the 
command. 
On July 1, 1996, an EA-6B Prowler piloted and manned entirely by Air 
Force aviators, landed on the aircraft carrier, USS CONSTELLATION (CV-
64). Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Shalikashvili praised 
the Navy and Air Force cooperation at NAS Whidbey Island which made the 
event possible. 60 
3. Air Force Interoperability Issues 
There are two major milestones towards integration of Navy managed 
EA-6B squadrons into Air Force operations. The first milestone, outlined in the 
MOA is to integrate the joint squadrons into the Air Force Force Generation 
Plans. This milestone is required to be completed by the end of fiscal year 1996. 
This phase of the consolidation is well on-track and expected to be completed 
by the deadline. Another phase of interoperability that was not specified in the 
MOA is integration of the joint squadrons into the Air Force Time-Phase Force 
Deployment (TPFD) plan. This plan specifies logistical requirements that 
determine precedence and airlift considerations for Air Force deployments to 
forward areas. An air force enlisted logistician has been assigned to the 
COMVAQWINGPAC joint operations staff to address this difficult problem.61 
60 Watkins, Steven, "Air Force Crew Makes History," Air Force Times, 57:3, 
August 19, 1996, p. 13. 
61 Interview with J. Bejarano, Tech Sergeant, USAF, Logistics Journeyman, 
COMVAQWINGPAC Joint Operations Staff, NAS Whidbey Island, April17, 1996. 
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Again, progress is being made and integration into the TPFD is nearing 
completion. The "J-Prowler'' joint doctrine and tactics publication, also required 
by the MOA is also on schedule and nearing completion. 
4. Funding Problems with Establishment of VAQ-128 
In early July 1996, Air Force Chief of Staff General Ronald Fogleman 
sent a memorandum to General Shalikashvili indicating his concern that the 
Navy was not placing high enough funding priority on fielding the last five of 
the 104 EA-6B PAI.62 Concern over the inventory shortfall was identified when 
the Navy fiscal year 1998 Program Objective Memorandum submission did 
not include funding for the last four aircraft to be assigned to V AQ-128. 63 
According to Rear Admiral John Luecke, Director of Strategy and Policy on the 
CNO staff, the funding shortfall of approximately $136 million occurred 
because the initial transfer of $500 million from the Air Force to the Navy was 
insufficient to field the 20 aircraft agreed upon. 64 Air Force officials requested a 
Joint Staff "tank session" to include the Air Force Staff and Navy staff to 
resolve the problem, threatening to delay retirement of the remaining 12 EF-
62 Fulghum, David A., "Bosnia EW Coverage May Suffer From Rift," Aviation 
Week and Space Technology, 145:4, p. 29, July, 22, 1996. 
63 Holzer, p. 1. 
64 Holzer, Robert, "Navy: EA-6B Program is Ahead of Schedule," Defense News, 
11:28, July 15-21, 1996, p. 8. 
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111s through the end of fiscal year 1999.65 The estimated cost of depot 
maintenance and operations for the Raven service extension was estimated 
between $103 and $133 million dollars.66 
In late July, Paul Kaminski, Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition 
and Technology, directed the Navy to reexamine its funding priorities for the 
Prowler. In a July 23, 1996 memorandum to the Office of the CNO, Mr. 
Kaminski stated: 
With the EA-6B becoming the department's sole support 
jamming platform in 1999, I believe a review is necessary to 
ensure a solid program is in place to maintain the readiness of the 
EA-6B and to upgrade its warfighting capabilities to counter the 
current and projected threats.67 
On August 7, 1996, the issue was apparently resolved when the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff assured General Fogleman that the funding problem 
for the final four aircraft would be resolved and directed the Chief of Staff to 
stop all plans for extending the Raven retirement deadline.68 The Navy is 
currently exploring funding solutions to be submitted for budget consideration 
in the fiscal year 1998 Navy budget. COMVAQWINGPAC has submitted a 
"facts and justification" message to the CNO via COMNAVAIRPAC 
65Fulghum. 
66 Holzer, "U.S. Air Force Slams Navy EW Progress." 
67 Holzer, Robert, "Kaminski Joins U.S. Navy-Air Force Spat Over EA-6B," 
Defense News, 11:30, July 29-August 4, 1996, p. 6. 
68 "US Navy Prowlers Will be Funded, USAF Told," Janes Defence Weekly, 26:6, 
August 7, 1996, p. 5. 
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requesting approval to continue with establishment of V AQ-128 in October 
1997 as planned. 69 
An unfortunate side-effect of this funding problem is to cast doubt on 
whether the Navy is capable of fulfilling the obligations set forth in the 
Memorandum of Agreement and whether the Navy is placing sufficient 
emphasis on upgrading the Prowler to meet future threats. 70 
E. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter provided a case study of a significant example of mission 
consolidation initiated since the beginning of the defense drawdown, the 
assumption of the electronic warfare mission for the entire Department of 
Defense by the U.S. Navy EA-6B Prowler. Historical review revealed 
increasing interest and developments in electronic warfare during the late 
1960s as U.S. air forces suffered substantial losses to enemy surface-to-air 
missiles and radar guided anti-aircraft artillery in Vietnam. The first modem, 
dedicated tactical jamming aircraft was the Navy Prowler followed nearly a 
decade later by the Air Force EF-111 Raven. 
The role of electronic combat in air warfare was significantly enhanced 
by the enormous success of both aircraft during Operation Desert Storm in 
1991. However, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the end of the Cold War 
69 Interview with Lt Col Rivard, August 8, 1996. 
70 Ibid. 
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saw the beginning of the largest drawdown in U.S. military spending in fifty 
years as lawmakers sought the benefits of a "peace dividend." As a result of 
decreased funding and the need for costly system and structural upgrades, the 
Air Force decided to retire the EF-111 from service and rely on the Navy 
Prowler for its electronic warfare needs. Program Budget Decisions 752 and 
753 officially sealed the fate of the Raven when funding for the EF-111 was 
reprogrammed to the Navy for expansion and enhancement of the EA-6B fleet. 
After nearly a year of planning and negotiating, the final composition 
and size of the new Joint-Service Expeditionary Squadrons was agreed upon by 
Defense Resources Board, Navy and Air force. Without specific direction from 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Current Operations Staff of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff Operations Directorate (J33), began the process of 
planning and organizing the consolidation of the JSEAD mission. Several 
concept of operations meetings considered many options for implementing the 
plan. These options ranged from USAF ownership and operation of EA-6Bs to 
joint manning of Navy-managed squadrons. After independent studies were 
conducted by the Air Force Air Combat Command and a General Officer 
Steering Group led by the Joint Staff Force Structure, Resources and 
Assessment Directorate (J8), the decision to establish five joint-service EA-6B 
squadrons manned by both Air Force and Navy aircrew, but owned and 
operated solely by the Navy, was submitted to the Secretary of Defense for 
approval and funding. 
In March 1996 a Memorandum of Agreement between the Joint Staff, 
the Navy, Marine Corps and the Air Force detailed specific relationships and a 
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plan of action and milestones required for the consolidation of the electronic 
warfare mission. The three main issues addressed by the MOA were operations 
and training, integration of USAF aircrew, and tactical employment 
considerations for the EA-6B the joint arena. While the MOA remains to be 
approved, the EA-6B community supported by the Air Force and Joint Staff 
has continued with the process of consolidations with enormous success. 
A perceived lack of commitment of the Navy by the Air Force 
threatened to derail the entire process during July 1996, however intervention 
by OSD and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs reemphasized the need to 
continue with the plan of action and funding requirements that would facilitate 
the retirement of the EF-111 in fiscal year 1997 and the assumption of the 
JSEAD mission by the Prowler. 
The consolidation of the Air Force and Navy electronic warfare mission 
has not been easy. However, given the historical parochialism and fierce 
protection of individual service role and missions in previous decades, the 
overall consolidation efforts may be viewed as successful. Interservice friction 
similar to the Revolt of the Admirals, though a possibility, was avoided. 
Integration of Air Force pilots and Electronic Countermeasures Officers into 
traditionally all-Navy training, aircraft and squadrons may serve as a model 
for future consolidations. As stated by Lieutenant Colonel Ronald Rivard, the 
Joint Operations and Liaison Officer attached to the Navy's Electronic 
Combat Wing: 
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Our success or failure of the jamming consolidation may well 
prove to be a fore-runner of similar efforts ... The deployment of 
V AQ-134 and the first graduating [Air Force] aircrew are the first 
of many benchmarks we anticipate setting with this joint 
venture.71 
However, the process of consolidation is far from over and many hurdles must 
still be negotiated. Issues of logistics, funding and readiness are still concerns 
and will be addressed in the following chapter. 
71 Air Force News Service. 
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V. PROMISE AND PITFALLS: ISSUES OF LOGISTICS, FUNDING 
AND READINESS 
The previous chapter analyzed the baseline plan of action for 
consolidating the joint electronic warfare mission under the "ownership" of the 
U.S. Navy. This study will now focus on the key elements of "winning the 
mission." These are logistics, funding and their implications for the readiness of 
the sole source of tactical airborne electronic combat in the military. 
The chapter is divided into four areas. The first section will address the 
new logistical requirements faced by the joint-service squadrons as they plan 
for land-based contingency operations. Section B will analyze the funding 
issues associated with the peculiar mission requirements of the new 
contingency squadrons, focusing on the Navy Flight Hour Program (FHP). 
Congressional action on the EA-6B for the fiscal year 1997 defense budget will 
also be discussed. Section C will address how the elements of logistics and 
funding will affect electronic attack readiness at the service level. Additionally, 
PERSTEMPO effects on readiness will be discussed in light of the findings in a 
recently published General Accounting Office (GAO) report. Finally, summary 
and concluding remarks will be presented. 
A LAND-BASED JOINT OPERATIONS: A RE-EVALUATION OF 
LOGISTICS SUPPORT 
Logistics is critical to any weapon system and is required by DOD 
acquisition directives to be considered at the earliest stages of weapon system 
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acquisition. I Planning and managing the logistical aspects of a weapon system 
over its entire life cycle from initial concept to disposal is accomplished through 
a process known as Integrated Logistics Support (ILS).2 ILS is defined by the 
Department of Defense as: 
A composite of all the support considerations necessary to assure 
the effective and economical support of a system for its life cycle. 
It is an integral part of all other aspects of system acquisition and 
operation. 3 
Integrated Logistics Support is composed of two distinct phases. Phase I 
covers aspects of logistical planning and management that are performed 
during the acquisition of a weapon system, prior to its delivery to the end user. 
Phase II considers every aspect of logistics after the weapons system has 
been fielded and is in operational use. 4 Phase I for the EA-6B ended in the early 
1970s when the Prowler was introduced to the fleet. However, Phase II has 
continually evolved as evidenced by the numerous upgrades to the airframe 
and its system as well as its adaptation to the constantly expanding 
environment of carrier aviation. 
1 Green, Linda L., Logistics Engineering, New York, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 
1991, p. 1. 
2 Although the term "Integrated Logistics Support" has been replaced in the 
new DOD Directive 5000 series (March 15, 1996) by the term "Support Elements," 
ILS will be used in this thesis to maintain congruence with referenced texts. 
3 From the Joint Electronic Library, via the world wide web, located at: 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel. 
4 Jones, James V., Integrated Logistics Support Handbook, Blue Ridge 
Summit, Pennsylvania, TAB Professional and Reference Books, 1987, pp. 4-5. 
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With the consolidation of the electronic warfare mission, the mission 
environment has also changed. The Prowler and its support functions will now 
be required to operate for extended periods of time away from its primary 
logistics support providers, the aircraft carrier and carrier air wing. This 
change requires that certain elements of ILS be re-evaluated to ensure that 
the EA-6B operates effectively in its new role. 
Integrated Logistics support is composed of ten to twelve specific 
elements depending on the reference source. The number of elements is not as 
important as the need to identify all aspects of logistics support. Green (1991) 
identifies twelve elements of logistics essential to the successful support of a 
weapons system as: 
• Maintenance Planning 
• Manpower & Personnel 
• Supply Support 
• Facilities 
• Training and Training Devices 
• Support and Test Equipment 
• Transportation 
• Standardization and Interoperability 
• Handling and Storage 
• Technical Data 
• Computer Resources 
• Design Influence 5 
5 Green, pp. 9-19. 
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Every element of Integrated Logistic Support is effected by the 
changing mission environment of the joint-service EA-6Bs. The first eight: 
Maintenance Planning, Manpower and Personnel, Supply Support, Facilities, 
Training and Training Devices, Support Equipment, Transportation, and 
Standardization and Interoperability, will experience the most significant 
evolutions from their current configuration. Handling and Storage, Technical 
Data, and Computer Resources will also require re-evaluation but their impact 
will not be as dramatic. Analysis of Design Influence factors will be necessary 
in the current and planned system and aircraft upgrades to the entire Prowler 
fleet, but are beyond the scope of this study. 
Since the objective of the Joint-Service Expeditionary Squadrons is to 
support the requirements of the Air Force and CINCs in land-based MRCs, 
contingency and peace-keeping operations, analysis of the requisite changes to 
ILS will concentrate in that area. Currently, the Air Force is engaged in three 
forward deployed peace-keeping/airspace control operations. Electronic 
warfare assets are based at Aviano Air Base, Italy in support of Operation 
Deny Flight/Joint Endeavor in Bosnia, Incirlik Air Force Base, Turkey in 
support of Operation Provide Comfort in northem Iraq, and Dhahran Air Base, 
Saudi Arabia in support of Operation Southern Watch in southern Iraq. Re-
evaluation of ILS elements is based on informal site surveys conducted at 
Incirlik and Dhahran Air Bases by representatives of the Prowler community 
in March 1995. Additionally, ILS requirements for Aviano Air Base will be 
determined from a post-deployment report filed by VAQ-130 in February, 
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1995.6 Each location offers different levels of support and infrastructure. In 
most cases, Incirlik, a large, well established and permanent Air Force Base 
offered the most complete levels of logistic support, while Aviano and Dhahran 
were considerably less capable due to their size and/or non-permanent status. 7 
The following evaluation addresses concerns in anticipation of a "worst case" 
scenario where logistics support for the EA-6B is not immediately available. 
Additionally, because MCAS Iwakuni (where the first two joint-service 
squadrons V AQ-134 and -133 are being deployed) has supported Marine 
EA-6B assets for many years, ILS requirements at that base have not been 
considered. It should be noted that Marine Corps corporate knowledge in land-
based operations is being used in planning for many ILS evaluations.s 
1. Maintenance Planning 
The Maintenance Planning element of ILS addresses the process 
conducted to develop and implement maintenance concepts and requirements 
for the system's life cycle.9 When the Prowler was first. developed, the 
maintenance concept was designed to include unique maintenance 
requirements associated with carrier operations such as stresses involved in 
catapult launches and arrested landings, and maintenance evolutions being 
6 Sources: ''VAQ-130 Detachment 1 Report," dated February 2, 1995; "Incirlik 
Air Force Base Site Survey," dated March 17, 1995; and "EA-6B Dhahran Bed Down 
Site Survey Results," message from VAQ-131 dated March 28, 1995. 
71bid. 
s Interview with Lt Col Ronald Rivard, USAF, March 26, 1996. 
9 Green, p. 12. 
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performed in cramped spaces on rolling seas. The maintenance plan must be 
re-evaluated for extended shore-based operations where these elements of 
maintaining aircraft are not as significant. However, other maintenance 
factors take on considerably more weight. For instance, normal carrier-based 
flight cycles are between one and three hours in duration. Shore-based 
requirements at the three sites surveyed can be as long as six to eight hours. 
Prowlers assigned to USAF contingency operations will be expected to support 
a significantly larger number of strike aircraft and evolutions, thereby 
increasing the total number of daily flights for each aircraft. Not only will this 
increase the quantity of maintenance required by each aircraft, but it will 
drastically reduce the availability of these aircraft for preventative and 
corrective maintenance evolutions. Maintenance regulations differ between the 
two services also. What might be acceptable for Air Force units may be 
specifically against Navy procedures such as aircraft "tie down" procedures 
during high power "turns" for engine maintenance.IO 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Air Force uses two levels of 
maintenance (Operational and Depot) while the Navy uses three levels of 
maintenance. The intermediate level of maintenance is supplied by the carrier 
Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department (AIMD) when deployed with 
the air wing. Without the carrier, the EA-6B squadrons will have to supply 
their own intermediate level maintenance facilities. Due to the age of the 
Prowler and the original maintenance concept during Phase I of ILS, 
10 Incirlik site survey and Aviano Detachment Report. 
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elimination of intermediate level maintenance is not possible.ll The Marine 
Corps has used mobile Intermediate Maintenance Activity (IMA) "vans" to 
provide intermediate level support for many years, however, their vans are 
necessary for supporting Marine Prowler squadrons and are not available for 
permanent loan to the joint squadrons. Fortunately, funding has been 
programmed for the acquisition of three sets of IMA vans for the joint 
squadrons. However, this is going to require additional personnel with the 
required intermediate level training. 
2. Manpower and Personnel 
This aspect of ILS deals with the identification and selection of 
operations and maintenance personnel with specified skills to operate and 
maintain the weapon system over its life cycle.12 This element also includes 
properly equipping these personnel to fulfill their assigned functions. This 
aspect of ILS has been extremely difficult to meet as the establishment of the 
joint-service squadrons was initiated during the reduction in force resulting 
from the post-Cold War defense drawdown.13 The Memorandum of Agreement 
highlighted specific requirements for the manning of the joint squadrons. Each 
squadron is required to have at least one crew of Air Force aviators. 
Additionally, maintenance personnel for the joint squadrons will be Navy 
11 Electronic Warfare Associates, "Q and A for Assumption of Air Force 
Mission," untitled facsimile dated March 22, 1995. 
12 Green, p. 13. 
13 Interview with Kenneth Scruggs, LCDR, USN, Joint Operations Manning 
Requirements, COMVAQWINGPAC, NAS Whidbey Island, March 29, 1996. 
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enlisted and non-commissioned officers. While this will provide many beneficial 
results such as ease of integration into Air Force operations, the mixture of 
Navy and Air Force personnel may result in other administrative and 
organizational difficulties. Responsibility for handling administrative matters 
such as annual "fitness reports" for Air Force officers must be addressed. Also, 
temporarily assigned duties to areas such as base/flight-line security, food 
services and base infrastructure for enlisted personnel must be considered and 
planned. 
Equipment and uniform requirements are different for shore-based and 
shipboard operations. While the necessity for "float-coat" life preservers will 
not be an issue, chemical warfare gear and damage control equipment are 
drastically different between the two environments. Aircrew flight equipment is 
also disparate between the services. All Air Force aircrew must be outfitted 
with Navy flight harnesses, survival vests and "G-suits" that may not 
integrate well with land-based chemical warfare clothing requirements.14 
3. Supply Support 
Supply support encompasses all management activities involved in 
determining the acquisition, storage, issue and disposal of secondary items.15 
This includes providing for initial procurement and replenishment of supplies. 
This is an area that will require extensive re-evaluation as the joint-squadrons 
deploy to Air Force dominated installations. Without aircraft carrier aviation 
14 Interview with Lt Col Ronald Rivard, USAF, March 26, 1996. 
15 Green, p.14. 
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supply departments, the joint squadrons will be disconnected from their normal 
logistics pipeline. All three locations considered the use of the NAS Sigonella, 
Sicily supply pipeline as advantageous to supply support considerations. The 
Air Force on the other hand, relies on multiple logistics flights each week that 
originate from Dover Air Force Base, Delaware to provide supply support and 
replenishment. Without the aircraft carrier to support their supply needs, the 
joint squadrons will most likely be forced to rely on a combination of larger 
initial supply load-outs when they deploy, and initiating logistics flights from 
either NAS Whidbey Island to Dover AFB or from Mchord AFB (near Whidbey 
Island) to Dover. If naval supply resources are located within the area, there 
may also be the opportunity to tap into their supply pipeline as is the case 
with NAS Sigonella. 
Another concern not often associated with the shipboard environment is 
customs. Regular replenishment from support/supply ships precludes the need 
for customs. However, each host nation has different requirements for bringing 
supplies and equipment into the country. This factor is further complicated 
when dealing with ordnance and hazardous materials. 
Another area that must be evaluated is the accounting systems that 
the Navy and Air Force use for supplies. The Incirlik site survey team 
recommended the conversion of Navy Stock Numbers (NSNs) to the Air Force 
equivalent, if possible, in order to integrate the Navy and Air Force supply 
pipelines for common items. Another problem identified by the VAQ-130 
detachment to Aviano was the inability for the Navy squadron to establish fuel 
accounts at the Air Force installations due to incompatible systems. Instead, 
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V AQ-130 used "fuel cards" which are a type of debit card to purchase fuel from 
the Air Force. Although this provided a means of purchasing fuel, it is also 
labor and paperwork intensive. 
4. Facilities 
Facilities include the permanent or temporary real property assets 
necessary to support the weapon system and associated support functions 
and personnel. Facilities management focuses on determination of types of 
facilities, required improvements, space and environmental concerns, and 
equipment.16 This has been a major concern since the beginning of the 
consolidation process. Each site provided different levels of suitability and 
availability of facilities from maintenance hangers and supply storage facilities 
to operations and administrative spaces to billeting for aircrew and 
maintenance personnel. As with the carrier environment, space and facilities 
are at a premium, but in different ways. Shipboard, the efficient use of facilities 
is a must, and every function of a squadron is assigned a space to perform their 
specific duties based on physical space needs. The same holds true for Air 
Force installations, however, weather, distance and host-nation restrictions 
play an additional role in the allocation of facilities. Furthermore, internal and 
external security concerns are far less critical for a ship at sea. With a mission 
that deals heavily with Top Secret and compartmentalized information, the 
joint squadrons are faced with ensuring that adequate security is available for 
mission support systems, classified publications and software. 
16 Ibid., p. 17. 
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Aircraft carriers are often likened to "floating cities" that produce their 
own electricity, potable water, food and lodging. Production and medica1/dental 
facilities are also within the confines of the "city." This does not necessarily 
hold true for shore-based installations. Each location has varying assets in 
terms of these functions. Availability of mission critical production facilities 
such as hydraulic, avionics, ordnance and airframe "shops" depend of the 
degree of commonality between the services. Because of the afore-mentioned 
lack of an intermediate level maintenance support function, many of the 
services Navy squadrons are used to are simply not available. These shortfalls 
must be identified early and procedures, equipment and mobile facilities must 
be in place to fill in the gaps. 
5. Training and Training Devices 
This element of ILS applies to the processes, procedures, techniques, 
training devices, and equipment necessary to properly train personnel to 
operate and maintain a weapon system. Most of the training facilities and 
devices will not be affected by the addition of the joint-service squadrons since 
the infrastructure at NAS Whidbey Island is capable of supporting the 
increased requirements generated by five new units. The Fleet Replacement 
Squadron (FRS) has been augmented with additional aircraft and instructors 
to meet the expanded maintenance and operational training requirements. 
However, with the expanded mission environment created by the 
mission consolidation, several areas of training must be implemented or re-
evaluated to accommodate the change. As previously mentioned, chemical and 
biological warfare training and equipment will become of greater concem as the 
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Navy squadrons deploy to Air Force installations. Air Force personnel are 
routinely trained in this area, but Navy personnel do not normally train to this 
requirement outside normal General Quarters training. All air crew in the joint 
squadrons will be required to maintain carrier qualifications per the 
Memorandum of Agreement. This will be difficult to integrate into a training 
schedule that will also demand more Air Force specific training such as the Air 
Force "Red Flag'' exercise at Nellis AFB, Nevada. Other training evolutions 
such as low-level flight and night field carrier landing practice (FCLP) are 
subject to host nation restrictions at different locations such as Incirlik.17 
Other training requirements result from forward deployment to foreign 
countries. As noted in the previous section, facilities are often separated by 
considerable distance and require ground transportation. Drivers for these 
vehicles are provided organically from within the unit. This requires many 
personnel to receive armed forces drivers licenses from the host nation. Some 
locations such as Aviano require that special licenses be issued for buses, 
heavy trucks and forklifts. All these licenses require additional training and 
expense in terms of Operations and Maintenance funds as well as time. 
Ordnance training for Aviation Ordnancemen in the joint squadrons will have to 
be expanded to include assembly of HARM missiles (an intermediate level 
maintenance skill) since missiles are delivered to Incirlik and Dhahran in 
"coffin" containers and require further assembly prior to loading. Shipboard, 
missiles are assembled by the AIMD ordnance personnel when required. 
17 See: Incirlik site survey. 
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Additionally, the Navy and Air Force have different certification requirements 
for personnel authorized to handle ordnance. A method of equating the two 
systems must be identified and implemented. 
6. Support Equipment 
Support equipment (SE) includes all equipment (mobile or fixed) required 
to support the operation and maintenance of a weapon system. This includes 
equipment starting units, tools, calibration and test equipment. IS Many of the 
SE assets used by the Navy and Air Force are compatible such as HARM 
missile test sets, avionics cooling units, and high pressure air ''blowers" for 
starting aircraft engines. Others, such as electrical power units for starting 
aircraft and supplying ground power to avionics, are not directly compatible 
but can be fitted with adapters for compatibility. However, there are still many 
other forms of SE such as aircraft tire and engine maintenance stands that 
are not available. All three reports from the proposed sites suggested using 
NAS Sigonella as sources for Navy SE, but sources of support equipment 
must be identified for contingency operations outside of Navy specific pipelines. 
Additionally, there are certainly limits to the level of support and quantity of 
SE that can be provided by installations like Sigonella. Another concern is 
maintenance of support equipment. Standard Navy EA-6B squadrons do not 
normally have personnel trained or certified to perform preventive and 
corrective maintenance on support equipment. This requirement will add to the 
manpower and training elements of integrated logistics support. 
18 Green, p. 14. 
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7. Transportation 
This element of ILS focuses on required modes and capacity of various 
forms of transportation for the weapon system, supplies, support equipment 
and personnel.19 This is a considerable departure from standard Navy logistical 
considerations. Normally, when an EA-6B squadron deploys with its Carrier 
Air Wing (CVW), supplies, support personnel and excess aircrew are airlifted to 
the port facility where the carrier is based and simply ''walk on." The aircraft 
wait until the carrier is at sea and fly aboard. Once the air wing is assembled 
on the carrier, the ship deploys to its designated station as an entire unit. With 
shore-based squadrons, the process of deploying the unit to its "station" must 
be done through airlifts using Air Force Air Mobility Command transports and 
"TransPac/Lant" flights for the aircraft supported by Air Force KC-135 and/or 
KC-10 airborne refueling aircraft configured for Navy aircraft. This method 
has several implications. First, the amount of supplies and support equipment 
must meet very exact standards as outlined by the Air Force Time Phased 
Force Deployment (TPFD) plans. Deviation from these standards can result in 
essential supplies and equipment being left behind for up to 30 days.2o This 
also implies that the amount of equipment and supplies in initial deployment 
may be severely limited. Finally, there is the costly, exhaustive and 
maintenance intensive trans-oceanic flight to the deployment area. When 
aircraft finally arrive at the installation they will undoubtedly require 
19 Ibid., p. 18. 
20 Interview with Tech Sergeant J. Bejarano, USAF, April17, 1996. 
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significant down time for corrective maintenance. Fortunately, the Air Force is 
well versed in these evolutions and personnel are already involved in 
integrating the new squadrons into the TPFD and Force Generation Plans. The 
ILS element of Packaging and Handling, which includes the resources, 
processes, procedures, and methods required to ensure the system and supply 
support are handled and stored properly, will also be re-evaluated as part of 
this process.21 
8. Standardization and lnteroperability 
This aspect of Integrated Logistics Support applies to many of the 
elements listed above and also ensures that the weapon system fits within 
established parameters for effective operation, employment and 
maintenance.22 This element also applies to doctrinal and training issues. As 
outlined in the Memorandum of Agreement, steps are currently being taken to 
ensure that Air Force tactics and training are adapted to EA-6B capabilities 
and limitations. Additionally, a joint-employment doctrine is being developed to 
provide a common reference for both the Navy and Air Force to train around. 
The final two elements of Integrated Logistics Support are Technical 
Data, information in the form of publications, manuals, and schematics that 
aid in the proper operation, maintenance and support of a weapon system, and 
Computer Resources such the Tactical EA-6B Mission Planning System 
(TEAMS) and other mission support systems. Each of these elements can be 
21 Green, p. 18. 
22 Ibid., p. 19. 
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readily augmented from existing supplies or additional procurement of 
systems. Since they are Navy-specific items they must be included into supply 
support and transportation considerations. 
B. FUNDING AND THE JOINT SEAD MISSION 
Funding has been addressed throughout the past two chapters as a 
major issue in the consolidation of the electronic warfare mission. Indeed, the 
necessary re-evaluation of logistics support will add considerable expense to 
the funding requirements for the EA-6B. As identified in the case study, PBDs 
752 and 753 identified a major reprogramming of nearly $1.5 billion in budget 
authority away from the Air Force EF-111A program and slightly less than 
half that amount toward expanding the Navy EA-6B fleet. However, priorities 
within the Department of Defense and the Navy in particular led to a funding 
shortfall in the fiscal year 1998 budget submission for the final joint-service 
squadron, V AQ-128, that caused considerable concem within the Air Force. 
1. Concerns Over Funding Priorities Within the DOD 
As the Navy proceeds with its plans to assume the Joint Suppression of 
Enemy Air Defenses mission with the retirement of the EF-111A in fiscal year 
1998, some observers, including members of Congress and the General 
Accounting Office, believe that the Department of Defense is not placing a high 
142 
enough priority on funding the SEAD mission. 23 In an April 1996 report to 
Congress, the General Accounting Office asserted that, 
Despite its own analyses that show SEAD capabilities need to be 
improved, DOD has instead decided to place higher funding 
priority on other combat air power programs, such as the Air 
Force's F-22 aircraft.24 
It is also increasingly apparent that the Air Force acquiesced the electronic 
warfare mission in order to invest in more budget-rich emerging technologies. 
Mr. Clark Murdock, a deputy special assistant to the Air Force Chief of Staff 
said in an August, 1996 interview that General Fogleman, " ... wants to be clear 
on what's a sunrise system and what's a sunset system as he fights for 
dollars."25 Clearly, the nearly twenty-year old EF-111A qualifies as a "sunset" 
system. Still others allege that the Air Force Chief of Staff made the decision 
to retire the Raven specifically with, " ... the hope of saving money that could be 
used for other top priorities, especially the development of the F-22 fighter."26 
2. Congressional Budgetary Action 
In an effort to ensure that the Navy and the Defense Department 
attach the appropriate importance to the upgrade and expansion of the EA-6B 
23 Sperling, Michael, "Congress Urges U.S. Navy to Speed EA-6B Upgrade," 
Defense News, 11:31, August 5-11, 1996, p. 2. 
24 U.S. General Accounting Office, Combat Air Power: Funding Priority for 
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses May Be Too Low, GAO/NSIAD-96-128, 
Washington D.C., April, 1996. 
25 Breen, Tom, "Air Force Works to Prepare 'New Strategic Vision'," Defense 
Daily, 192:28, August 8, 1996, p. 218. 
26 Watkins, Steven, "USAF Defends Decision to Retire EF-111, F-4G Fleets," 
Defense News, 11:22, June 3-9, 1996, p. 33. 
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fleet, House and Senate Conferees on the fiscal year 1997 defense 
authorization, inserted language into the defense bill that threatens to transfer 
funds slated in 1996 for EA-6B modifications and upgrades to the Air Force for 
improvements to the remaining EF-111 fleet unless a plan of action for 
upgrading the planes is delivered by June, 1997.27 The fiscal year 1996 defense 
appropriation provided $165 million for EA-6B fleet enhancements. 
Congressional action on the fiscal year 1997 defense authorization adds 
additional proof that Congress intends to continue "urging'' the DOD to place 
priority on ensuring the Prowler is able to provide the necessary electronic 
warfare support for the military into the twentieth century. When the DOD 
submitted its fiscal year 1997 budget request, $101 million was slated for 
upgrades and modernization of the EA-6B fleet.28 However, on July 30, 1996, 
Senate and House negotiators delivered their 1997 fiscal year defense 
authorization conference report which included provisions for $201.6 million for 
EA-6B upgrades-a "plus up" of over $100 million.29 
3. The Navy Flying Hour Program 
Another area that must be addressed in regards to the funding of the 
Joint-Service Expeditionary Squadrons is the costs of constantly forward 
deploying these squadrons in support of contingency operations. Funding for 
27 Asker, James R., ed., "Use It or Lose It," Aviation Week and Space 
Technology, 145:7, August 12, 1996, p. 23. 
28 Towell, Pat, "Retrench Warfare Flares Anew Over Clinton's Budget," 
Congressional Quarterly, 54:10, March 9, 1996, p. 631. 
29 "Clinton Expected to Approve Defense Bill," Aerospace Daily, 179:22, August 
1, 1996, p. 1. 
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Naval Aviation units is performed and analyzed using the Navy Flying Hour 
Program (FHP). 
A considerable portion of the Navy EA-6B budget is administered by the 
COMNAVAIRPAC Force Comptroller through the Navy FHP. The most 
significant portion of the FHP is the Cost Per Flight Hour (CPH) which is the 
total cost of operating aircraft including fuel, parts, maintenance, etc. 30 Simply 
put, CPH is computed by summing the total cost of operating an aircraft type 
divided by the total number of hours flown. 31 The primary tool used by the 
comptroller in determining funding for different aircraft types is the Flying 
Hour Projection System OP-20 Report which provides a detailed breakdown of 
each aircraft by Type/Model/Series (TMS).32 Unfortunately this system 
seldom provides a realistic representation of the costs of operating and 
maintaining naval aircraft. The February, 1996 OP-20 report indicates a CPH 
of$2,783 for a current force complement of 40 EA-6Bs.33 However, the Official 
Flying Hour Cost Report for June 1996 indicates a cost of $3,245 per hour with 
30 McGarvey, Michael P.,"A Comparative Analysis of the Higher Costs Per 
Flight Hour Observed in Forward Deployed Navy Squadrons,"Masters Thesis, 
Monterey, California, Naval Postgraduate School, December, 1995, p. 7. 
3llbid. 
32 Interview with Jeffrey E. Malone, LT, USN, COMNAVAIRPAC Force 
Comptroller Division, Flying Hour Program Office, August 15, 1996. 
33 Flying Hour Projection System "OP-20 Report" versions 885 and 887, dated 
February 28, 1996. 
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a total force complement of 43.4 EA-6Bs.34 The discrepancy can be attributed 
to variables within the Flying Hour Projection System that do not account for 
certain costs associated with operating naval aircraft and lags reflected by 
new/refurbished aircraft procurement. 35 
In an analysis of increased costs per flight hour experienced by Navy 
squadrons forward deployed to Carrier Air Wing FIVE at Naval Air Facility 
Atsugi, Japan, Navy Lieutenant Michael McGarvey concluded that four major 
factors contributed to the increased costs of operating aviation units in a 
forward deployed status. Of those four, the two most significant cost variables 
were: (1) Logistics and Support and (2) Operational Tempo (0PrEMP0).36 A 
comparison of three separate CVW s was used in arriving at this conclusion 
including CVW 5. The other two air wings, CVWs 11 and 15, were based in the 
Continental United States (CONUS). The data used in the analysis covered 
similar deployment cycles experienced by the three air wings from November 
1992 to March 1994.37 Total CPH for the forward deployed EA-6B squadron, 
V AQ-136, was nearly three times that of the EA-6B squadrons in the CONUS-
34 COMNAVAIRPAC Force Comptroller, "Official Flying Hour Cost Report: 
June 1996," August 9, 1996. 
35 For a detailed analysis of the Navy Flying Hour Program, see: General 
Accounting Office, Naval Aviation: the Flying Hour Program's Budget and Execution, 
GAO/NSIAD-89-108, July, 1989. and Naval Audit Service, Fleet Readiness 
Squadrons Flying Hour Program, Audit Report 032-96, April 15, 1996. 
36 McGarvey, p. 43. 
37 Ibid., p. 19. 
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based squadrons. 38 Since the two primary explanations for this dramatic 
increase in cost per flight hour were logistics and OPTEMPO, it stands to 
reason that the joint-service squadrons will also experience higher costs per 
flight hour than their air wing affiliated counterparts for those same reasons. 
Obviously, cost per flight hour while home-based in Whidbey Island will 
more closely approximate the costs per flight hour of carrier-based squadrons 
while stationed in Whidbey Island. Additionally, current plans to rotate the 
joint squadrons through carrier deployments will further mitigate cost per flight 
hour at the squadron level. However, considering the elevated costs envisioned 
with increased logistics requirements for shore-based joint operations, it follows 
that costs per flight hour in the Prowler community will increase substantially. 
C. THE IMPACT OF MISSION CONSOLIDATION ON READINESS 
The most significant impacts on readiness can be described in terms of 
logistics and funding. The first section of this chapter discussed multiple issues 
of logistics that will have a direct affect on the readiness levels of the joint-
service EA-6B squadrons. If these squadrons do not have the benefit oflogistic 
support tailored to meet their needs in the joint arena, then their ability to 
support the CINCs requirements will be negatively affected due to reduced 
aircraft availability. 
Funding priority to ensure logistic support and aircraft system upgrades 
are also key to the successful accomplishment of this goal. However, critics 
38 Ibid., p. 28. 
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point out that even with improvements to the EA-6B, the elimination of the 
EF-111A will result in a 30 percent net loss in support-jamming aircraft which 
will negatively impact readiness in the electronic warfare arena.39 However, 
these critics fail to consider that the upgrades to the Prowler will make it a 
significantly more capable aircraft than the Raven, and that the joint 
squadrons can be augmented by aircraft and aircrew from CVW squadrons on 
shore rotation to NAS Whidbey Island. 40 They further argue that "interim" 
replacements for lethal SEAD (HARM delivery systems) are not as capable as 
the now retired F -4G Wild Weasel and will also have deleterious effects on the 
ability of U.S. forces to suppress enemy air defenses.41 The F-16 Falcons 
equipped with the Harm Targeting System (HTS) are not as capable as the F-
4G, but the EA-6B HARM employment capabilities are superb and are a 
"force multiplier" since the Raven does not have a lethal SEAD capability. 
Additionally, the EF-111 lacks the communications jamming ability of the 
Prowler.42 
39 Knowles and Lum, p. 46. 
40 The alleged 30 percent decrease is a rough estimate based on 16 EA-6Bs 
replacing the 24 Ravens that were in service at the time. With 20 EA-6Bs dedicated 
to the joint-service mission, that number is significantly smaller. Additionally, the 
total Raven inventory was 24 aircraft. With the establishment of the five joint-
service squadrons, total EA-6B aircraft inventory will be in excess of 120 Prowlers. 
41 Ibid., pp. 49-50. 
42 Letter from Commander, Electronic Combat Wing, U.S. Pacific Fleet to 
General John J. Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 29, 1996. 
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PERSTEMPO is another area that observers see as beginning to erode 
readiness in the electronic warfare mission. In April, 1996, the General 
Accounting Office presented a letter report to Congress entitled "Military 
Readiness: A Clear Policy Is Needed to Guide Management of Frequently 
Deployed Units." This report concluded that increased U.S. commitments to 
peace-keeping operations and enforcement of "No-Fly Zones" was having a 
detrimental effect on specialized units including EF-111 detachments in Bosnia 
and Saudi Arabia. 43 Although Status of Resources and Training System 
(SORTS) data report that overall unit readiness during the 1990s remained 
stable and at prescribed levels, the GAO indicated that this system, " ... does not 
capture all the factors that DOD considers critical to a comprehensive 
readiness analysis, such as operating tempo and personnel morale."44 Visits to 
units experiencing higher than normal deployment rates identified that morale 
and OPTEMPO were generally having a negative effect on readiness in those 
units. The report also allowed that the Air Force and Army do not enforce 
PERSTEMPO restrictions to the same degree as the Navy and Marine Corps 
which traditionally deploy at twice the rate of the other services. 45 Navy 
commitment to enforcing equitable PERSTEMPO may mitigate these 
disturbing findings. 
43 U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Readiness: A Clear Policy Is Needed 
to Guide Management of Frequently Deployed Units, Letter Report to Congress, 
GAO/NSIAD-96-105, April 8, 1996, pp. 2-3. 
44 Ibid., p. 3. 
45 Ibid., p. 1. 
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D. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter has identified key issues of logistics and funding and the 
impact that these elements in addition to deployment rates have on readiness. 
With the evolving mission environment brought about by the consolidation of 
the tactical airborne electronic warfare mission, re-evaluation of Phase II of 
Integrated Logistic Support is necessary to best meet the requirements of the 
Commanders in Chief of the Combatant Commands. The areas that are most 
critical to logistics support of the land-based squadrons are Maintenance 
Planning, Manpower and Personnel, Supply Support and Facilities. Proper 
advance planning is crucial to the success of these elements. Failure to ensure 
adequate support in these key areas will directly impact the ability of these 
units to fulfill their mission requirements, which in turn will affect the overall 
readiness of the units themselves. 
Funding for logistics and planned upgrades to the Prowler fleet must be 
given the highest priority. The Navy has risen to the challenge of assuming the 
JSEAD role, but without proper funding, the Defense Department may end up 
"snatching defeat from the jaws of victory." Additionally, funding levels as 
viewed through the Navy Flying Hour Program may be underestimating the 
cost of providing all DOD electronic warfare assets for future contingency and 
peace-keeping operations. A comparison of the increased logistics and 
OPTEMPO costs of EA-6B assets forward deployed to Japan indicated 
shortfalls in the estimation of cost per flight hour. 
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In addition to logistics and funding concerns, decreased readiness levels 
in remaining Air Force electronic warfare units have been linked to higher 
deployment rates. Although viewed with concern by the GAO, it is assumed 
that strict Navy policies concerning maximum PERSTEMPO rates can 
mitigate these perceived decreases in readiness. 
If the Navy is to successfully and smoothly assume the role as the sole 
provider of airborne electronic combat forces for the next decade, sincere and 
in-depth re-evaluation of key elements of Integrated Logistic Support must be 
conducted and implemented. Additionally, the Department of Defense and the 
Navy must give funding priority to expanding the EA-6B fleet and enhancing 
its warfighting capabilities. Threats from Congress to reprogram allocated 
funds back to the Air Force must not be taken lightly. By adhering to the 
directives included in the fiscal year 1997 Defense Authorization, the DOD can 





This thesis has sought to develop background to assess the implications 
of interservice rivalry, roles and missions, and mission consolidation for 
logistics, funding and readiness. Interservice rivalry has been a fact of life for 
the U.S. miliary since its beginning. With the introduction of air power, the 
establishment of the Air Force and the "unification" of the military 
departments under the Department of Defense, friction between the services 
has often had a crippling effect on service cooperation. The roles and missions 
of the armed forces are being readdressed as a result of the end of the Cold 
War. Roles and missions defined over fifty years ago are ill suited to meet the 
new geo-political environment created by the collapse of the Iron Curtain. 
The inability of the services to perform effectively and efficiently in 
combined operations led to the landmark Goldwater-Nichols Defense 
Reorganization Act of 1986. The Act further strengthened the power of the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and has pushed the Department of 
Defense, sometimes grudgingly, down the road to jointness. As with other 
periods in military history, Congress began to reduce in the size of the defense 
budget in light of the end of the Cold War in search of a "peace dividend." To 
alleviate some of the fiscal pressures of the declining defense budget, the DOD 
has begun consolidating many missions under a single service or platform. 
Complying with the recommendation of the Commission on Roles and Missions 
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of the Armed Forces, the Defense Department decided to retire the Air Force 
EF-lllA Raven aircraft and rely on the Navy to provide electronic combat 
support using the EA-6B Prowler. In order for the Navy to meet the 
requirements of the new mission known as Joint Suppression of Enemy Air 
Defenses (JSEAD), five new squadrons of Prowlers were established. The Joint-
Service Expeditionary Squadrons are the first truly joint tactical units to 
evolve from the Department of Defense trend toward jointness. Each squadron 
will have a compliment of Air Force aviators and will deploy to land-based sites 
operationally controlled by the regional Commander in Chief. 
The process of organizing and establishing the joint squadrons was 
difficult and often acrimonious. However, with positive direction from the Joint 
Staff (J33), the program is progressing steadily and squadrons are "standing-
up" and deploying well ahead of schedule. 
With consolidation comes the necessity for both services to change the 
manner in which they "do business." Of primary concern are how to handle 
logistical problems, and funding shortfalls while still preserving readiness. It is 
apparent from the analysis presented in the previous chapter that logistics 
cannot be accomplished within the constraints of either Navy or Air Force 
current modus operandi. New methods of operating and supporting the 
logistics chain must be devised. 
With defense dollars reduced, the DOD is being forced to do more with 
less. However, the adage of, "you've got to spend money to make money'' 
applies in this case. The Defense Department has chosen to consolidate the 
electronic warfare mission as a means of saving money while preserving 
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military ability to provide electronic "cover" for its strike assets. Funding must 
be made available to upgrade the EA-6B to enable the aircraft to meet CINC 
and Air Force requirements. Without a clear funding priority, the fleet will not 
receive critical enhancements to meet proliferating threats, and electronic 
combat readiness will suffer. 
Readiness will almost certainly be affected as the services move to 
arrange a suitable and effective logistics support plan for the joint-service 
squadrons. Additionally, PERSTEMPO for the joint squadrons will have to be 
closely monitored or readiness could suffer from the perspective of morale. 
B. AREAS FOR CONTINUED RESEARCH 
This thesis has developed nearly as many questions as it attempted to 
answer. This study concludes just as the first Joint-Service Expeditionary 
Squadron, VAQ-134, reaches the mid-way point in its initial deployment. 
Additionally, three more squadrons wait to be established. Therefore, areas for 
further research are numerous. Additional research in the following areas may 
prove beneficial: 
• How has the integration of Air Force personnel benefitted the Joint-
Service Expeditionary Squadrons in supporting land-based 
operations? Is there an opportunity or requirement to integrate 
enlisted maintenance and support personnel into the squadrons? 
Have interservice rivalries surfaced within the units? 
• What have been the positive or negative long-term effects to overall 
readiness with the consolidation of the JSEAD mission? Has 
PERSTEMPO remained in line with Navy objectives? 
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• What effect has the Navy assumption of the DOD electronic warfare 
support mission had on costs per flight hour for the EA-6B 
community? Are funding levels consistent with expanded mission 
requirements? 
• What innovations and paradigm shifts in logistics support of the 
joint-service squadrons have occurred? How has been the impact of 
the implementation of Intermediate Maintenance Activity vans on 
maintenance procedures? 
• The first two deployments of the joint-service squadrons were not in 
direct support of Air Force operations. What has been the outcome of 
subsequent deployments in direct support of Air Force operations? 
C. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This thesis focused on a case study of EA-6B Joint-Service 
Expeditionary Squadrons. The Navy has literally "won" the mission of 
electronic warfare support for the entire Department of Defense, yet nearly a 
year passed after the issuance of PBDs 752 and 753 before the Office of the 
Secretary of the Navy or the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations gave 
formal direction to Commander, Electronic Combat Wing Pacific Fleet to 
proceed with the establishment of five new joint-service squadrons. Had it not 
been for the proactive role played by the Joint Staff, specifically the 
Operations Directorate (J3) and the Force Structure, Resources and 
Assessment Directorate (J8), the entire program might have foundered until 
direct congressional action was taken. The role played by the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs and the Joint Staff is a significant example of the positive aspects 
of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Prior to the enactment of the reorganization 
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statute, the likelihood that the Joint Staff would have taken such proactive 
measures is doubtful. 
Interservice rivalry issues during the process of planning the 
consolidation were not as prevalent as one might have envisioned. In fact, 
interservice friction only occurred at the higher echelons of the services. When 
questioned about interservice rivalry at the operational level during interviews 
with the Operations Staff at COMVAQWINGPAC, a Navy Commander 
stated, "If you're looking for interservice rivalry, you're looking in the wrong 
place." In fact, intra-service rivalry was more of an obstacle for the "transition 
team" that headed the joint squadron establishment and long-range planning 
timeline as extensive negotiations between the Marine Corps and Navy were 
required to delineate roles and responsibilities. 
Although the overall consolidation of the electronic warfare mission and 
the establishment of the expeditionary squadrons can be viewed as a success, 
diligence must be taken to ensure that this remains a military operation. 
Congressional intervention of the process can be seen in the fiscal year 1997 
Defense Authorization. The joint command "nationalization" of the Prowler 
could still be an option if lawmakers are not confident in DOD progress. 
Funding priorities must be made clear if the JSEAD mission is to be 
successful. Observers are extremely concerned about the long term affects the 
merger will have on readiness and the ability of the EA-6B to provide adequate 
electronic defense for strike assets. Without enhanced capabilities the Prowler 
will be forced to fight the battles of tomorrow with technology of the past. 
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System incompatibilities plagued the services during the invasion of 
Grenada in 1983, and steps have been taken to eliminate many of the 
interoperability shortfalls identified. However, as indicated in Chapter V, many 
interoperability issues still remain unresolved as evidenced by the different 
logistics and accounting systems used by the Air Force and Navy. As the 
military continues to stress jointness, these systems must be made 
compatible or replaced with a single DOD-wide system. The Joint-Service 
Expeditionary Squadrons are likely to be the first of many consolidations in the 
future. Each will be unique, yet they will all have areas of similarity. Using the 
lessons learned from this venture could help to ensure a smoother transition. 
The push towards jointness is far from over. The goal is not a few missions or 
units jointly manned and operated, but four services that are dedicated to 
cooperating and coordinating their efforts to provide the most effective national 
defense. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Shalikashvili, 
U.S. Army, said in an August 7, 1996 interview: 
It isn't just the matter of whether an Air Force crew can land on a 
carrier. It is whether the services can be put together into a joint 
warfighting team and do so that at the end of this, you end up 
with more than just a sum of these parts. That's true jointness.l 
1 "General John J. Shalikashvili: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff," Army 
Times, 57:4, August 19, 1996, p. 4. 
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